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ABSTRACT 
In the Shadow of the Sea: the Destruction and Recovery of Zeeland, the Netherlands, 
1940-1948  
  
This study explores the wartime experiences of the rural Dutch province of 
Zeeland from the German invasion in May 1940 to 1948 by a close reading of Dutch 
newspapers as well as Dutch government and Allied sources. It seeks to contextualize the 
liberation of Zeeland in the autumn of 1944 by exploring both before and after the 
Second World War. It argues that the subdued reaction the Canadians received was a 
product of a very different understanding of the war for the citizens of Zeeland. Their 
experience was above all driven by geography, topography, confessionalism, as well as a 
very complex and unusual understanding of a war that dated back to 1914. Zeeland’s 
experience of neutrality during the First World War, as well as government responses to 
the post-war era and Depression of the 1930s created a precedent with which many would 
compare the experience of war a generation later. In many ways, the German occupation 
of Zeeland after May 1940 resembled the experience of neutrality after the outbreak of 
war in 1914. In both instances, the province was touched by war, but remained isolated 
by its economy, politics, and, culture. In that sense, the idea of liberation in the fall of 
1944 had a very different meaning, especially with the Allies’ flooding and sinking of 
Walcheren Island in early October. That event brought an unprecedented level of 
destruction that framed the local response to liberation, which lasted well beyond the 
conventional end of the war in 1945.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“The water came with a speed and force that they had not believed possible. After 
all, the dikes had always been around the island; no one could imagine their ever giving 
way,” wrote Dutch novelist A. den Doolaard in his 1948 book Roll Back the Sea.1 In it, 
den Doolaard described life on the island of Walcheren in autumn 1944. His version of 
the events of October 1944 said nothing of the joys of liberation, for the world in which 
den Doolaard inhabited had effectively been swept away by the sea. He recounted almost 
nothing about either the German occupation, or Allied liberation. Flooding and water 
took center stage. The war was peripheral. 
All of this is very curious when many Canadian accounts of liberation in the 
Netherlands, and elsewhere in Europe, celebrate the valiant efforts of Allied soldiers, and 
depict almost without exception Dutch women climbing onto vehicles and showering 
Allied soldiers with kisses.2 While this might be true for some parts of the Netherlands, it 
is not representative of the liberation experience for the entire country. Some Canadians 
noted the subdued reception they received when they crossed the Belgian border into the 
westernmost province of Zeeland. Reflecting on crossing into Zeeland in autumn 1944, 
Brigadier N.E. Rodger of 2 Canadian Corps noted that “the contrast with the flag-waving, 
bouquet-throwing, cheering dash across France from Normandy must have been pretty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A. den Doolaard, Roll Back the Sea trans. Barrows Mussey (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), 32. 
2 See for example official fact sheets provided by Veterans Affairs Canada, “The Liberation of the 
Netherlands,” accessed 10 June 2014 http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/second-world-
war/liberation-netherlands 
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tough for [the Canadians].”3 To what exactly was Rodger referring and how was the 
reaction to liberation any different across northwest Europe? 
This study explores the wartime experiences of the rural Dutch province of 
Zeeland from the German invasion in May 1940 to 1948 by a close reading of Dutch 
newspapers as well as Dutch government and Allied sources. It seeks to contextualize the 
liberation of Zeeland in the autumn of 1944 by exploring both before and after the 
Second World War. This study argues that the subdued reaction the Canadians received 
was a product of a very different understanding of the war for the citizens of Zeeland. 
Their experience was above all driven by geography, topography, confessionalism, as 
well as a very complex and unusual understanding of a war that dated back to 1914. 
Zeeland’s experience of neutrality during the First World War, as well as government 
responses to the post-war era and Depression of the 1930s created a precedent with which 
many would compare the experience of war a generation later. In many ways, the 
German occupation of Zeeland after May 1940 resembled the experience of neutrality 
after the outbreak of war in 1914. In both instances, the province was touched by war, but 
remained isolated by its economy, politics, and, culture. In that sense, the idea of 
liberation in the fall of 1944 had a very different meaning, especially with the Allies’ 
flooding and sinking of Walcheren Island in early October. That event brought an 
unprecedented level of destruction that framed the local response to liberation, which 
lasted well beyond the conventional end of the war in 1945. 
The time frame of the study goes well beyond the beginning and the end of the 
Second World War. For Canadian historians, 1945 marked the end to Canadian military 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) Historical Report No. 154, “Clearing the Scheldt Estuary and 
Opening the Port of Antwerp: Operations of First Canadian Army in North-West Europe, 1 Oct- 8 Nov 
1944 (Preliminary Report)” p. 10. 
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involvement and thus the end of the Second World War. Canada’s official historian, C.P. 
Stacey devoted less than one page to Civil Affairs and its role in the post-war world.4 The 
same trend can be found in popular histories written by journalist-cum-historian Mark 
Zuehlke and historian Michiel Horn.5 However, when approached from a European 
perspective, the periodization of the war is not so clear. Reconstruction and recovery 
efforts, the corollary of war, lasted well into the 1950s.  
Only recently have a few non-Canadian historians begun to appreciate the 
complexity of post-war recovery in Europe.6 Tony Judt undertook the monumental task 
of examining the European continent from 1945 to the late 1990s. Although the majority 
of the book is not germane to this study, Judt first traversed time and space to show how 
occupation and liberation had considerably affected the immediate post-war period, 
particularly as governments from the English Channel to the steppes of Asia sought to 
rehabilitate their people and economies. His third chapter identified some of the 
challenges to physical and economic rehabilitation, such as de-nazifying local and 
national governments. Central to his book is the idea that while 1945 certainly marked 
the end of the war, in practice it meant very little for governments seeking to rehabilitate 
their states. In other words, he underscored the importance of political, economic, and 
cultural developments following the war and how the post-war era shaped European 
identities well into the 1990s. While 1945 witnessed the end of unprecedented death and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. III The Victory 
Campaign: Operations in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960), 638. 
5 See for example, Mark Zuehlke’s Holding Juno: Canada’s Heroic Defence of the D-Day Beaches 
(Toronto: Douglas & McIntrye, 2005); David Kaufman & Michiel Horn, A Liberation Album: Canadians 
in the Netherlands, 1944-1945 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980).  
6 The two major studies are Tony Judt’s Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: Penguin 
Books, 2005) and Keith Lowe’s Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II (New York: 
Picador, 2012). 
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destruction, it did not begin with immediate prosperity.7 Keith Lowe has also tried to 
encapsulate many of the same challenges facing European governments following the 
defeat of Nazi Germany, paying particular attention to the themes of vengeance and 
ethnic cleansing in Eastern Europe.8 Using his father’s experience in Nazi-occupied 
Utrecht, journalist Ian Buruma has contributed to this literature by interweaving his 
family’s history into the broader context of destruction and post-war reconstruction in 
Europe. His book looked at how European societies or “civilizations” are put back 
together following such monumental change. Yet here, too, Buruma adopts the 
conventional periodization of the war, one in which 1945 remains an historical 
watershed.9 By contrast, the year 1945 is largely devoid of significance for the province 
of Zeeland. These are all valuable themes, many of which appear throughout the present 
study. To say that the province of Zeeland was deeply affected by post-war era politics on 
a national and international scale is to state the obvious. However, the pace at which 
rehabilitation and recovery could continue depended a great deal on national Dutch 
politics, as well as those of the Allied nations—both during and after the Second World 
War. In this way, my work seeks to resituate the chronology of liberation and 
reconstruction by exploring long-term continuity and change during the first half of the 
twentieth century in Zeeland. 
This study contributes to the existing literature on post-war life in Europe. It 
argues that while the population of Zeeland endured a lengthy occupation under the Nazi 
regime, a violent liberation, and massive destruction as a result of Allied and German 
operations, it proved accommodating to each phase of its wartime experience with a stoic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, 63ff. 
8 Lowe, Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II, 94. 
9 Ian Buruma, Year Zero: A History of 1945 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2013), 7. 
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and pragmatic commitment to survival, recovery, and regeneration. Furthermore, I argue 
that of all the political, economic, and cultural challenges the Zeeuwen faced during the 
first half of the twentieth century, Allied liberation was the most destructive and costly. It 
left an even more indelible print on the province than did Nazi occupation. Exploring the 
province’s experiences from 1900 to 1947 helps highlight this point. In both First and 
Second World Wars, many in the province emphasized the economic challenges of war 
as well as maintaining a distinct Dutch identity grounded in a communal and bureaucratic 
culture. There were many parallels in the experiences of the province during these 
decades. This manifested in various ways in 1919 and 1946. Following the Great War in 
1919, Zeeland fought off Belgian efforts to annex part of the province, while in 1946 the 
Dutch government sought to reclaim the Dutch empire and restore its pre-war 
international prestige. Additionally, the ways in which governments controlled and 
influenced the province during the Great War often resembled the benign occupation the 
Nazis imposed during the early 1940s. Exploring the economic pressures in the province 
during the Great War and the 1930s shows how German construction projects and other 
initiatives worked to assuage the financial troubles of the Depression and provided a 
certain degree of security for civilians in Zeeland. In other words, I argue that Zeeland’s 
negotiation with the twentieth century was a complicated process. Aside from 
maintaining a precarious neutral position during the Great War and governmental 
measures to alleviate the worst effects of the Depression in the 1930s, Zeeland had but 
few reference points with which to understand the upcoming occupation when the 
German army invaded in May 1940. This study, therefore, deals with an important and 
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pointed question: was it Nazi occupation or Allied liberation that really marked the 
breaking point in this region’s modern history?  
All of these events have had profound consequences on how the people of this 
region have come to remember the war. The memory of war, occupation, and liberation 
in Zeeland is not a collective one, but rather communalized over the various islands that 
make up the province. This communalization varies a great deal from one town to the 
next, and often diverges from the liberation narrative upheld by the Dutch government, 
one centered on the spring of 1945. In at least one museum that this study explores, 
Allied liberation in 1944 was the first time during the twentieth century that the Zeeuwen 
became victims on a large scale. This diversity in memory corresponds to the uneven 
contours of the liberation process. 
 This study also suggests that reconstruction in Zeeland was particularly 
challenging for both Dutch and Allied authorities. The Netherlands lacked a collective 
reference point in their memory related to war and reconstruction, while France and 
Belgium had experienced the destructive nature of modern warfare from 1914 to 1918. 
Their neutral status meant that the Netherlands navigated and evaded the most destructive 
period in modern European history. Because of their precarious experience in 
maintaining neutrality during the First World War Dutch civilians and politicians alike 
invested great currency in neutrality during the interwar years. Studying life in the 
province before 1939, therefore, underscores the permeating shock of occupation, war, 
destruction and reconstruction. 
Owing to the absence of this historical reference, before the war had ended the 
Dutch government authorized the establishment of the Militair Gezag (MG), or 
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Netherlands Military Authority, an institution which in many ways mirrored the mandate 
of Civil Affairs (CA), while the French and Belgian governments authorized no such 
equivalent. As we will see, the sheer scale of desolation in Zeeland also contributed to its 
uniqueness. Although Civil Affairs operated on similar mandates across Belgium, France, 
and the Netherlands, the situation facing CA authorities first in Zeeland and then 
elsewhere in the Netherlands offered a different set of challenges. 
  
Methodology and Sourcebase 
 The sources used in this work come from a variety of Dutch and British archives. 
The Militair Gezag (MG), or Netherlands Military Authority, was tasked with assessing 
damage and working alongside Allied Civil Affairs (CA) units during the very chaotic 
and transitional phase from liberation and destruction, to reconstruction and recovery. 
The documentation for Zeeland’s MG can be found in the Zeeuws Archief (ZA) in the 
province’s capital, Middelburg. This series of manuscript sources is an important 
foundation for this study. The work of the MGs was extremely diverse and extensive, 
which is reflected in the large body of records they left behind. This documentation 
includes notes, communiqués, and reports on the distribution of foodstuffs, rationing, 
providing fresh drinking water, the evacuation of internally displaced people, evacuation 
of cattle, repairing the dykes and reclamation of land, and the rehabilitation of physical 
infrastructure, among other issues. The diversity inherent in these sources highlights the 
complexity of tasks given to the Allied and Dutch officials. 
Another extensive body of manuscript sources comes from the Nederlands 
Instituut voor Militaire Historie (NIMH) located in Den Haag, which is part of the Dutch 
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Ministry of National Defense. Many newspapers from the province have also been used 
to shed light on the activities, concerns, and thoughts of the province’s inhabitants. 
Although the use of newspapers is not without methodological problems, such as 
investing too much currency in the representativeness of the stories newspapers carried, 
the combination of newspapers and extensive bodies of archival sources helps 
supplement this historical investigation by painting a fuller picture of life in the region. 
 The vast majority of primary sources employed in this study, therefore, are in the 
Dutch language, which has dictated the trajectory of the work. The sources that examine 
recovery are inherently negative in tone and deal with extensive human and physical loss. 
Thus, the topics on which MG and CA officials reported were rarely of a positive nature 
and lacked the triumphalism commonly associated with liberation. The choice to focus on 
such sources means that this is very much a bureaucratic history, one that looks at the 
ways in which institutions played a key role in shaping Zeeland’s experience after 1944. 
These sources highlight the challenges civilians faced during this period. There are a 
couple reasons why I have not included ego-documents, such as memoires or oral 
histories, some of which are pragmatic while others are methodological. As a European 
historian in Canada, time and financial constraints forced me to be selective in what types 
of sources to investigate. My journeys to the Netherlands were very often consumed by 
reading manuscript and archival sources over secondary material. Methodologically, the 
ways in which memories are constructed and how they change after decades influenced 
my decision to rely more on evidence from archives as opposed to the oral testimony of 
individuals recalling their experiences years later. Ex post facto accounts of civilian 
experiences under Nazi occupation can be particularly challenging to interpret. A farmer, 
 9 
who may have supported the benign occupation of Zeeland in the 1940s, may have 
excoriated Nazism after the 1960s or 1970s, when more detailed accounts of the 
Holocaust came to light. These are just some of the problems inherent in the complexity 
of memory. As such, my study lays the foundation on which further research involving 
ego-documents like oral histories and memoirs can build. It is neither the first nor the last 
account on the topic, but rather a way to encourage discussion about the long-term affects 
of war and reconstruction in Europe.     
This is neither an operational military history nor a political history, yet both of 
these sub-genres of historical inquiry have informed the work at one point or another. 
This is above all a regional, social and cultural history of one rural province in the 
Netherlands, which at times is interwoven with important political, institutional, military, 
and environmental themes. The sources used here help reflect how Dutch authorities 
perceived the experiences of civilians, how civilians reacted to Nazi occupation and 
Allied destruction, as well as how they understood their existence in a rural part of the 
Netherlands after the most destructive period of their province’s history. 
 While Dutch sources have formed the basis upon which this study has been 
written, I have also included archival material from the Public Records Office (now 
called and referred to as the National Archives) in the United Kingdom. This material 
consists of records from the Foreign Office (FO) and War Office (WO). Because the 
primary purpose of this study aims to explore Dutch civilian experiences, the British 
material acts as a supplement rather than a core group of records. In addition, I have used 
aerial photographs, which can be found in the appendices, from the unique collection 
housed at the Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) 
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in Waterloo, Ontario. These will help the reader envisage the level of destruction inflicted 
upon the region by both German and Allied operations.  
 In addition to this body of manuscript sources, there are several Dutch-language 
monographs which explore various parts of Zeeland’s history. These have proven 
invaluable to foreign readers of rural Dutch history. In particular, L.W. de Bree’s 1979 
study in which he attempted to examine the impact of the Second World War on 
Zeeland.10 His premature death, however, prevented the completion of the history, which 
ends abruptly around 1941. In the late 1980s, Gijs van der Ham, who unlike de Bree was 
a professional historian, was commissioned to write the second part to de Bree’s 
unfinished history of the province’s wartime experience.11 This account was much more 
satisfactory in both methodology and breadth. Van der Ham employed archival material 
rather than solely relying on newspapers as de Bree did years before. 
 Two other Dutch-language studies are invaluable when studying the history of 
Zeeland. Jacoba Kramer-Vreugdenhil, who was old enough to remember occupation in 
her village on Walcheren, published her dissertation in 2001 in which she analyzed 
“occupation and inundation” in three villages on the island.12 To flesh out the 
complexities of life under Nazi occupation in her pastoral surroundings, she used synodal 
and church records from the Dutch Reformed Church, an institution which wielded great 
influence in the region. In many ways, Vreugdenhil’s work shows how confessional 
culture in Zeeland had a substantial impact on how civilians understood their role before 
and after the war often within a covenantal and chiliastic framework. Another study is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bree, L.W. de Zeeland 40-45, deel 1  (Middelburg: Den Boer & Provincie Zeeland, 1979). 
11 Ham, Gijs van der Zeeland 1940-1945. Deel 2  (Zwolle: Waanders, 1990). 
12 J. Kramer-Vreugdenhil, Eilandbewoners: bezetting en inundatie in drie Walcherse dorpen (Vlissingen: 
Uitgeverij ADZ, 2001)	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Jan Zwemer’s monumental work that explores aspects of reconstruction in the province.13 
Taken together, these few works represent the most significant attempts to examine 
Zeeland’s wartime experiences. 
 During one of my visits to the NIMH in Den Haag, Dr. D.C.L. Schoonoord was 
kind enough to lend me a copy of his unpublished manuscript, entitled Het ‘Circus 
Kruls’: Militair Gezag in Nederland, 1944-1946 (2011). This magisterial study, 
consisting of over 800 pages, is one of the first works to explore the role of the MG 
across the Netherlands from 1944 to 1946. Schoonoord’s work helps situate the 
institutional framework of the MG across the country and some of the challenges to 
reconstruction it encountered in other provinces. Although the book mainly focuses on 
the northern and western regions of the country, Schoonoord does address the evacuation 
scheme and the situation facing MG and CA authorities in Zeeland.  
 There are other works that do not address Zeeland specifically, but whose themes 
and questions have informed this study. This dissertation ultimately sheds light on the 
civilian experience in the wartime Netherlands. As early as the 1980s, Michiel Horn 
called for a more nuanced approach to understanding the Canadian relationship with the 
Netherlands, arguing correctly that it involved more than simply “cigarettes, sex and 
chocolate.”14 Later, in 1995, Geoffrey Hayes drew from translated secondary sources to 
examine the effects of liberation from the perspectives of both civilians in West Brabant 
and Canadian soldiers. While the Allies had reached Antwerp by 4-5 September 1944, 
the people of Bergen op Zoom waited long and anxiously for their liberators. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Jan Zwemer, Zeeland, 1945-1950: De wederopbouw van Zeeland na de oorlog (Vlissingen: den Boer de 
Ruiter, 2000). 
14 Michiel Horn, “More than Cigarettes, Sex and Chocolate: The Canadian Army in the Netherlands, 1944-
1945,” in Journal of Canadian Studies 16, no. 3/4 (Autumn 1981), 156-173. 
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civilians, as Hayes rightly points out, “The long [delay in the] arrival of the liberators was 
frustrating.”15 Civilians in that part of the country were impatient with the progress of 
Allied armies. Central to the narrative of liberation in this part of the country was how 
local accounts described Dutch civilians as active agents in their own liberation, rather 
than as passive victims caught helplessly between belligerents. As we will see, one 
museum in Zeeland has adopted a similar narrative to emphasize their role in post-war 
reconstruction at the expense of Allied Civil Affairs. These two revisionist approaches 
have influenced the ways in which I have approached this work by using the word 
“liberation” in a more critical way. 
The Canadian historians concerned with the Schelde tend to focus on the 
operational efficacy of First Canadian Army as opposed to what civilians experienced 
and the various recovery efforts in the region. This is understandable given their bodies 
of evidence and the types of questions each raises. Popular historians Denis and Shelagh 
Whitaker, as well as Mark Zuehlke have all assessed Canada’s performance in the 
campaign, but none have used Dutch sources.16 As a professional historian, Terry Copp 
has offered the most extensive look into the Schelde campaign. Published in 2006, 
Cinderella Army is the authoritative account on military operations in the region. 
Drawing on a wealth of English-language sources from British and Canadian archives, 
Copp has provided the most in-depth operational history of the campaign in northwest 
Europe.17 Focusing on Canada’s operational history, he aimed to disabuse the traditional, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Geoffrey Hayes, “‘Where are our liberators?’ The Canadian Liberation of West Brabant, 1944,” in 
Canadian Journal of Netherlandic Studies XVI, ii (Fall 1995), 56-62. 
16 Denis and Shelagh Whitaker, Tug of War: The Canadian Victory that Opened Antwerp (Toronto: 
Stoddart, 1984); Mark Zuehlke, Terrible Victory: First Canadian Army and the Scheldt Estuary Campaign 
(Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2007). 
17 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2006), Introduction. 
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and not too flattering, interpretation of Canada’s wartime army proffered by C.P. Stacey 
in the 1960s. The plight of civilians and the pace at which recovery unfolded, however, 
were well beyond the scope of his study. Nonetheless, Copp is correct in his conviction 
that the Allied flooding of Walcheren played an essential role in defeating Nazi Germany 
in Zeeland. As he suggests, the flooding of Walcheren was at the time the best option 
available to Allied decision makers and one which would maximize Allied strength while 
also minimizing Anglo-Canadian casualties.18 To say that the decision to flood the island 
in October 1944 was misguided, as one Dutch historian has claimed, is to impose a 
teleology that ignores the strategic context in which the Allied decisions were made.19 
This study agrees with Copp’s premise, but picks up where he left off in an attempt to 
understand what happened to the region after liberation. 
These contributions notwithstanding, successive Canadian governments have 
emphasized the so-called “Sweetest Spring” narrative that continues to be celebrated in 
Canada, focusing on Canadian military achievements during the spring of 1945. This is 
especially evident when looking at the narratives created by Veterans Affairs Canada or 
other official channels. Government of Canada publications highlight euphoric letters 
written about Canadians and the oral testimony of young Dutch observers in towns which 
were rather unaffected by war compared to elsewhere in the country.20 The memory of 
Canada’s role in liberation is therefore intimately connected to the central and northern 
parts of the Netherlands; it is divorced from events in the southern part of the country in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Copp, Cinderella Army, Ch. 5. 
19 Tobias van Gent, “The Allied Assault on Walcheren, 1944,” in Building Liberty: Canada and World 
Peace, 1945-2005 edited by Conny Steenman-Marcusse and Aritha van Herk (Groningen: Barkhuis 
Publishing, 2005), 11-30. 
20 See for example, Veterans Affairs Canada, “Remembrance: The Liberation of the Netherlands,” Letter 
from Holland 27 April 1945, accessed 12 June 2014 
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/second-world-war/liberation-netherlands 
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autumn 1944. If 1945 is most renown for Canada’s role in liberating large parts of the 
Netherlands, then 1944 is best known as the year in which Canada spearheaded the 
amphibious assault on Juno Beach on 6 June 1944. This has cast a wide shadow over 
First Canadian Army’s role in clearing the Schelde in between these two significant 
periods.  
 Other European historians, such as Peter Schrijvers, have reexamined what life 
was like in Belgium once the Allies liberated the country in September 1944. He argues 
that after the initial euphoria of liberation had subsided, the civilians grew tired of what 
some saw as a second occupation that prevented a return to the pre-1940 world. The 
clichés of chocolate, kisses, and bubble gum began to give way to disappointment and 
even crime.21 As Schrijvers writes, “[historians] would almost have us believe that, after 
cheers and kisses in September 1944, the Allied armies packed up, moved on to Nazi 
Germany, and vanished from Belgium altogether, allowing the country to get back to 
normal all by itself. The reality was, however, that as long as the campaign against 
neighboring Germany continued, there remained a mass presence of Allied troops in 
Belgium.”22 William Hitchcock has similarly emphasized the costs of victory in Europe 
and the ways in which destruction was a necessary evil in the bitter road to freedom.23 
While reconstruction efforts in the Schelde were not necessarily an occupation as 
Schrijvers suggests was the case in Belgium, this work does identify issues that caused 
increasing discontent among the civilian population in Zeeland. Schrijvers’ work in 
particular represents a trend in relatively recent English-language reassessments of how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Peter Schrijvers, Liberators: The Allies and Belgian Society, 1944-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 2-3. 
22 Schrijvers, Liberators: The Allies and Belgian Society, 1944-1945, 3. 
23 William I. Hitchcock, The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe (New 
York: Free Press, 2008).	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“liberation” is understood. The common thread connecting his study to this one lies in 
how concepts like “liberation,” “rehabilitation,” and “recovery” are understood.  
This study contributes to the literature on war and society in a number of ways 
and engages in a discussion that Schrijvers has initiated. Using evidence that Canadian 
historians have not had access to in the past, I seek to reconfigure the language of 
liberation, to show that the Allied victory over Nazi Germany in this region of the 
Netherlands was part of an extremely diverse set of liberations that exacted an uneven toll 
on the territory over which German and Allied armies fought. It also highlights many of 
the problems contemporaries experienced in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War in the Netherlands. In this way, this work adds to the existing discussion on 
civil-military relations. Additionally, the environmental impact of warfare is a common 
theme that appears throughout the study. Both Allies and Germans mobilized water and 
manipulated topography to their advantage during combat, which suggests the degree to 
which even the physical environment, and particularly the lithosphere, was not beyond 
the realm of operational planners. The use of water as a weapon illustrates the totality of 
“total war.” The pervasiveness of water, not only in times of peace but also in war, 
dominates popular Dutch imagination—exemplified by den Doolaard’s work in the 
immediate post-war period. 
 This study does not focus on regions or provinces beyond Zeeland. As such, I 
have focused on the history of reconstruction and recovery during the war in the 
Netherlands and often very close to military operations, as opposed to following the 
complete liberation of the country in May 1945. In so doing, this case study demonstrates 
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some of the pressures facing both Allied and Dutch authorities in their efforts to recover a 
region while military operations to defeat Nazi Germany continued. 
 One final and important note must be made regarding methodology. The 
documentation of the MG is vast and sometimes disparate. For this reason, some aspects 
of occupation, destruction, inundation, and reconstruction are emphasized over others, 
and some regions of the province receive greater ministration than others. 
Contemporaries gave a disproportionate amount of attention to Walcheren, partly because 
of the damage inflicted upon that island by the Allies and partly because of the island’s 
administrative and economic primacy to Zeeland. The evidence from the archives reflects 
this emphasis often, and unfortunately, at the expense of more remote parts of the 
province, such as Tholen and Schouwen-Duiveland, the latter of which was not liberated 
until May 1945. Additionally, because many towns were badly damaged, communication 
between authorities in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and other parts of the province in September 
and October 1944 was erratic at best. For this reason, this dissertation adopts a thematic 
approach because this is most conducive to the presentation of such a diverse set of 
themes. The use of themes also helps to understand the immense complexity of the 
situation facing both Allied and Dutch authorities and civilians during the transitional 
period from November to December 1944.   
 
Structure and Themes 
 This work follows the experience of Zeeland both chronologically and 
thematically. Chapter I provides an overview of the history of Zeeland and its people 
from about 1900 to the outbreak of the Second World War. In so doing, this chapter 
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tacitly underscores the problem of periodization in history. It argues that a look at the 
period covering the First World War, industrialization, and economic crises helps 
understand Dutch mentalities and reaction to occupation in May 1940. It also highlights 
the historical parallels between the Great War, the depression, and the occupation in 
1940. In order to understand better occupation experiences, this chapter helps 
contextualize the occupation of Dutch territory within the social, political, and economic 
developments of the interwar period. This, furthermore, emphasizes another important 
point that interwoven throughout the study: the rural-urban dichotomy in history. Much 
of what historians in the English-language world know about the occupied Netherlands 
comes from evidence found in the densely populated urban areas of the so-called “old 
provinces” and cities like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Utrecht. Far less is known about 
the rural regions of the Netherlands and how dominantly agrarian societies, particularly 
ravaged by the economic crises of the 1930s, reacted to Nazi occupation. While readers 
versed in Dutch history may be familiar with this information, I have included this 
chapter for English-language readers whose knowledge of Dutch history and geography 
is limited. 
 Chapter II explores Nazi occupation in the countryside and shows how the 
environment played a significant role during those years. The Germans very quickly 
understood the importance of controlling land for defensive purposes. This manifested in 
the construction of Hitler’s Atlantikwall and the emphasis he placed on the fortification of 
the Schelde and Zeeland. The construction of this defensive system had great 
consequences for over 20,000 Zeeuwen who worked on building projects, either as 
conscripts or volunteers. However, given the province’s geographic position and unlike 
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other Dutch provinces, most workers were permitted to stay within Zeeland rather than 
being forced to work in Germany or elsewhere. Additionally, although resistance groups 
were widespread in the occupied Netherlands, Zeeland’s topographic circumstances and 
its sparsely populated islands made resistance an extremely challenging enterprise, 
especially once the German presence crested in the region after 1942. Until late in the 
war, Nazi occupation in Zeeland was relatively benign. In this chapter, I have tried to 
emphasize the use of primary source material or sources that focus exclusively on 
Zeeland to shed light on occupation experiences. For this reason, readers will notice that 
the voluminous work of Louis de Jong, namely the multi-volume Het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, is not used. While his works are indeed 
prolific, de Jong often sacrificed depth for breadth. In this context, lesser-known works, 
such as those of de Bree or Zwemer offer greater insight into the history of this region 
specifically.  
 In Chapter III, I provide a very brief overview of the strategic and operational 
plans for Allied action in the Schelde, as well as a look at how German armed forces 
reacted to the Allied advances. This chapter also stresses how Allied decision makers 
used the environment to neutralize the heavy coastal batteries and “sink” the island of 
Walcheren. Although the Allies were left with little other choice, the Allied 
bombardment that flooded Walcheren and killed many civilians was a sine qua non of 
opening the port of Antwerp and supplying Allied armies in western Europe. From the 
perspective of Canadian and Allied military planners, the use of water as a weapon was 
the optimal choice, even if that meant widespread suffering and destruction. Mobilizing 
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water as a weapon significantly aided in capturing the province and resupplying armies in 
the west. But water also had a profound effect on the local people. 
 Chapter IV introduces the authorities responsible for assessing and commencing 
reconstruction projects in the badly damaged, but liberated, parts of Zeeland in October-
November 1944. It provides a brief institutional overview and history of Allied Civil 
Affairs and its Dutch counterpart the Militair Gezag voor Zeeland (MG). This chapter 
explores some of the early personnel problems identified with CA and MG units. Chapter 
V examines how CA and MG units worked to restore some semblance of pre-war society 
in Zeeland amidst inundation and evacuation. It underscores the complexity of civil-
military relations and, at times, the almost antithetical understanding of the situation 
between officials and civilians. Efforts to evacuate civilians and transfer them to other 
parts of the province, for example, were not always greeted kindly and many civilians 
articulated their frustration through their burgemeesters. It also suggests that the 
establishment of the MG was informed by a Dutch pre-war political and bureaucratic 
culture. This partly influenced the Netherlands’ decision to establish a separate military 
organization.  
 Chapter VI continues the examination of the rehabilitation of post-war Zeeland 
until 1947. In particular, this chapter uses the concept of “exiting war,” an idea postulated 
by French historian Henry Rousso.24 “Exiting war” refers to processes during which 
autochthonous populations are left to conceptualize their own memories following the 
official and diplomatic declaration to end hostilities. As Rousso writes,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Henry Rousso, “A New Perspective on the War” in Jörg Echternkamp and Stefan Martens. 
Experience and Memory: The Second World War in Europe. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 1-9. 
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“‘Exiting wars’ not only refers to a simple state, a given situation at a certain 
point in time, such as the term ‘postwar era,’ but rather a process, a development 
that encompasses social dimensions of great scope and in a certain sense can be 
understood as a continuation of the war—on the national as well as the 
international level. The term thus avoids a clear-cut distinction between ‘before’ 
and ‘after,’ which is characteristic for legal documents that define specific states 
of war or peace, ceasefire, capitulation, or armistice, and that assume a clearly 
defined temporal caesura…Not everybody arrives at the war’s end at the same 
time, or under the same circumstances, or even with the same short-, mid-, or 
long-term consequences.”25  
 
The concept applies to Zeeland, but here, too, problems of periodization surface when we 
consider the ways in which war and its corollaries of destruction and recovery affected 
Zeeland particularly. The year 1945, in the history of this province, means very little and 
certainly does not mark the denouement of the province’s problems. In addition, this 
chapter broaches a number of questions about the Dutch government’s curious 
prioritization of reclaiming the Dutch East-Indies, while large segments of the country 
remained destroyed. 
 Finally, Chapter VII focuses on the construction of memory long after the 
cessation of hostilities between Allied and German armies. It compares the ways in which 
two museums in the province have given meaning to war, occupation, and liberation in 
Zeeland. This chapter demonstrates that the memory in this province is communalized. 
Even within separate provinces, the construction of memories can differ drastically in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Rousso, “A New Perspective on the War,” 5. 
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space of a few kilometers. Yet, it also suggests that memory in some parts of Zeeland has 
changed very little from the immediate post-war period. The literature written by 
individuals like den Doolaard in the late 1940s continues to inform the narratives adapted 
by one particular museum in the region, one in which civilians’ resilience in the face of 
adversity takes center stage. In adopting the communalization thesis, this chapter 
suggests the difficulty of creating and maintaining a provincial memory in Zeeland. 
 In the end, an examination of this painful period of Zeeland’s history presents an 
alternative narrative to how Dutch “liberation” is understood in the English-speaking 
world. The idea that the Netherlands celebrates Canadian and British efforts in their 
country is not wrong, but it is certainly not representative of the entire country. By 
focusing on the rural-urban dynamics of history, the environmental impact of war, the 
problems of periodization between Dutch- and English-language history, as well as the 
various ways in which Dutch towns have given meaning to the most destructive event in 
their history, this study highlights how Canadian historians of Europe and the Second 
World War need to reevaluate comfortably held certainties and ask critical questions 
about the liberation of western Europe. This study raises those critical questions. It aims 
to show how complex the two narratives are and how multiple narratives compete against 
one another. This is effectively a regional history of a little-known rural province that 
nonetheless figures prominently in Canadian and British military histories. In this way, 
historians of the war have often neglected one very important side of Dutch wartime 
experience. While Dutch civilians celebrated the capitulation of German armed forces in 
the Netherlands in May 1945, the people of Zeeland continued to rebuild their homes and 
lives. A close reading of the documents dealing with the destruction and recovery of this 
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province shows that “liberation” is a word that needs to be reconfigured and applied 
much more cautiously than it has been in the past.  
  
Note on Language 
 Throughout this study I have maintained the use of Dutch-language names and 
locations as they would have appeared to contemporaries during the war. For example, 
Vlissingen is used instead of “Flushing,” Zuid-Beveland instead of “South Beveland,” 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen instead of the cumbersome “Zeelandic Flanders,” and so on. 
Additionally, Dutch-language demonyms and their derivatives are often difficult to 
render into proper English. Readers will frequently encounter the plural demonym for 
people of Zeeland, “Zeeuwen.” “Zeeuws,” which can be translated as Zeelandic, can refer 
to the dialect spoken in Zeeland and in parts of Zuid-Holland, while “Zeeuwse” or 
“Zeeuwsch” are used to describe or modify nouns. Although C.P. Stacey used the English 
spelling of the “Scheldt,” he included an important note on its usage in a footnote. Citing 
a letter written in 1944 by a Dutch-American physician, Dr. G.J. Rennier, Stacey claimed 
that English speakers should “pronounce the name of the Scheldt in the Dutch fashion 
(‘Skelt’) and abandon the German pronunciation ‘Shelt’.”26 I advocate for the same. 
Where sources are quoted extensively, I have provided in full the original Dutch-
language quotation in a footnote. All translations are the author’s unless otherwise noted.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, see footnote on p.365. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Zeeland and the Zeeuwen, 1900-1939 
 
The scale of violence and destruction that befell much of Europe during the 
Second World War was unprecedented. Historians of the Second World War have rigidly 
periodized the period from 1939 to 1945, paying great attention to how and why war 
erupted and evolved through those years. While this focus covers most military 
operations, it does not help us understand how and why certain peoples reacted to 
German occupation in 1940. It also misleads us into thinking that the Belgians, French, 
and Dutch had no point of reference to gauge or conceptualize the developments of war 
and occupation in their lands. This idea is particularly important for the Netherlands. 
During the Great War the Netherlands adopted a position of armed neutrality and their 
sovereignty was never fully violated. As Hermann von der Dunk has rightly pointed out, 
“to understand the persistent effect of the shock of 1940… we have to dig rather a long 
way back into the past, because we cannot separate Dutch reactions during and after the 
war from some peculiar features of Dutch political culture and society, and we cannot 
understand these, in their turn, without delving into history.”27 For von der Dunk, 
particular notions of anti-centralism, religious pluralism, and the pragmatic form of 
tolerance found in the Netherlands considerably affected Dutch mentalities in 1940.  
This chapter examines the socio-economic, political, and confessional 
development of Zeeland from about 1900 to the eve of occupation in 1940. It is important 
to explore some of the characteristics that have influenced the province’s historical 
development. Although the Netherlands remained neutral for the duration of the Great 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hermann von der Dunk, “The Netherlands and the Memory of the Second World War,” European 
Review 4, 3 (1996), 222. 
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War, Zeeland’s proximity to the Western front and Belgium subjected the province to 
some of the pressures bona fide belligerents experienced. As a consequence, the echoes 
of war heard in Zeeland reinforced the importance of Dutch neutrality in the crises 
leading to war in 1940. Maartje Abbenhuis has shown how difficult it was to maintain a 
position of armed neutrality and how the political and socio-economic pressures of war 
from 1914 to 1918 nearly plunged the country into the war on a number of occasions.28 
After 1918, parts of Zeeland experienced a period of rapid modernization and general 
economic prosperity. Like elsewhere in Western Europe, this period of prosperity ended 
abruptly in the early 1930s after the stock market crashes of 1929. As a dominantly 
agrarian region, the economic challenges arguably affected Zeeland more than other 
provinces in the Netherlands where population density was greater. After several years of 
economic deprivation Zeeland, along with much of Western Europe, was subjected to 
Nazi occupation in May 1940. The unique geographical and topographical features of 
Zeeland’s various islands made it a crucial part of the Nazi war machine and, as we will 
explore later, its conquest was a sine qua non for Allied victory in 1945.  
To contextualize better the various provincial experiences of the Zeeuwen during 
occupation and after liberation, the following chapter provides a brief background about 
the province and its people. This chapter argues that while the importance attached to 
neutrality in the Netherlands prevented the country from entering the Great War in 1914, 
it strengthened the idea of neutrality among decision makers in the 1930s. With no 
experience of dealing with destruction and recovery in modern memory, Dutch 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Maartje Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral: The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914-1918 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). See also, P. Moeyes “Neutral Tones: The Netherlands 
and Switzerland and Their Interpretations of Neutrality, 1914-1918” in (ed.) Herman Amersfoort and Wim 
Klinkert, Small Powers in the Age of Total War, 1900-1940 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 57-84. 
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authorities after 1944-1945 lacked the practical experience of reconstruction their Allies 
had gained in 1918. For this reason, as we will see in later chapters, post-war recovery 
presented a number of substantial challenges for Allies and Dutch authorities alike. In 
addition, the political and economic pressures placed upon the Dutch during the Great 
War and the 1930s resonated with the relatively benign Nazi occupation of the province 
in the 1940s. This chapter highlights long-term trends and continuity during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century. 
*** 
When driving on the E312 from Vlissingen in Walcheren past a village like 
Nieuwdorp in Zuid-Beveland it is difficult to imagine that until relatively recently the 
province of Zeeland consisted of seven separate constituent parts, six of which were 
islands and one attached to the mainland. Walcheren protrudes furthest into the North 
Sea, while Zuid- and Noord-Beveland lay to its east and northeast (Appendix VI). 
Schouwen-Duiveland is the most northern part of the province and is closest to the island 
of Overflakkee near the mouth of River Maas. While Overflakkee is technically part of 
Zuid-Holland, the people there resemble the Zeeuwen in dialect, culture, and also had 
very similar occupation experiences, including inundation in 1944.29 Tholen, which 
consists of two peninsulas that were formerly islands, borders Noord-Brabant to the east. 
The most southern part of the province is Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, which lies on the southern 
side of the Schelde and borders Belgium. Before the 1950s, the various islands separated 
the estuaries of the three great rivers—Rhine, Maas, and Schelde— with dune barriers at 
their western ends. Nowhere in the province of Zeeland exceeded 10 feet in altitude, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 A.J. Jansen, Bezetters & water: Een Geïsoleerd Gebied in Oorlogstijd (Dreischor: Uitgeverij 
Steengracht, 1988). 
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which means that over the centuries the Zeeuwen had developed a very effective dyke 
system and a variety of dune belts to protect the land against inundation.30 For that reason 
settlements normally grew around the areas protected from floodwaters called polders. 
Being below sea level and living so close to the sea has presented the inhabitants of 
Zeeland with innumerable challenges over the centuries. Zeeland was, as Wijlen W. de 
Bree put it, “a land created by the people’s hands in a millennial battle against the sea.”31 
While no doubt romanticized, Zeeland’s history has been characterized by regular 
inundation and reclamation. 
Zeeland experienced some marked demographic changes from 1900 to 1930. 
From 1899 to 1909, the overall provincial population increased by 16,220 and from 1909 
to 1920 the population again increased by 12,922. This population growth, as we will 
examine later, likely correlates to the nascent industrialization that took place in Zeeland 
at the turn of the century. From 1920 to 1930, however, the growth witnessed in previous 
decades had begun to level out, but still increased by 2,169 (see Table 1). 
Population of Zeeland 
Province32 
1899 216, 295 
1909 232, 515 
1920 245, 437 
1930 247, 606 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Naval Intelligence Division, Netherlands: Geographical Handbook Series (London: Naval Intelligence, 
1942), 24.	  
31 Wijlen L.W. de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945 (Middelburg: Den Boer, 1979), 6. “een land door 
mensenhanden geschapen in een duizenjarige strijd tegen de zee.” 
32 Censuses conducted in the Netherlands from 1795 to 1971 have been digitized and are available online at 
www.volkstelling.nl. Understandably, no data or official censuses exist for the period from 1930 to 1947. 
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This provincial demographic trend reflects similar growth found in major Dutch 
towns. For the purposes of this study, major towns include towns with a population 
greater than 1500 and some which we will encounter later, such as Breskens (Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen), Goes (Zuid-Beveland), Middelburg (Walcheren), Terneuzen (Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen), and Vlissingen (Walcheren). Some towns, however, experienced very little 
shift in population from 1899 to 1930. This is particularly true for the capital of Zeeland, 
Middelburg. In 1899, Middelburg had a population of 18,837, a figure that largely 
remained the same throughout the period, boasting 18,395 inhabitants by 1930. The 
smaller towns of Terneuzen and Goes experienced constant growth during this period. 
The port town of Terneuzen on the southern side of the Schelde, for example, went from 
8,174 in 1899 to 10,458 in 1930. Vlissingen, the province’s largest economic and 
industrial center, experienced population fluctuations according to the broader economic 
developments of the 1930s. During the period of industrialization in the 1920s, 
Vlissingen’s population was at its height, reaching 23,025, but decreased during the 
1930s to 21,716.33 By 1939, only 9 percent of Zeeland’s population lived in towns of 
20,000 inhabitants or over, mainly in Vlissingen. This figure pales in comparison to the 
72 percent of the population in Noord-Holland, or even the 38 percent in neighbouring 
Noord-Brabant, that lived in towns of 20,000 inhabitants or more.34 As these data 
suggest, a significant number of Zeeuwen inhabited small villages across the various 
islands, with the only two major concentrations of the population residing on Walcheren. 
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To evaluate Dutch reactions to the events of May 1940 von der Dunk found that 
the sixteenth century provided a useful point de départ.35 Indeed, many scholars of the 
Netherlands maintain that divisions in confessional composition and politics can be 
traced to the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish in the 1560s.36 Although the events of the 
1500s are well beyond the scope of this study, it would be worthwhile to consider the 
confessional composition of Zeeland and how the spread and adoption of Calvinism 
affected the development of politics and life in the province. When the Dutch Reformed 
Church in Alphen caught fire in April 1916, the Goessche Courant claimed it was the 
town’s first serious “warning for each community that appreciates the preservation of its 
valuable buildings,” eluding to divine admonition.37 In the 1940s, as historian Jan 
Zwemer has pointed out, some people in Zeeland “saw, out of religious conviction, 
[military] occupation as a punishment from God for the sins of the Dutch people and by 
extension regarded the Germans as the legitimate government.”38 In short, to resist 
against the Germans was to question an ordained and divine plan. Confessional culture, 
therefore, remains an important component in assessing prewar and occupation 
experiences in the dominantly rural regions of the Netherlands. This is especially true for 
Zeeland and we will encounter this later regarding the immediate reconstruction of 
Walcheren in 1944. 	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Ruiter, 2000), 74. He writes “Maar sommigen zagen uit religieuze overtuiging de bezetting als een straf van 
God op de zonden van het Nederlandse volk en in het verlengde daarvan beschouwden zij de Duitsers als 
de wettige overheid.” 
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In his study on politics in the post-war Netherlands, Arend Lijphart wrote that 
“the two basic cleavages which divide the Dutch population are class and religion.”39 For 
the most part, this observation also applies to twentieth-century Zeeland. In 1909, the 
majority of Zeeuwen belonged to Nederlands Hervormde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church) 
with small pockets of Roman Catholics found in villages throughout the Province and in 
the larger towns of Middelburg, Vlissingen, and Terneuzen. In the town of Breskens 
(Zeeuws-Vlaanderen), for example, which in 1909 had a population of 2,198, 81.3 
percent recognized themselves as Dutch Reformed. Larger towns like Middelburg, whose 
population reached 19,564 in 1909, had a more diverse confessional composition 
including 61.9 percent belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church, while 9.2 percent 
confessed to the Roman Catholic Church, as well as a small Ashkenazim population (less 
than one percent) whose synagogue can still be found on the Seisplein. The largest city in 
Zeeland, Vlissingen, counted 21,363 inhabitants in 1909, 53.7 percent of whom were 
members of the Dutch Reformed Church, 32 percent were Roman Catholic, and roughly 
11 percent were recognized Gereformeerd (Calvinist Orthodox Reformed).40 
Communities of Orthodox Reformed Zeeuwen could be found scattered throughout the 
province, but were typically in the minority. For instance, of the 1,529 inhabitants of 
Koudekerk, located about three kilometers northwest of Vlissingen, a total of 783 people 
were members of the Dutch Reformed Church, while only 26 were members of the 
Orthodox Reformed community. But “the bastions of heavy Christianity,” as de Bree put 
it, “were found—and still found—spread over the different islands: on Walcheren in 
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Aagtekerke, Arnemuiden, Meliskerke; on Zuid-Beveland in Borssele, Waarde en 
Yerseke; on Tholen in Poortvliet, Scherpenisse, Sint Annaland and Stavenisse; on 
Duiveland in Nieuwekerke and Oosterland.”41 These were the towns, situated on the 
island furthest out on the North Sea, in which villagers were arguably most devout. In 
Sint Philipsland, for example, more than half of the 2,000 inhabitants belonged to the 
Orthodox Reformed community.42 Still other confessions were found in the province and 
included “Other reformed Churches,” Evangelical Lutherans, Mennonites or Anabaptists 
(doopsgezinden).43 Of the many hamlets and villages that cover the province, however, 
the majority were Dutch Reformed. Beyond Zeeland to the east and northeast, in 
neighbouring Noord-Brabant for example, Catholicism dominated as opposed to the 
various forms of Protestantism across Zeeland. 
This confessional composition had obvious implications for the political 
complexion of the province. But first a brief and general mention of Dutch politics is 
necessary. The sovereignty of the Netherlands resides in the House of Orange-Nassau 
and the monarch, but the Netherlands also has a powerful parliament called the States-
General. The States-General consists of two Chambers, the First (Upper) and Second 
(Lower), which convenes at Den Haag. The First Chamber consists of fifty members who 
are chosen by indirect election through the Provincial States, or legislatures, which are in 
turn elected by universal suffrage. The eleven provinces are arranged in four groups with 
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roughly equal populations, each of which is allotted roughly one-quarter of the total 
membership of the Chamber. Thus, Noord-Brabant, Zeeland, Utrecht, Limburg, and 
Gelderland formed one group which had 13 representatives. In contrast, Zuid-Holland 
alone had 12 representatives based on its larger population. To bring fair composition to 
the First Chamber with the wishes of the electorate, the States-General “weighs” their 
votes. Members of the Chamber are elected for six-year terms.44 
The Second Chamber consists of 100 members and has been elected by universal 
suffrage since the reforms of 1917-1922. In 1939, there were 4,639,503 voters in the 
Netherlands (98.5 percent of all citizens over the age of twenty-five).  The Second 
Chamber is elected as a whole and typically sits for four years. The States-General shares 
the legislative function with the Queen, but the two Chambers differ in their function and 
legislative capacity. The Second Chamber exercises the initiative in legislation and the 
First Chamber can only put forward proposals that are not bills. The First Chamber has 
no power to amend bills accepted by both the sovereign and the Second Chamber. The 
First Chamber can only reject or accept bills.45 
Each province possesses its own legislative and administrative assembly known 
as Provinciale Staten (Provincial States). Members of these bodies are elected by 
universal suffrage according to the same system described above. The population of each 
province determines the size of the Provincial State. Thus in 1939 Zeeland had one 
member per 5,900 Zeeuw for a total of 42 members in the provincial assembly, whereas 
Zuid-Holland had one member per 23,900 inhabitants for a total of 82 members. The 
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Provincial States are rather autonomous and have jurisdiction over all administration in 
the province, with the exception of public works administered by the Departement van 
Waterstaat. Each province also has an executive power which is comprised of a 
permanent six-member committee called the Gedeputeerde Staten (Deputed States). 
Importantly, this committee also oversees the communal authorities. Both bodies of the 
provinces meet under the presidency of a Commissioner appointed by the Crown 
(Commissaris der Koningen).46  
The Gemeente, or Commune, was and continues to be an important part of 
provincial politics in the Netherlands. In 1940, there were 1,054 communes across the 
country. Each commune is administered by two bodies: the gemeenteraad (communal 
council) and the wethouders (aldermen). Both of these bodies are led by a single 
burgemeester (burgomaster or mayor). While the councils are elected by universal 
suffrage, the aldermen are chosen by the council itself and the mayor is appointed by the 
Queen and remains in office for six years. As de facto representative of the Queen or 
monarch in towns, the mayor is responsible for the maintenance of public order and 
morals, as well as local taxation.47 The extent to which people identified themselves with 
their commune is difficult to know, but the communes wielded a great influence on local 
populations. During recovery, the communal governments and burgemeesters would act 
as the first point of reference for Allied and Dutch civil affairs projects. 
The various administrative bodies were comprised of a multitude of political 
parties, but a detailed exposition of the parties need not concern us here. However, many 
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political parties were organized according to confessional background. This is generally 
true for all of the Netherlands, but especially important for Zeeland. Some of the major 
political parties of the early twentieth century consisted of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij 
(ARP), Christelijk-Historische Unie (CHU), de Rooms-Katholieke Staatspartij (RKSP) 
and, after 1918, the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP).48 Lijphart observed that, 
for all of the Netherlands, three sub-cultural groups called zuilen (pillars) dominated 
Dutch politics in the twentieth century.49 According to him, political affiliation could 
normally be divided by Catholicism, orthodox Calvinism (i.e. Reformed Church, other 
fundamentalist Protestant churches), and a third bloc dominated by more liberal-leaning 
individuals of the Dutch Reformed Church, as well as secular or non-affiliated 
individuals.50 To a certain degree, the Nazi occupying forces would capitalize on the 
political and confessional landscape of the province. 
Like many other parts of Western Europe, most political parties operated or, at the 
very least, influenced certain newspapers. In Zeeland, de Zeeuw provided daily news and 
was largely influenced by the Reformed Church and the CHU. Other significant daily 
newspapers, some of which later proved important means to disseminate information 
regarding occupation proclamations and other Nazi regulations, included the 
Middelbursche Courant, Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, and the Zierikzeesche 
Nieuwsbode. While these were certainly important media, this should not obscure the fact 
that copious other smaller papers provided news to smaller communities, not to mention 	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the extent to which church services provided many Zeeuwen with weekly news and 
information. It would be misleading to assume that people from Zierikzee in Schouwen-
Duiveland read the Middelburgsche Courant on a regular basis and, for as de Bree 
emphasized, “everyone from the seven parts of Zeeland spoke their own dialect, in 1919 
they also wore their own clothes or clothing, each island had its own health-care centre, 
its own market, and its own lifestyle.”51 In other words, the Zeeuwen remained highly 
regionalized in language and experience. That the islands of the province are in so many 
ways disparate suggests that historians must be mindful of the Zeeuwen’s heterogeneity 
when considering the changes wrought by economic crises and the effects of occupation 
and war. The effects brought on by socio-economic and political pressures, therefore, 
were not uniform and did not affect all of Zeeland equally. This work, therefore, tries to 
flesh out the complexity inherent in rural-urban dynamics in relation to historical 
development. In other words, the occupation of Schouwen-Duiveland or Tholen likely 
had few similarities with occupation in Noord-Holland or Utrecht. 
 This basic introduction provides a backdrop against which two important eras can 
be explored. The Great War presented Zeeland with a host of challenges to its supposed 
neutrality and offered a very different experience compared to what Belgium and France 
had gone through in 1914. Consequently, the Dutch had a much different point of 
reference to conceptualize the invasion and occupation in May 1940. Additionally, the 
post-war period and the economic crises of the 1930s not only significantly affected the 
dominantly agrarian lifestyles of Zeeland’s many fishermen and farmers, but also the 
newly industrialized centres of Vlissingen and Terneuzen. 	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The Great War and the Netherlands, 1914-1918 
 Few historians have investigated how the Great War affected the Netherlands. 
Maartje Abbenhuis argued that because the Second World War, or simply “the war” in 
Dutch parlance, affected the Netherlands irreclaimably the history of the First World War 
was simply not a priority for Dutch historians in the post-1945 era.52 Consequently, only 
a handful of studies on the Great War and the Netherlands existed until the late 1990s.53 
Abbenhuis examined how the Netherlands navigated along the often difficult path to 
maintain its neutrality, and how on many occasions the towns along the borders of 
Germany and Belgium dealt with refugees, the black market, and other pressing 
circumstances which effectively violated their neutral status. According to Abbenhuis, 
the Dutch remained neutral by “compromising with each belligerent when and where 
possible, even at the expense of conceding its own independence and neutrality.”54 What 
Abbenhuis observes for the First World War is the pragmatism with which the Dutch 
approached occupation and destruction. 
Because of its proximity to the fighting in Belgium and northern France, 
Zeeland’s waterways and strategic position naturally made Great War neutrality 
challenging. As early as 21 September 1914, the Imperial German cruiser, Karlsruhe, 
sunk the Dutch cargo ship Maria en route to Ireland. This was one of many Dutch ships 
leaving from ports in Zeeland that were destroyed by the German navy over the course of 
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the war, including the Medea, Katwijk, Tubantia and the Palembang.55 By 1918, a total 
of 121 Dutch cargo ships were sunk, among them some 96 Zeeuwse fishing vessels that 
were shot at, torpedoed, or destroyed by mines drifting through the Schelde or North Sea. 
The cost was roughly 1,200 Dutch lives.56 Newspaper headlines from Middelburg and 
other towns reveal that the German introduction of airpower, mainly by employing 
Zeppelins to bomb certain targets, caused much consternation for some in Zeeland.57 
Throughout the war, there were several cases of both British and German aircraft making 
emergency landings in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and Walcheren after overshooting the 
objectives of Zeebrugge or IJzer.58 On 23 September 1914, only days after the sinking of 
the Maria, the Middelburgsche Courant published an article entitled “Our Neutrality” in 
which the editors urged the central Dutch government to pursue belligerents who had 
dropped bombs from Zeppelins that had landed along Zeeland’s eastern border in towns 
like Bergen-op-Zoom and as far north or east as Nijmegen. Other bombs had also 
exploded in Zeeland in Zierikzee, Sluis, and Goes.59 The article recommended that “when 
it could be determined that this [Zeppelin] has thrown bombs, then there is every reason 
to question the government vigorously to insist on strict punishment of those reckless acts 
and [demand] reimbursement for damages.”60 The author of this article thought that the 
neutral Netherlands should not have to fear destruction from the sky and, moreover, 	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“That [the bombing] was done over a neutral country can only be explained by, and not 
defended by, [a pilot’s] irresponsible mistake in calculating the place where he was, and 
that it was done over an open city without defense makes the matter worse.”61 This 
emphasis on Dutch neutrality during the Great War would resonate with similar claims 
made during the 1930s.  
It would be dangerous to assume such attitudes regarding neutrality could be 
ascribed to all Zeeuwen, but the article does articulate how some conceptualized the 
Netherlands’ rather exceptional status among nations engulfed by war. The Dutch had, 
after all, remained neutral since 1815. Such status, however, did not mean that Zeeland 
was unfamiliar with military obligations. On the contrary, the unique contours of the land 
and familiarity with the maritime environment and industry meant that the Zeeuwen were 
often at the forefront of maintaining Dutch neutrality. As the gateway to the Schelde 
estuary and Antwerp, Zeeland was vulnerable to attacks, yet in the early twentieth 
century the General Staff allocated only a token defence force to Zeeland. Growing 
tension between Britain and Imperial Germany in 1910, however, led the Dutch 
government to plan the construction of a large fortified position in Vlissingen.62 Even 
before plans for the fortress materialized, Britain, France, and Belgium accused the Dutch 
of neglecting their role as a neutral country and claimed they had sided with Germany. 
Abbenhuis rightly stated that this controversy indicates how central the Schelde and 
Zeeland could figure in a continental dispute.63 Far from being an obscure rural province, 
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Zeeland was at the heart of both defence and neutrality and remained the focus of much 
international discussion both before and during the Great War. 
Whether one lived in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen on the Belgian border or as far north as 
St. Philipsland in Tholen, the Zeeuwen became familiar with the sights and sounds of war 
that had brought much destruction to neighbouring Belgium and France. That the 
Territorial Commander of Zeeland (Territoriale Bevelhebber in Zeeland) issued 
proclamations warning Zeeland’s residents about undetonated ordnance found on their 
property suggests that the Zeeuwen were exposed to some of the dangers that other bona 
fide belligerents faced during the period.64 As early as 29 August 1914 the Dutch 
government declared that the Province was in a “state of siege” (in Staat van beleg), the 
increasing rate at which the residual effects of war were being felt in Zeeland made an 
indelible print on daily life.65 By 1915 Zeeland’s traditional municipal administrative 
bodies were governed by the armed forces to ensure the country’s neutrality was not 
being compromised. This is a significant point. Although the Dutch were neutral, they 
had experience in implementing emergency measures to combat the residual effects of a 
war of which they were not a part. 
The larger provincial towns of Middelburg and Vlissingen saw the flow of 
refugees from Belgium and Northern France beginning immediately after German attacks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ierseksche en Thoolsche Courant, “Waarschuwing: Artillerie-Schietoefeningen,” 3 July 1915. For 
instance, “De Territoriale Bevelhebber in Zeeland enz., waarschuwt een ieder tegen het aanraken van niet 
gesprongen artillerie-projectielen, zijnde zulks levensgevaarlijk. Van het vinden van dergelijke projectielen 
moet onmiddellijk kennis gegeven worden aan den Burgemeester ter plaatse of den Kantonnements-
commandant te Krabbendijke. Schijven, vlaggen, overblijfseleu van gesprongen projectielen zijn 
Rijkseigendommen, waarvan het ontvreemden strafbaar is volgens de Wet.” 
65 For a detailed discussion on the Oorlogswet (War Law) of 1899 and the differences between “state of 
war” and “state of siege,” see Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, 139ff. Contemporary newspapers also 
issued the regulations. Cf. Ierseksche en Thoolsche Courant, 3 July 1915, “Gezien de Koninklijke 
Besluiten van 29 August 1914 (Stbl. no. 435), van 8 September 1914 (Stbl. no. 448) en van 11 Febr. Stbl. 
no. 81, waarbij de gemeenten in de Provincie Zeeland zijn verklaard ‘in Staat van beleg’.” 
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on Belgium. Refugees put pressure on Zeeland’s territorial and neutral integrity, as well 
as its resources. In December 1914, the Inspector for Public Health, G. de Graeff, 
traveled to Vlissingen to monitor the current influx of Belgian refugees that had crossed 
the Schelde from Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. The inspector, whose job was to oversee providing 
public housing for these people, found that over 5000 Belgian refugees were being put up 
in private homes. The government ordered the construction of four experimental housing 
units (loodsen),66 which could house between 350 and 400 refugees. These helped 
monitor the refugees.67  
The generous treatment of Belgian refugees stemmed from the widespread news 
of German atrocities. Yet the local press chose not to take sides, instead offering a more 
abstract and neutral view of the war that denounced war in general. In Breskens, the 
Breskensche Courant published articles on the treatment of the Belgians at the hands of 
advancing German units—the so-called German atrocities—as well as the plight of 
Belgian children.68 As early as February 1915, the editors of the Breskensche Courant 
used Belgian refugees as the physical manifestation of the war’s malevolence. In this 
way, the editors began publishing pieces explicitly condemning the war and highlighting 
its disastrous effects on Zeeuwse society. The editors used some of the first issues of the 
year to reflect on the war’s development: “Today is the first full half year of the war. A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 This Dutch term is very difficult to render into English and roughly translates to “pilotage” or something 
characterized by or of experimentation—perhaps even a type of tenement house. 
67 Vlissingsche Courant, “Nederland en de Oorlog: Belgische vluchtelingen,” 14 December 1914, 1. “De 
inspecteur der Volksgezondheid, in het bijzonder belast met het toezicht op de handhaving der wettelijke 
bepalingen betreffende de volkshuisvesting, jhr. G. de Graeff, is Vrijdagsavond teruggekeerd van een reis 
van Vlissingen… Te Vlissingen zijn thans pl.m 5000 vluctelingen in particuliere woningen gehuisvest.	  Het 
aantal woningen bedraagt ongeveer 800. Er worden daar vier loodsen gebouwd, die in ieder 350 a 400 
menschen kunnen bevattend en waarin dus een deel der vluchtelingen zal kunnen worden ondergebracht.	  
Het algemeene streven is echter, te bewerkstelligen, dat de mensen zich zooveel mogelijk in de door de 
regeering gestichte vluchtdorpen vestigen. 
68 Breskensche Courant, “Breskens, 8. December 1914,” 9 December 1914, 2. 
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full six months now that millions of men, in the prime of their lives, [were] snatched from 
their usual labour in society and from their families, in two giant groups facing each other 
with no other immediate objective than to kill, maim, or wound as many of their 
‘enemies’ as possible.”69 Weekly newspapers in Tholen, further away from the Belgian 
border, reveal a similar anti-war sentiment, though issues of Belgian refugees figure less 
prominently in the press due to Tholen’s isolation. The Ierseksche en Thoolsche Courant 
asked its readers “Will the New Year bring change and perhaps a breath of fresh air?” 
and later admonished both Germany and the Entente, exclaiming that they should “Cease 
fighting! throw down the weapons, [and] end the mass murder.”70 These common 
editorials are resoundingly anti-war in tone. 
By 1916, the people of Zeeland began to feel the effects of resource scarcity. 
Most newspapers from the Province generally included detailed reports on the war’s 
development. In 1916 the major newspaper of Goes in Zuid-Beveland published a three-
column article entitled “The Paper Crisis” as part of the war news in which the authors 
used the scarcity of paper to highlight the dearth of other supplies like raw materials and 
grain.71 Just as the newspapers were reporting on the conditions of the French and British 
armies after the Somme, Zeeland also began dealing with government-imposed 
regulations like the Bruinbroodregeling (Brown Bread Regulation), or noodbrood 
(emergency bread). In April 1916, the Minister of Agriculture, Trade and Industry held a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Breskensche Courant, “Tegen den oorlog,” 3 February 1915, 1. “Heden is het eerste halve jaar van den 
oorlog vol. Een vol half jaar staan nu millioenen mannen in de kracht van hun leven, ontrukt aan hun 
gewonen maatschappelijken arbeid en aan hun gezinnen, in twee reusachtige machsgroepen tegenover 
elkander met geen ander onmiddelijke doel dan om zoovelen hunner "vijanden" als slechts mogelijk is, 
dood, verminkt of gewond buiten gevecht te stellen.” 
70 Ierseksche en Thoolsche Courant, “De Oorlog,” 1 January 1915. “Zal het Nieuwe jaar verandering en 
misschien verluchting brengen?...Staakt het strijden! Werpt de wapenen neer; eindigt den massamoord, gij 
menschenkinderen 
71 Goessche Courant, “Verspreid Oorlogs-Nieuws: de papiernood”, 17 June 1916, 2. 
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conference with the executive of the Nederlandschen Bakkersgezellen-Bond (Dutch 
Bakers Union) to discuss the prevailing food shortages in their communities.72 The 
minister planned to ask the mayors of each town to enforce the government provisions to 
produce bread with adulterated flour in order to ration the Province’s cereals.73 The 
editors of the Middelburgsche Courant blamed the dismal situation facing the Zeeuwen 
on Britain’s maritime and economic blockade, calling the war De Handelsoorlog (War of 
Trade). They also claimed that Dutch bakers had been exporting bread to Belgium 
illegally as part of the growing black market, which partially explained the current state 
of affairs.74 Nonetheless, this measure affected not only Zeeland but also the rest of the 
Netherlands and preceded an even more intense period of scarcity. Until that point, the 
government had left supply issues to private organizations, but by 1917 the government 
recognized the need to assuage Dutch foodstuff shortages and intervened directly.75  
On 19 August 1916, the Dutch government devised the Distributiewet 
(Distribution Law), which monitored stocks of goods, distributed raw materials to key 
industries, and kept account of domestic consumption needs.76 The government began by 
regulating bread with the Bruinbroodregeling, but by the following year it had issued 
ration cards for most staple items, such as milk, butter, meat, soap, potatoes, and cheese. 
In February 1917, adults received about 400 grams of bread per day. By late 1918, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Goessche Courant, “Bruinbroodregeling,” 22 April 1916, 2. 
73 Goessche Courant, “Bruinbroodregeling,” 22 April 1916, 2. “De minister was voornemens den 
burgemeesters te verzoeken, aan de bruinbroodregeling stipt de hand te houden en opgave te verstrekken 
van de patroons, die hieraan niet voldeden, opdat die bakkerijen verstoken zouden blijven van de 
verstrekking van regeeringsmeel.”	  
74 Middelburgsche Courant, “De Handelsoorlog,” 6 March 1916, 3; Middelburgsche Courant, “Uitvoer 
stopgezet,” 17 August 1916. “Naar wij uit goede bron vernemen zal de uitvoer van brood naar Belgie de 
volgende week geheel worden stopgezet.” The paper also said the same about the exportation of onions, see 
for example, Middelburgsche Courant, “Uitvoer van uien weer stopgezet,” 18 August 1916. 
75 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, 188-189. 
76 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, 189. 
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however, food rations had decreased to four kilograms of potatoes per week, and 200 
grams of bread and 100 milliliters of milk per day.77 These strenuous average rations 
affected urban and rural regions differently. In Zeeland, although foodstuffs were readily 
available, the majority of farmers were forced to raise the prices of their produce. Until 
the Distributiewet, prices of produce were generally what they had been in 1914. But, as 
one in Breskens put it, “with the New year [1917], the minister of agriculture raised 
prices, which for many thin wallets is an unpleasant surprise.”78 Apples, a staple export 
from parts of Zeeland, increased by 5 ½ cents per kilogram, while red and yellow 
cabbage also increased by 5 to 6 cents per kilo. Salt, which had a pre-war price of 1 cent 
per kilogram, doubled by 1917. Petroleum prices also increased by 4 cents, reaching 
about 14 cents per can.79 Eggs, which normally sold for 9 ½ cents in the early 1900s, 
were now sold for 14 cents. Cheese farmers and their consumers in Zeeland experienced 
some of the most severe price increases. Gouda cheese without the Rijksmerk 
(government brand) cost about 55 cents per pound and 11.5 cents per ounce. Cheeses 
with the Rijksmerk were 61 cents per pound and 13 cents per ounce.80  
Increased government control on production and higher prices encouraged black 
marketers and smuggling. This was a particularly difficult problem for the central 
government to monitor and was prevalent in Zeeland, especially in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 
along the Belgian border. In May 1917, police in the town of Sluis began to crack down 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, 189 
78 Breskenssche Courant, “Verhoogde prijzen,” 6 January 1917.  “Met Nieuwjaar zijn door den minister 
van landbouw verschillende prijzen verhoogd die voor menige dunne beurs een onaangename surprise is. 
79 See for instance, Goessche Courant, “De Gasprijzen,” 3 March 1917, 1. 
80 Breskenssche Courant, “Verhoogde prijzen,” 6 January 1917. “De kaassoorten sloegen elk met 5 cent per 
pond op; jonge Goudsche kaas zonder Rijksmerk kost voortaan 55 cent per pond of 11 ½ cent per ons. 
Oudere kaas met Rijksmerk kost 61 cent per pond en 13 cent per ons, zonder Rijksmerk is de prijs per pond 
2 cent en per ons ½ cent lager, dus respectievelijk 59 cent en 12 ½ cent.” Cf. Goessche Courant, 
“Minimumprijzen landbouwproducten,” 22 February 1917, 2. 
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on black market trade and piracy. On 7 May, police apprehended a man from IJzendijke 
(Zeeuws-Vlaanderen) and two Belgians. A search of the man’s house in IJzendijke 
uncovered more than 85 kilograms of hard soap, more than 17 kilograms of coffee beans, 
and a large quantity of cacao.81 Not only were the borderlands subjected to smuggling 
and black market trade. The Goessche Courant reported that the tugboat Jantina 
Rensiena had cruised the Schelde for some time before coming into Middelburg. 
Suspicious of its activity, the authorities searched the vessel and discovered it was filled 
with contraband fats and soap. Both the captain and the first mate were arrested and 
brought to Middelburg.82 
The regulation of food prices and production had profound implications for daily 
life in Zeeland. Given its proximity to Belgium and high domestic prices imposed by the 
province and central government, some Zeeuwen turned to illicit trade and smuggling to 
assuage daily needs. They reacted to these difficult years with pragmatism and 
accommodated to their conditions accordingly. 
These issues coincided with an important change in how newspapers reported on 
the war’s development. Initially, newspapers like the Middelburgsche Courarnt and the 
Breskensche Courant contested the war, outlined military operations in Flanders and 
northern France, and focused on the external pressures facing the province and the 
importance of upholding the country’s neutrality. By 1916, however, one observes a 
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81 Breskenssche Courant, “Breskens, 8 Mei 1917,” 2. “De vorige week kon de politie alhier een geode slag 
slaan. Bij een poging tot smokkelen zijn gesnapt een tweetal Belgen en een bewoner van IJzendijke, 
meevoerende 85 kilograms harde zeep. Bij een grensbewoner werd na huiszoeking in beslaggenomen een 
hoeveelheid cacao en 17 KG koffieboonen.” 
82 Goessche Courant, “Hansweert,” 5 May 1917, 1. “Bij het visiteeren der sleepboot ‘Jantina Rensiena’, 
kapitein v. K., werd door de ambtenaren alhier een partijtje smokkelwaar gevonden, bestaande uit vet en 
zeep. Sleepboot en smokkelwaar zijn in beslag genomen, terwijl de kapitein en de stuurman gevankelijk 
naar Middelburg zijn gebracht.” 
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of headlines began to deal with the many internal conflicts the Dutch faced as a result of 
the war. Military operations were no longer the most important stories to report, but 
rather the side-effects that had put increasing pressure on the province. The introduction 
of rationing, the flow of Belgian refugees, and a flourishing black market meant that 
Zeeland and the rest of the country only nominally maintained their neutrality.  
For the duration of the war, the waters that encircle and crisscross the province 
remained subjected to the sights and sounds of war, which for many reinforced the 
importance of upholding neutrality in the Netherlands. On 2 January 1917, the people 
living in South Vlissingen woke up to find a German destroyer stranded on the coast. One 
observer noted that some of its munitions had fallen out and that there was a possibility of 
the ordnance exploding under water or against the shore.83 In another case in January 
1918, a German pilot made an emergency landing in Sluis while trying to take aerial 
photographs of the Belgian-Dutch border. The pilot was questioned and then interned in 
one of several prisoner of war (POW) camps in the Netherlands.84 As a neutral country, 
and broker of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Netherlands set up POW 
camps to deal with prisoners and deserters who crossed over the borders from Germany 
and Belgium. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Middelburgsche Courant, “Uit Vlissingen,” 2 January 1917, 1. “In den vroegen morgen van Zondag is 
ten N. van het fort de Nolle te Vlissingen de torpedoboot G1 gestrand. Naar wij vernemen was de boot die 
voor anker lag van haar anker geslagen en is toen in den storm en duisternis op de steenglooing van een 
oud paalhoofd geslagen. Een der onderofficieren had de pistolen van de torpedo's afgehaald en daardoor 
voorkomen, dat deze ontploften bij het stooten tegen den wal. 
Door het brengen van een lijn naar den wal door een der matrozen, konden de opvarenden zich 
reden. De boot zat gisteren nog op dezelfde plaats en zoowel Zondag als gisteren werd druk gewerkt aan 
het demonteeren der boot, die vrij ernstig beschadigd is. Het is te begrijpen, dat vele personen van de twee 
vrije dagen gebruik maakten om eens een kijkje te gaan nemen, maar niet velen hebben iets gezien daar de 
dijk bij de punt voor het fort door de militairen was afgezet.”	  
84 Middelburgsche Courant, “Vliegmachine gedaald,” 2 January 1918, 1. 
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These incidents illustrate that many Zeeuwen experienced the effects of the Great 
War in a different and peripheral way compared to how the Belgians or French endured 
the physical destruction of war. The clearest difference between the experience of the 
Netherlands compared to that of Belgium and France is that the former’s neutrality 
prevented widespread destruction from spilling over Dutch borders. Both France and 
Belgium had been occupied, civilian homes had billeted Imperial German troops, and 
civilians in Flanders and northern France saw and heard death and destruction on a 
widespread scale. In short, the Dutch experience was dramatically different and many in 
the country accounted for this difference by the country’s neutral status. 
For Zeeland, the armistice announced in November 1918 meant that soldiers on 
guard could once again return home and were no longer in a “state of siege.” All 
foreigners interned on Dutch territory like prisoners of war and the thousands of refugees 
were to begin planning their return.85 Importantly, government interference with prices 
and production would soon stop, and the market would eventually return to its prewar 
trends.86  
Although the Dutch managed to maintain their neutrality, the residual effects of 
war still affected the people of Zeeland. Whether imagined or not, many Zeeuwen felt 
threatened from the use of airpower and were often subjected to stringent government 
control. However, the key difference in experiences between the Netherlands and the rest 
of Western Europe was that the residual effects of war led to a greater investment in 
neutrality. According to many in Zeeland, the country’s neutral status meant that the 
province had not been occupied by a foreign sovereign in the way that Belgium and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Middelburgsche Courant, “Terugkeer van krijgsgevangen,” 12 November 1918, 1. 
86 Middelburgsche Courant, “Distributie en productie,” 11 November 1918, 1. 
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France had. Until the Meidagen (May Days) of 1940 the Netherlands tenaciously clung to 
what its citizens believed saved them from the ravages of war in 1914. Neutrality, many 
Dutch believed, offered the greatest defense in an increasingly hostile Europe. In the end, 
however, Zeeland’s position within the neutral Netherlands embodied a paradox: the 
province’s topography and geographic position created a type of negotiated neutrality in 
the twentieth century. As we will see, this unfamiliarity and inexperience played a key 
role in Zeeland’s reactions to the Nazi invasion in 1940 and how they attempted to 
recover. This, however, did not mean the Dutch were unfamiliar with stringent 
government control during times of crisis. 
 
The 1920s and 1930s in Zeeland: Annexation, Economic Growth, and Financial Crisis 
  The immediate postwar era ushered in a series of changes to the socio-economic 
and political landscape of Zeeland. One of the most complex political issues that 
Zeeland’s government dealt with, and one that called into question the loyalty of the 
Zeeuwen to the Netherlands, came from Belgium and the Comité de Politique Nationale. 
In 1919, in the midst of negotiations at Versailles, the Belgian government began 
advocating for the annexation of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen on the grounds that the Schelde 
would improve the economic conditions of Belgium. The debate about whether or not 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen should be part of Belgium was centuries old, so it is no surprise that 
after the tumultuous experience of the Great War questions about Belgium’s reparations 
also included territorial expansion. Even the Dutch historian de Bree admitted that the 
Belgian “position was not utterly incomprehensible.”87 For it would provide the Belgians 
with a port on the southern side of the Schelde. The proposal of the Comité, which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945, 9. “Volstrekt onbegrijpelijk was deze houding niet.” 
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Belgian government in Brussels supported, argued that if France should reclaim Alsace 
and Lorraine from Germany, then Belgium should also reclaim what was rightfully and 
historically theirs. To compensate its losses, according to the Comité, the Netherlands 
would receive adjacent parts of Germany. The plan received little support at Versailles. 
While France showed some willingness to favor the Belgian cause to have a country from 
the ‘Mosel to the Rhine’, both Britain and the United States vehemently opposed the 
annexation of a neutral country during war.88 The debate had once again brought the 
Netherlands into the world of geopolitics. 
If the plan had received little support among diplomats at Versailles, it earned 
even less in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and the rest of the Province. The great powers requested 
that an entourage from Den Haag, led by Minister H.A. van Karnebeek, visit Versailles to 
discuss the Dutch position on the matter.89 In both East- and West-Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen, 
many municipal and residential buildings and businesses flew the Dutch flag to protest 
the annexation proposal and to show their support to the Dutch monarchy. In most 
communes in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, towns established protest-committees and planned 
public rallies to contest annexation, which were led by preachers, pastors, politicians, and 
journalists, all of whom highlighted the important historical bond between Zeeland and 
the House of Orange. Importantly, “they wanted no action taken against the Belgians, but 
against the annexationists among them.”90 The delegates in Versailles decided that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945, 10. “Frankrijk toonde enige bereidheid zijn klein noorderbuur ter wille te 
zijn. Engeland en de USA verklaarden zich tegen elk pogen de Belgische staat ten koste van de 
Nederlandse te vergroten.” 
89 de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945, 10. “Op verzoek van de geallieerden reisde een omvangrijke deputatie uit 
Den Haag naar versailles, om daar als gelijkberechtigde partij het nederlandse standpunt kenbaar te maken. 
Minister H.A. van Karnebeek, die een knap verdediger van de Nederlandse belangen bleek te zijn, wist zich 
sterk gesteund door de publieke opinie, in het bijzonder die in de omstreden gebieden.” 
90 de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945, 10. “De sprekers- predicanten, pastoors, politici- zij wensten geen actie 
tegen Belgen, maar uitsluitend tegen de annexationisten onder hen.” 
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plebiscite be held in Zeeland to decide whether Zeeuws-Vlaanderen would remain part of 
the province. About seven weeks after the vote, Queen Wilhemina arrived in Vlissingen 
on 5 March 1919 to a celebratory reception, parade, and naval flotilla led by the Dutch 
cruiser Hydra. In her speech to the people of Zeeland, the Queen famously stated that 
“the people of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen are Dutch and shall remain that way.”91 Upon her 
return to Den Haag, the Queen wrote “I felt compelled to say how deeply affected I was 
by the impressive national parade, which has given my visit to both parts of Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen great historical significance.”92 After months of debate and negotiation, the 
plebiscite showed that the people of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and Zeeland wanted to remain a 
part of the Netherlands, and the threat of annexation eventually subsided.  
The annexation issue was only one of many external obstacles Zeeland had to 
surmount during the post-war period and as the province negotiated with the outside 
world. It took considerable time for market forces and economies to adjust to peacetime 
production, so the threat of being subsumed under Belgian suzerainty was at the nadir of 
Zeeland’s troubles.93 The 1920s witnessed an increase in industrialization and 
modernization for many parts of the Province. Importantly, however, this growth was 
neither distributed evenly nor uniformly.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945, 10-11. “De bevolking van Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen is Nederlands en zal dit 
blijven.” 
92 Middelburgsche Courant, “Het Koninklijk bezoek aan Z-Vlaanderen,” 7 March 1919, 1. “Bij mijn 
terugkeer te 's-Gravenhage gevoelde ik mij gedrongen uit te spreken, hoe diep ik getroffen ben door de 
indrukwekkende nationale betooging, welke aan dezen dag van mijn bezoek aan beide gedeelten van 
Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen een groote historische beteekenis heeft gegeven. De gevoelens van trouw en 
verknochtheid aan ons dierbaar vaderland, welke heden wederom op zoo trefeende wijze tot uiting werden 
gebracht, hebben mij tot diepgevoelde erkentelijkheid gestemd.” 
93 A survey of the major newspapers, Middelburgsche Courant, Goessche Courant, Breskensche Courant, 
etc., shows that towns were very concerned with how the war affected the production and distribution of 
agricultural products and employment, and this trend continues well into 1920. 
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As described above, some demographic changes partially reflect the changing 
economic and social complexion of the Province, particularly the improvement of 
infrastructure. In towns where ports and harbours dominated commerce and industry, 
such as Vlissingen and Terneuzen, the population typically increased following the war 
(see Appendix I). Although Zeeland’s ports had always been important for seafaring 
trade and commerce, the advent of railway connections and land transport facilitated both 
travel and industry.94 In 1875, the Stoomvaart Maatschappij Zeeland (Steamship 
Company of Zeeland) established its headquarters in Vlissingen to provide a cross-
channel service to England. In that same year, the shipbuilding firm De Schelde was 
founded and provided employment for many men in Vlissingen and surrounding areas. 
Following the war, this company received government subsidies to modernize its inner- 
and outer-port which became a fueling station for other seagoing vessels.95  
But it was, as de Bree wrote, the development of infrastructure in the 1920s that 
brought Zeeland into an age of modernity.96 Established in late 1919, the N.V. 
Provinciale Zeeuwsche Electriciteitsmaatschappij (Zeeland Provincial Electricity 
Company/PZEM) began providing electricity to many towns in the province and took 
over several smaller electricity companies in the region. The PZEM laid a cable under the 
Westerschelde to connect the six islands of Zeeland, and constructed a separate power 
station in Westdorpe for Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Eventually, the PZEM monopolized the 
inchoate power industry in Zeeland. By 1 January 1939, the entire province’s electricity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Dirk Marc de Waard, “Luctor et Emergo: The Impact of the Second World War on Zeeland,” (M.A. 
thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1983), 10. 
95 de Waard, “Luctor et Emergo: The Impact of the Second World War on Zeeland,” 12. 
96 de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945, 12. “Infrastructurele voorzieningen brachten Zeeland in de jaren twintig 
nader tot de modern samenleving.” 
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was administered by the PZEM, with the exception of Tholen and Sint-Philipsland, 
whose electricity was provided by a company in Noord-Brabant.97  
Railways also deepened the connections between Zeeland and the rest of the 
country, as well as Belgium. In March 1920, a steam train line offered transport between 
Breskens and Sluis in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen to Maldeghem in Belgium, increasing mobility 
for the residents of that part of the province south of the Schelde.98 Although there were 
talks of expanding train lines to other towns and building a more comprehensive transport 
system for the region, it is clear that the Stoomtram Maatschappij (Steamtrain Company) 
for Breskens required more funding than what the province and investors had provided.99 
On the other hand, bicycles were (and still are) much more common in the Province. In 
1929, for example, a bridge was constructed between Tholen and Noord-Brabant. In one 
year, no more than 120 automobiles had travelled across the bridge, which was more 
widely used for bicycle traffic.  
These changes in transport also coincided with the introduction or expansion of 
waterleiding, or public water systems, and this was particularly important for the 
countryside. The larger towns of Vlissingen and Middelburg had watermains at the turn 
of the nineteenth century, but many Zeeuwen preferred rainwater. De Bree characterized 
the Zuid-Bevelanders as “in general somewhat more progressive” since many of them 
had tap water as early as 1913. Tholen introduced waterworks in 1923, Sint-Philipsland 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945, 13. “Levering van energie van een centraal punt uit stuitte op praktische 
bezwaren; met name tegen het leggen van een kabel over de bodem van de Westerschelde opperden de 
technische adviseurs ernstige bedenkingen. Daarom bouwde de PZEM te Westdorpe een aparte centrale 
voor Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen. Maar liefst 26 gemeentelijke distributiebedrijfjes in dit gebied werden 
achtereenvolgens door de provinciale maatschappij overgenomen--het laatste op 1 Januari 1939.” 
98 Breskensche Courant, “De tramweg Breskens-Sluis met zijlijnen,” 10 March 1920, 1. 
99 Breskensche Courant, “De tramweg Breskens-Sluis met zijlijnen,” 10 March 1920, 1-2. “De 
Maatschappij wil krachtig medewerken aan de totstandkoming der lijnen en harerzijds ook financieel flink 
steunen. Willen de lijnen tot stand kunnen komen, dan zullen echter belanghebbenden uit de streek zich 
ook aanmerkelijke geldelijke offers moeten getroosten.” 
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in 1924, Schouwen-Duiveland in 1930, and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen in 1936. It took until 
1954 for the people of Noord-Beveland to replace cistern wells with running water.100  
Such development widened the difference between the province’s urban and rural 
residents unevenly across Zeeland. The various industries that existed offered 
employment opportunities for some Zeeuwen, but most were available in larger towns 
like Vlissingen, Breskens, Terneuzen, and, to a lesser extent, the political capital 
Middelburg. In many villages, agrarian life remained largely unchanged and the emphasis 
placed on the expansion of infrastructure here, as a way to demonstrate broader trends of 
industrialization in the region, should not obscure the fact that Zeeland was a dominantly 
agriculture-based economy. The economic crisis of the late 1920s and 1930s thus had 
disastrous effects on Zeeland’s socio-economic conditions and presented the Province 
with an unprecedented set of challenges. Increasing connections, industrially and 
economically, with the outside world put the Dutch at risk regardless of the country’s 
neutrality. 
The Zeeuwse newspapers Goessche Courant, Ierseksche en Thoolsche Courant, 
or the Zierikzeesche Nieuwsbode, for example, did not begin reporting on the economic 
situation in the United States until about 4 November 1929. Even then the paper in Goes 
published a small article on the recent issues in the American automotive industry and 
delegated it to the last page.101 The problems in foreign industry were not the top-priority 
for many newspapers reporting on more dissociated and rural issues. By January 1930, 
Middelburg reported that from 1929 to 1930 the grain markets in the province fluctuated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 de Bree, Zeeland 1940-1945, 13. “De Zuidbevelanders, in het algemeen iets vooruitstrevender, leerden 
het kraanwater al in 1913 kennen...” 
101 Goessche Courant, “Amerikaansche automobielindustrie,” 6 November 1929, 4. 
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only “very slightly.”102 In the more industrial town of Vlissingen, however, reporters paid 
close attention to American President Herbert Hoover’s plans to generate industry by 
developing hydroelectricity in the United States.103 Yet, the province was not immune to 
rising tariffs. The Vlissingsche Courant also warned investors and businesses that the port 
authorities in Antwerp had raised their duties on goods by 50 centimes per gross ton, 
from 3.00 frs to 3.50 frs.104 
These contemporary reports belied a serious but nascent problem in the 
dominantly agrarian region, which could be seen in the rising prices of foodstuffs and 
increased costs of land. The price of grain from the Province listed on the Rotterdam 
market decreased from 15.12 florins per 100 kilograms to a meager 8.54 florins in 1930. 
Barley worth 9.79 florins in 1926 dropped to 6.82 florins in 1933 and to 4.47 florins later 
that year. Kidney beans were worth 20.90 florins per 100 kilograms on the Middelburg 
grain market in 1926, plunging to 16.50 florins in 1930 and 10.80 florins in 1933. From 
1926 to 1933, the price of pork also dropped from 0.73 florins per kilogram to 0.34 
florins.105 The decreases in the value of these products were commensurate with the value 
of land in the province (see Appendix II). On 19 November 1930, the Zeeuwsche 
Landbouwmaatschappij (ZLM/ Zeeland Agricultural Society) met in Goes to address the 
crises. Roughly 1,700 farmers from all parts of Zeeland attended the meeting.106 The 
meeting had the potential to become a serious protest as so many in the province 
depended on agriculture, but the meeting was calm and collected. The Goessche Courant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Vlissingsche Courant, “Marktberichten,” 2 January 1930, 3. “Wegens de festdagen was de aanvoer op 
de graanmarkt heden zeer gering en werd geen noteering opgemaakt.” 
103 Vlissingsche Courant, “Hoover heeft groote plannen,” 25 October 1929, 1. 
104 Vlissingsche Courant, “Verhooging havenrechten te Antwerpen,” 2 January 1930, 2. 
105 de Bree, Zeeland, 1940-1945, 17. 
106 Goessche Courant, “De crisis-vergadering in Goes,” 21 November 1930, 1. 
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attributed the crowd’s politeness to the meeting’s chairman, Mr. Dieleman, and “the 
sober nature of most Zeeuwen.”107 The ZLM agreed that immediate assistance was 
necessary to stymie further deterioration of the situation in the Province, and decided that 
they would take measures against the so-called “dumping” of foodstuffs and provide 
greater subsidies to the many sugar beet farmers in the region. Further goals of the ZLM 
included the abolition of excised meats as well as the compulsory use of a percentage of 
local wheat.108 While some contemporaries greeted these measures with enthusiasm, 
others were more skeptical and emphasized that “Only haste can prevent suffering and 
misery!”109 One observer laconically noted that “we will be waiting to see what our 
government will do with our farmers.”110 Despite these misgivings, still others were more 
moderate and claimed that “the meeting was a great success! But here, too, we are not 
there yet,” indicating a degree of reticence in government action.111 Although the 
situation facing the Zeeuwen was serious, the Middelburgsche Courant tended to focus 
on the distribution of bread and foodstuffs in more urban provinces like Noord-Holland 
and towns outside of Zeeland, which might suggest that the consumption of foodstuffs in 
Zeeland was not the issue, but rather the business many Zeeuwse farmers had lost as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Goessche Courant, “De crisis-vergadering in Goes,” 21 November 1930, 1. “Een crisis-vergadering als 
die van Woensdag had gemakkelijk in een felle protest-vergadering kunnen ontaarden. Dat dit niet is 
geschied, is te danken aan de leiding, die bij mr. Dieleman in vertrouwde handen was, en aan de 
bezadigden aard der meeste Zeeuwen.” 
108 de Bree, Zeeland, 1940-1945, 18. “Eenparig waren de samengestroomden van mening, dat de 
boerenstand steun van de overheid behoefde, onverwijld steun: maatregelen tegen dumping (zonodig 
verhoging van invoerrechten), subsidie voor de teelt van suikerbieten en invoering van een maalgebod, 
waarbij het gebruik van een zeker percentage inlandse tarwe verplicht zou worden gesteld; afschaffing van 
de vleesaccijns.” 
109 Goessche Courant, “De crisis-vergadering in Goes,” 21 November 1930, 1. “Spoed kan veel leed en 
veel ellenden voorkomen!” 
110 Goessche Courant, “De crisis-vergadering in Goes,” 21 November 1930, 1. “In een tarieven-oorlog kan 
een klein landje zich onthouden zoolang het dermate afhankelijk is van zijn export als Nederland. Wij 
zullen dienen af te wachten wat onze regeering met onze landbouwers van plan is.” 
111 Goessche Courant, “De crisis-vergadering in Goes,” 21 November 1930, 1. “De vergadering is een 
groot success geworden! Maar hiermede zijn we er nog niet!” 
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result of poor market conditions.112 Nonetheless, the combination of higher tariffs, lower 
commodity and land prices resulted in an increased rate of unemployment by the mid-
1930s. 
The fishing industry on which a large number of Zeeuwen traditionally depended 
also experienced similar pressures. The main fishing areas around Breskens, 
Brouwershaven, Tholen, Yerseke, Arnemuiden, Veere, and Vlissingen were largely 
unaffected until the early 1930s. In 1934, however, France and Belgium closed their 
borders to the traditional supply of Zeeuwse shrimp, oysters, mussels, and other pelagic 
foodstuffs. These were the traditional markets to which Zeeuwen exported their fish. The 
French and Belgian decrees were so stringent that many fishermen were left unemployed, 
exacerbating the employment conditions in the province.113By the 1940s, Nazi authorities 
dictated the rates at which farmers were paid for produce and livestock, sustaining 
agricultural activities at least for the first few years of occupation. 
One of the measures the provincial and central governments took to alleviate the 
financial and unemployment crisis involved strengthening key manufacturing sectors 
through subsidies, though this typically only helped larger port towns like Vlissingen and 
Terneuzen. This meant that shipbuilding companies and maritime industry garnered 
greater attention from politicians in Middelburg and Den Haag. By the early 1930s, the 
Province had requested the construction of several large ships in Vlissingen: the 
passenger-carrying Dempo and the motor ship Bengalen. Both of these ships, however, 
were ordered by the company Rotterdam Lloyd, but constructed in Vlissingen. Other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See for instance Middelburgsche Courant, “Brooduitdeeling aan kamerleden,” 26 November 1930, 1. 
113 de Bree, Zeeland, 1940-1945, 20. “In 1934 besloten Belgie en Frankrijk de invoer van garnalen te 
contingenteren. De maatregelen waren zo streng, dat de grenzen in feite voor dit visserijprodukt gesloten 
werden, althans een groot deel van het jaar…In Breskens bleef inderdaad een aantal schepen werkloos 
langs de kade liggen.”  
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ships constructed as a way to generate the economy and decrease unemployment included 
two submarines for the Koninklijke Marine (Dutch Royal Navy) and the fire-fighting 
boat, Havendienst VI. The construction of these vessels still did not have the impact 
politicians had hoped for. In 1933, companies De Schelde and the Provinciale 
Stoombootdienst, with support of the central government and the Royal Dutch Navy, 
began building the naval ship Johan Maurits van Nassau, which during the invasion of 
Nazi Germany in 1940 became a cornerstone of Dutch defense.114 After 1933, the 
maritime companies in the province put more effort into producing turbines, motors, 
boilers, and other necessary parts.115 During Nazi occupation, Vlissingen became an 
important centre for maritime construction, which helped relieve unemployment in the 
town. 
In one week in January 1934, 1,082 men and 8 women were registered as 
unemployed of Vlissingen’s total population of 21,716 (see Appendix I).116 Although the 
Province did try to provide unemployment relief, their efforts were rarely enough to assist 
such large numbers of unemployed citizens. For instance, while about 1,121 people in 
Vlissingen registered as unemployed, only 129 were on relief.117 These data come from 
the most populous and industrial town in the province and one can only speculate about 
the situation facing families in more rural areas like Noord-Beveland or Tholen. In 
Tholen, for example, newspaper headlines reflected greater skepticism when it came to 
government assistance to relieve regional unemployment. One lengthy article read “Give 
Us Work!” which addressed many of the problems facing the villages around Tholen and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Vlissingsche Courant, “De N.V. Kon. Maatsch. ‘De Schelde’,” 2 January 1934, 1. 
115 de Bree, Zeeland, 1940-1945, 21. 
116 Vlissingsche Courant, “De werkloosheid,” 3 January 1934, 1. 
117 Vlissingsche Courant, “Werkloozen,” 5 January 1934, 1. 
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warned that “the injustice in income distribution is really concentrated in the younger 
generation, who at the moment see only closed business.” “Here lays the central 
problem,” the article continued, “which is dominated by the distribution of social income. 
There is less to divide and the pot is becoming increasingly smaller as the period of 
austerity and degradation lasts longer and [is] more intense.”118   
The socio-economic challenges of the era led some to speculate about the 
potential offered by alternative political movements, notably communism or national 
socialism. But an apostatical communism found very little support in most parts of the 
province. In the “battle for better social conditions,” many churches argued that their 
flocks should look to God and not an ideology that considers both Protestantism and 
Catholicism as “opium for the people.”119 Political movements, particularly the NSB, will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, but for now suffice it to say that the 
socio-economic pressures of the economic crises in 1930s pushed many Zeeuwen into 
thinking about the values of burgeoning political movements. Although some churches 
appear to have stressed the importance of refraining from atheism and communism for 
confessional reasons, every major newspaper in the province was writing about the 
developments of European politics. Without overstating the influence of newspapers 
among the Zeeuwen, the number of papers in the province carrying stories about Adolf 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Thoolsche Courant, “Geeft Ons Arbeid!,” 6 April 1934, 1. “De onrechtvaardigheid in de verdeeling van 
het inkomen concentreert zich in onzen tijd bij de jongere generatie, die momenteel het bedrijfsleven voor 
zich gesloten ziet. Ook voor de werkeloozen, die uit het productieproces gestooten zijn en die nergers 
anderseen onderkomen weten te vinden. Zij krijgen hun werkloozensteun, die weliswaar minder is dan zij 
met werk zouden hebben verdiend, maar voor broodsgebrek worden zij ongetwijfeld gespaard...Hier ligt nu 
het zwaartepunt van het probleem, dat beheerscht wordt door de verdeeling van het maatschappelijk 
inkomen. Er is minder te verdeelen en de pot wordt hoe langer hoe kleiner, naarmate de periode van 
versobering, van afbraak langer duurt en intenser wordt.” 
119 Thoolsche Courant, “De strijd voor betere sociale toestanden. De kerk tegen Atheisme en Bolsjewisme,” 
18 December 1936, 1. “Even lang als het communisme bestaat, bestaat ook de strijd van de kerk, zoowel 
protestant als katholiek, [?] deze ideologie, die openlijk het atheisme predikt en elken godsdienst als 'opium 
voor het volk' beschouwt.” 
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Hitler, Benito Mussolini, the Soviet Union, and the war in Spain, suggest that Zeeuwen 
were at the very least familiar with national socialism and communism—even if the 
ideologies were presented in a distorted way.120 Jan Zwemer has rightly argued that the 
economic crises of the 1930s, and the massive unemployment that the crises produced, 
led to a “crisis of democracy” in Zeeland on which the origins of the Nationaal-
Socialistische Beweging (NSB/National-Socialist Movement) in the province 
capitalized.121 The boom and bust of the 1920s and 1930s had profound implications for 
both occupation and post-war recovery. 
 
Conclusion 
  An exploration of Zeeland’s experiences during the Great War and after shows 
that the province experienced some of wartime’s hardships exemplified by stringent food 
regulation policies and government interference in most daily activities, such as 
conventional agricultural patterns and local economies. In addition to these economic 
pressures, many of Zeeland’s inhabitants were also subjected to the sights and sounds of 
war. Bombs occasionally dropped on Zeeland’s territory, neutral Dutch ships were sunk 
in the Schelde, and the Province had to deal with a massive influx of Belgian refugees, 
among other problems. But while Belgian and French civilians endured unprecedented 
violence and destruction on their own territory, the Dutch maintained their neutrality 
through strong government and were never under the sovereignty of a foreign power. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 In the Thoolsche Courant alone, see headlines for 17 July 1936, 18 December 1936, 14 August 1936, 13 
November 1936, 31 December 1936, 5 June 1936, 6 November 1936, 15 May 1936, 6 March 1936, 18 
September 1936. 
121 Zwemer, Zeeland 1945-1950, 25. “…de economische crisis van de jaren 1930 met haar werkloosheid en 
de ‘crisis van de democratie’, die zich in Nederland rondom de NSB gemanifesteerd had en waarvan de 
Duitse bezetting als het ware het hoogtepunt vormde.” 
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This had a profound effect on the political culture and mentality of politicians in the 
country. In the final analysis, this was one of the most crucial differences in the wartime 
experiences of western European states. For the Netherlands, it reinforced the idea that 
neutrality could stave off even the most destructive war in Europe’s history. On the other 
hand, a position of armed neutrality in Belgium did nothing to prevent Imperial German 
armies from invading. Later, we will see this experience profoundly shaped how Dutch 
authorities would conceptualize reconstruction and recovery efforts. 
 The 1920s ushered in the expansion of industry, infrastructure, and a prosperous 
agricultural market once it had recovered from wartime regulation. The general 
prosperity many Zeeuwen had experienced during the 1920s had subsided according to 
broader financial developments outside of the Province in 1930. Zeeland’s predominantly 
agricultural economy was once again affected by external market forces and resulted in 
the loss of business for many farmers and fishermen. While the government attempted to 
subsidize larger industries, like the shipbuilding sector in Vlissingen, these measures did 
little to assuage the crisis in other parts of the Province like Tholen and Goes. 
Consequently, some in the province thought that assistance was beyond the capacity of 
strong government, or that their government was simply not strong enough. It sowed 
some seeds for dissension in an already disparate province and, like elsewhere in Europe, 
provided a foundation on which alternative ideologies could build. While the Netherlands 
remained neutral during Germany’s rearmament in the late 1930s, ideologies from 
outside Zeeland began crossing the borders well before the Second World War began. 
Some of the salient issues addressed here serve as a backdrop against which we can 
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explore how Zeeland negotiated Nazi occupation, war and destruction, and, finally, post-
war recovery. 
  
 60 
CHAPTER II 
 
Nazi Occupation in the Countryside 
 
 In De Aanslag (The Assault), set in Nazi-occupied Holland, award-winning Dutch 
novelist Harry Mulisch wrote that “a man who has never been hungry may possess a 
more refined palate, but he has no idea what it means to eat.”122 Mulisch referred to the 
so-called “Hunger Winter” of 1944-1945, an event which has become so entrenched, 
particularly in English-language conceptions of Dutch occupation experiences, that few 
would contest its historicity. In the 1980s Henri van der Zee, whose account of starvation 
in Nazi-occupied Holland helped reinforce this narrative, opined “it dawned on me that 
the story of Nazi-occupied Holland is almost unknown, even though, according to one 
American writer, of all Western democracies the Netherlands had suffered the hardest 
fate.”123 While there is no doubt that the provinces of Noord- and Zuid-Holland suffered 
greatly during this period, particularly the Dutch-Jewish communities, this chapter differs 
from conventional interpretations, which are almost entirely based on evidence from 
urban and highly populated regions in the Netherlands, and demonstrates that the 
situation facing rural Zeeland was different. This historiographical trend can be found in 
arguably the most seminal English-language study on the Netherlands during Nazi 
occupation written by Werner Warmbrunn in the 1960s.124 A recent study by Ralf 
Futselaar, however, has cast doubt on the effects of De Hongerwinter in rural areas. 
Using quantitative data and a wealth of manuscript sources, Futselaar suggests that in 
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rural areas people managed to avoid starvation by acquiring sufficient calories from their 
own regions.125 This, however, as he points out, was simply not the case in densely 
populated and urban cities in which civilians could not acquire substantial foodstuffs. 
Futselaar estimates that about 9,000 Dutch civilians died from starvation during the 
winter of 1944-1945, while 26,000 alone died of tuberculosis during occupation.126 The 
central point is not to belittle the significance or degree of suffering, but to ask whether 
the experiences of urbanized Dutch citizens are representative of overall experience.  
This chapter sheds light on the history of occupation in a rural province and 
highlights what Nazi occupation was like in a more rural environment. More broadly, it 
charts the experiences of both German occupiers and Dutch civilians in Zeeland from 
May 1940 up to the Allied invasion in 1944. In many ways, the Dutch were not prepared 
for an invasion given their experience in the previous twenty years. It argues that the 
intial presence of occupying forces in this part of the country reduced some of the 
unemployment of the 1930s and was not altogether intrusive. It was, in other words, a 
benign occupation. As time went on, however, German strategic concerns over the 
Schelde shifted the nature of occupation and became increasingly restrictive. This chapter 
suggests that Allied liberation in autumn 1944 represented a more costly and physically 
damaging period than the four years under Nazi occupation. This chapter is not meant to 
be comprehensive, but rather designed to sketch what occupation was like in the 
province. For purposes of clarity, this chapter primarily uses a thematic structure because 
of its variegated content.  
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 The previous chapter has shown how Dutch politicians and leaders clung to their 
neutral status to avoid being dragged into war in 1914. But, as Abbenhuis rightly points 
out, the Dutch government barely accomplished this. The experiences of the Netherlands 
during the First World War and the crises that followed it were fundamental in shaping 
Dutch mentalities during the late 1930s. Leaders in the provinces as well as in Den Haag 
believed that Nazi Germany, in the event of escalating tensions, would respect their 
neutral status as the Great Powers had in 1914.127 This idea only partly accounts for the 
lack of preparation and inadequate defense policy in 1939-1940. Gathering reliable 
intelligence posed another problem. Information regarding the timing of the German 
invasion was received from Major G.S. Sas, the Dutch military attaché to Berlin, who in 
turn received intelligence from an Abwehr officer, Colonel Hans Oster, posted at the 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) in Berlin.128 Oster was later executed by the 
Germans for his relations with the Dutch government. He forwarded timely information 
about potential attacks, which were invariably cancelled or pushed back according to 
Hitler’s capricious personality. As a result, Den Haag consistently played down the 
possibility of invasion, and politicians and military commanders alike remained skeptical 
about information deriving from Oster in Berlin.129 When Nazi Germany invaded in May 
1940, the Dutch government and military were caught unprepared. 
 It took the Wehrmacht about one week to force Dutch General Henri Winkelman 
to capitulate formally on 15 May 1940. Queen Wilhelmina and her government were then 
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en route to London to spend the war in exile. Zeeland was one of the last places to be 
occupied on 17 May 1940, two days after the Netherlands formally capitulated. And this 
was only after the Luftwaffe bombarded Zeeland’s capital, Middelburg, causing a great 
deal of destruction to the Grote Markt and Stadhuis among other buildings.130 Some 
historians in Zeeland refer to this act as a “terrorbombing,” since the Netherlands had 
already formally surrendered.131 In some ways, this event helps explain how quickly the 
German forces overran the country. The Dutch units in Zeeland were under the command 
of schout-bij-nacht (Rear Admiral) H.J. van der Stad, whose primary objective was to 
defend the route through Zuid-Beveland to Walcheren. There were provincial positions in 
two places: near the decommissioned Fort Bath and the so-called Zanddijkstelling, which 
remained fundamental to the defense of Zuid-Beveland and Walcheren. The Bathstelling 
was defended by 14th Grensbataljon under the leadership of Majoor F.G. Triebal and 
consisted of twelve casemates, one anti-tank ditch, and some flooded terrain.132 The 
remainder of Zeeland’s islands, however, were sparsely defended. The important airfield 
in Haamstede on Schouwen-Duiveland, for instance, was guarded by only one company 
(bewakingstroepen) and one anti-aircraft battery.133 The core of Winkleman’s policy, 
therefore, aimed to defend against the violation of neutrality, and not necessarily to 
launch offensives. The emphasis on defence is a continuity of Dutch strategy that can at 
least be traced back to the Napoleonic era. In Zeeland, van der Stad aimed to protect the 
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administrative center of the Province, Middelburg, where the attack would undoubtedly 
be directed. 
 On the morning of 10 May, the French 60th Division d’infantrie under the 
command of général de brigade Marcel Deslaurens, along with elements of the 68th 
Division d’infantrie and others, arrived in Zeeland to aid Dutch forces. French 
commander Durand arrived on 11 May and met with van der Stad. Durand appeared 
unimpressed by the Dutch troops and questioned van der Stad’s strategy. The Dutch 
commander later recalled that “General Durand complained about my modest troop 
strength, especially the lack of sufficient artillery and antiaircraft batteries, he also 
explained that he had received orders to defend the islands to the last and he would do so, 
but I immediately got a strong impression that his main concern was to see that his road 
to retreat was secured.”134 From the very beginning, there existed some dissension among 
the decision makers and commanders in Zeeland during this crucial period. Above all, 
this suggests that there was no prior planning between the two countries, likely a result of 
the Dutch commitment to armed neutrality. This statement is indicting for a number of 
reasons. Did van der Stad blame the French for the failed defence of the province?  
Despite tensions in the command, the manipulation of the Province’s topography 
posed a number of problems for the attackers, notably the flooding of large areas in and 
around Kruiningen at the behest of Dutch authorities, which forced the German advance 
to follow the line from Zuid-Beveland to Walcheren. Nevertheless, Dutch historians have 
referred to the rapid advance of the XXVI Armeekorps through Limburg, Noord-Brabant, 	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and Zeeland.135 The Middelburgsche Courant, which stopped printing daily issues from 
14 to 20 May 1940, reported that German sources claimed to have taken 1,600 French 
and 13,000 Dutch troops as prisoners.136 This also included General Winkleman. The war 
for the Netherlands was over and this effectively marked the beginning of Nazi 
occupation.  
Given the circumstances of preparation and intelligence, the war in May 1940 was 
necessarily limited to a defensive one. Although French and Belgian units arrived in 
Zeeland to hinder German advances, there was, as H.W. van den Doel has pointed out, 
inadequate communication and coordination between Dutch and French commanders, 
which precluded an effective defense against a far superior force.137 By the afternoon of 
17 May, the SS Standarte ‘Deutschland’ had crossed the Sloedam, and by late evening 
the German advance reached Middelburg. In total, 38 soldiers from the Koninklijke 
Landmacht, 49 sailors from the Koninklijke Marine, and about 229 French soldiers were 
killed in action. During their advance through Zeeland, 22 Germans were killed and an 
additional 17 were killed in their attempt to gain the Sloedam.138 Although the Germans 
had fully captured Zeeland by 17 May, it took the Germans roughly two weeks to occupy 
more remote towns. The burgemeester of Breskens, for example, first came into contact 
with German troops on 31 May, while Middelharnis’ (Zuid-Holland) burgemeester met 
with German authorities on 24 May 1940.139 
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 The operational details of the Meidagen do not convey the consternation of 
Zeeland’s civilian population, which also suffered casualties. As L.W. de Bree has 
described, many civilians had begun to evacuate to safer villages away from the fighting. 
In Yerseke, which faces the Oosterschelde, some sought refuge in villages in nearby 
Zuid-Beveland like ‘s-Heer Arendskerke, Wolphaartsdijk, Wilhelminadorp and the 
commune of Kortgene, Kats, and Colijnsplaat in Noord-Beveland. A schoolmaster in 
Yerseke, J. Glerum, established several of these evacuation routes on 10 May, some of 
which would be used in 1944 and again 1953.140 During the several days of fighting, 
Middelburg’s civilians suffered considerably. Jan Zwemer estimates that about 22 
civilians were killed and over 573 buildings damaged. This was more than the rest of the 
Province combined.141 Yet, according to Nazi decree, civilians were to return to the 
addresses which were recorded by the communes in which they lived. The burgemeesters 
throughout the Province sent detailed lists to the German authorities regarding all 
inhabitants and any munitions, firearms, knives, military clothing or equipment in or near 
each household.142 The burgemeesters needed to complete these lists as soon as possible 
and submit them to the German commandant of Middelburg, whose headquarters was 
located in the Molenwater 115. The final occupation of Middelburg marked the end of 
resistance to the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands. The defeat of Zeeland, where the last 
Dutch and French troops saw action, initiated a period of withdrawal. Those Dutch and 
foreign forces still in the province withdrew across the Belgian border, many making 
their way to France. 
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German Civilian Administration in the Netherlands and Zeeland 
Werner Warmbrunn, whose work appeared in 1963, provided historians with the 
first systematic overview of Dutch reactions to German measures imposed onto 
administration and politics, the press and universities.143 This was the first general survey 
available to English scholars, but Warmbrunn primarily focused on Dutch reactions to 
nazification.144 In the mid-1980s Gerhard Hirschfeld published an important study on 
Dutch collaboration in German, later to be translated into English, which represented a 
significant contribution to the so-called “goed en fout” (“good and bad”) debates of the 
1970s and 1980s. Hirschfeld’s purpose, however, was to clarify the political, social, and 
economic conditions which made cooperation or collaboration in almost every sector a 
possibility.145 Together, these two studies offer the most thorough analyses available to 
English readers, but both neglect the pressures of occupation in rural regions including 
Zeeland. Hirschfeld mentions Zeeland once in passing, while Warmbrunn sometimes 
includes Zeeland in serial lists when referring to events in other Provinces.146 It is, 
therefore, important to identify how occupation in Zeeland took form, beginning with the 
establishment of German administration, as well as how civilians reacted to the new 
order. 
 By 13 May 1940, the Queen and the Dutch cabinet had left the Netherlands and 
delegated the highest authority in the country to General Winkleman. When Winkleman 	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capitulated formally on 15 May, he surrendered all authority to the German government 
and its armed forces. Following the German occupation of Middelburg on 17 May, Hitler 
assigned the supreme civilian authority in the occupied territory to a High Commissioner, 
Arthur Seyss-Inquart, an Austrian lawyer who had served as Austrian Chancellor during 
the Anschluss in 1938. This made Seyss-Inquart the Reichskommisar für die besetzen 
niederländischen Gebiete (High Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands). In this 
way, Hitler hoped to maintain a civilian administration in the Netherlands along the lines 
of the Norwegian model in which the civilian apparatus operated almost entirely separate 
from its military counterpart.147 In a letter dated 9 July 1940, for example, the 
commander of German troops in the Netherlands emphasized the importance of this 
distinction for Dutch civilians: “Whether or not the respect of the Dutch for Germany will 
develop further depends on whether or not, even with the increased presence of soldiers 
of the German Army, the previous peace is maintained and through the disciplined and 
given demeanor of the German troops. This cannot be achieved by trying to immediately 
come into close contact with the civilian population, but only by maintaining the 
necessary distance and impeccable behaviour of the troops themselves. The more difficult 
England's situation becomes, all the more will the Dutch look for a certain dependence on 
Germany.  It is the most important and beholden task of the soldiers of the German Army 
in the Netherlands to lay the foundations for this end.”148 The separation of military and 
civilian apparatuses, therefore, remained an important component of occupation. 	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Warmbrunn has pointed to different phases of the occupation, the first was 
characterized by relatively little coercion or violence and lasted from May 1940 to the 
spring of 1941. During this time, German employment services recruited labour, but did 
not force Dutch civilians to work in Germany. The Germans made sporadic arrests of 
civilians as reprisals for the alleged mistreatment of German civilians in the Dutch East 
Indies.149 But, as far as administration is concerned, the Germans permitted some 
political expression by liberal and denominational parties. This general leniency would 
transmute into a different style of occupation as the war progressed. In some ways, the 
increasingly strict regulation of economic matters discussed in the previous chapter, 
resembles some of the early features of occupation in 1940. 
 Within the first years of occupation much of the Dutch administrative apparatus 
remained intact. According to Hitler’s decree of 29 May 1940, Seyss-Inquart was directly 
subordinate to and derived his authority from Hitler. As Reichskommissar, Seyss-Inquart 
had four Generalkommissare (Commissioners General, GK) who oversaw administration 
and justice, finance and economy, security matters, and special affairs.150 In theory, 
Seyss-Inquart and the GK could call upon various Dutch authorities, offices, and 
institutions to implement certain regulations or laws. One of the most important ways in 
which nazification developed was through communal and provincial administration. 
Rather than change or “modernize” the provincial government in the Netherlands, the 
early period of occupation was characterized by attempts to “supervise” the smooth 	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transition to nazification.151 By August 1941, however, this mantra changed with Decree 
152/1941, which provided burgemeesters, but particularly Provincial Commissioners, 
with extensive authority over subordinate levels of administration. Most provincial 
governments in the Netherlands had already been suspended because of the ban on 
parliamentary parties, or were either dissolved or reduced to an advisory function.152 This 
had important consequences for Zeeland’s administrations, in part because this enabled 
more sympathetic individuals to work with Nazi authorities. 
 The tasks that Seyss-Inquart performed at the national level were delegated to the 
Beauftragte des Reichskommissars (BRK, Representative of the Reichskommissar) who 
represented Seyss-Inquart in the provinces. Willi Münzer was tasked with overseeing the 
administration in Zeeland for the duration of the war.153 Gijs van der Ham draws on 
archival evidence to suggest that Münzer came to see Zeeland as a second vaderland, 
which he expressed in a dirge outside of Koudekerke when his daughter died in 1943.154 
As BRK, Münzer worked closely with the highest Dutch authority in Zeeland, the 
Provincial Commissioner. 
 Like in other provinces, Zeeland’s burgemeesters came under the direct 
supervision of an appointed Provincial Commissioner who received increased authority 
and jurisdiction in a variety of areas. Until July 1940, the Provincial Commissioners were 
known as “Crown Commissioners,” who headed the Provincialstaaten and their 
executive bodies, the Deputiertenstaaten.155 Zeeland’s Crown Commissioner, J.W. 	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Quarles van Ufford was relieved in October 1940 for his alleged opposition to the regime 
and replaced by P. Dieleman.156 Before the war Dieleman was a deputy in the Anti-
Revolutionaire Partij (ARP), many of whose members went either underground or into 
exile in 1940. J. Kramer-Vreugendhil argues that before 1940 Dieleman showed no signs 
of sympathy towards the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging (NSB) cause or the Nazi 
regime. But he curiously chose to work very closely with the Nazis in late 1940.157 The 
relationship between Dieleman and the BRK was essential for the administration of the 
Province. 
 Another important administrative apparatus was the civilian police forces, 
although it is important to note that it was quite limited in manpower. The 
Ordnungspolizei established an office in Middelburg in the Dam 6-8. In every province, 
the BRK established one police officer who reported directly to the BRK, known as the 
Polizeioffizier beim Beauftragten.158 In Zeeland, this position was given to another 
German, W. Staub, who took orders from the Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei, 
headquartered in Den Haag. The Zeeuwsche Ordnungspolizei was also tasked with 
enforcing curfews and issuing special permits for certain businesses or travel. On 
occasion, they were called into Vlissingen to disperse a strike at the shipbuilding firm De 
Schelde.159 The Zeeuws police, however, were “primarily a matter of secondary 
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importance” since they were one of many police organizations in the Nazi hierarchy.160 In 
a way, the German authorities eased the civilian apparatus into occupation in much the 
same way that the Dutch government negotiated neutrality during the First World War.  
Two other police organizations in Zeeland were the Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) and 
the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). The former sought to suppress anti-German sentiment and 
combat espionage while the latter was primarily used for gathering intelligence. All 
police organizations in the Netherlands were under the authority of Hanns Rauter, the 
Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer, who was directly subordinate to Heinrich Himmler.161 As 
the war progressed, the Germans established smaller Aussenstellen (regional offices) 
throughout the country. Because of its topography Zeeland had three: one in Middelburg 
(Walcheren), Terneuzen (Zeeuws-Vlaanderen), and Zierikzee (Schouwen-Duiveland).162 
A total of six German police officers, assisted by six Zeeuwen, were assigned to combat 
illegal activity in the Province. By 1944, van der Ham estimates that in all of the 
Netherlands there were only between 300 and 350 Germans working for the Sipo and SD. 
That number increased to 700 when the number of Dutch police officers working for both 
organizations are included.163 Given these figures, one can assume that the need for a 
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stronger German police presence in Zeeland was unnecessary.164 In short, the German 
police presence in the province was not overwhelming. 
 
Nationaal-Socialitische Beweging (NSB) 
  The economic crises that permeated the fabric of most European societies during 
the 1930s had considerable implications for the political landscape. Like most other 
European countries, certain citizens of the Netherlands succumbed to the rhetoric of 
National Socialism and its promise of change in the particularly challenging socio-
economic conditions of the depression. The Nationaal-Socialitische Beweging (NSB) in 
the Netherlands was led by Anton Adriaan Mussert, a waterstaat engineer, who, 
according to one recent study of his life, learned many of his anti-democratic attitudes 
from his father.165 In Zeeland, Jan A. Dekker, the director of two factories in Goes (Zuid-
Beveland), became the most important member of the NSB. Dekker, along with his older 
brother, joined the NSB as early as 1933.166  Given his zealousness, Dekker was made 
leader of his Zeeuwse district until May 1942, when Mussert made him NSB leader of the 
province, with headquarters in Goes, where he would remain until September 1944.167 
Mussert organized the administration of the party in districts, which more or less 
coincided with provincial borders. The NSB supreme headquarters were in Utrecht. The 
larger cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Den Haag, however, formed their own 
entities. Zeeland, district 14, was divided into four main departments (kringen): Noord-
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Zeeland (Schouwen-Duiveland, Tholen en Sint Philipsland), the Bevelanden (Noord- and 
Zuid-), Walcheren, and Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen. These, too, conformed to existing cultural 
and political boundaries, and therefore did not usher in dramatically different power 
structures.168 
 While Dekker was indeed dedicated to the national socialist cause in Zeeland, his 
attitudes were not representative of the province as a whole. For very pragmatic reasons, 
Seyss-Inquart decided to maintain the basic structure of the Dutch government and 
administration, which meant that the German civilian administration had little use for a 
movement that many in the province, and the country as a whole, repudiated. As 
Warmbrunn points out, Seyss-Inquart knew that it was impossible to replace existing 
Dutch officials with members of the NSB when many of its supporters were simply 
unqualified to take up key positions.169 Among German authorities, too, Mussert soon 
acquired a poor reputation. In his letter to Himmler on 19 June 1943, Rauter reported that 
many believed Mussert was “a bourgeois fascist” and simply lacked the political acumen 
for leadership.170 For these reasons, the German regime ignored Mussert and gradually 
displaced existing Dutch administrators with more able members of the party. However, 
this would not take place until 1942-1943. 
 In her study of three villages on Walcheren, Kramer-Vreugdenhil demonstrates 
that in the days following the invasion membership in the NSB across the country grew 
considerably. In June, the NSB boasted a national membership of 27,000, which grew 
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slightly following the capitulation of France.171 By the autumn of 1941, the number of 
NSB members almost tripled.172 This national trend was commensurate with provincial 
patterns. In Zeeland, the NSB grew from 400 members in 1940 to 928 by the end of that 
year. Following Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, Zeeland’s NSB membership grew 
to 1,568 out of a total population of 258,000. This represented about 2 per cent of the 
national figure.173 One might argue that in Zeeland the increase in NSB support 
immediately following the attack on the Soviet Union can in part be explained by a 
confessional ideology, within which communism was perceived by reformed 
communities as anti-Christian, or simply a pragmatic reading of international events that 
would affect life in the province. Table 2 shows NSB membership in Zeeland broken 
down based on registered membership in each of the kringen: 
Number of NSB Members Divided by Kring174 
Noord-Zeeland 317 members 42,197 inhabitants 0.75% 
Bevelanden 382 62,536 0.61% 
Walcheren 290 67,583 0.43% 
Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen 388 85,606 0.45% 
 
These data suggest that formal membership to the NSB in Zeeland was indeed limited. 
This relatively small membership is typically used to dissociate the province from the 
atrocities committed by the Nazi regime elsewhere, and to demonstrate an aversion to 
National Socialism in principle. However, historical reality is often more variegated than 	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the goed en fout debates of the immediate post-war period, which sought to create a rigid 
dichotomy between those who were “good” and those were “bad” during occupation. The 
almost artificial division between collaborators and resistors does a disservice to the 
immensely difficult situations in which the Zeeuwen found themselves. In this way, we 
might either question the veracity or the relevance of NSB membership figures. The 
people of Zeeland were incredibly pragmatic when it came to dealing with the Nazis and 
membership to the NSB does not ipso facto demonstrate that only a small part of the 
population was staunch supporters of National Socialism in general and the Nazi regime 
in particular. In some ways, the lack of NSB support may suggest the degree to which the 
Zeeuwen remained loyal to the country as a whole. As we have seen in Chapter I, the 
people of Zeeland took pride in being part of the Netherlands when Belgium sought to 
annex part of the province, and these loyalties perhaps influenced how Zeeuwen 
perceived the NSB in the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
The Atlantikwall and Organisation Todt in Zeeland 
 In some ways, focusing on Zeeland as a separate entity becomes increasingly 
challenging when we consider German military strategy and defense of the Netherlands. 
In general, the German armed forces often conflated Zeeland and neighboring Zuid-
Holland, and this is particularly true of German defensive planning and the construction 
of Hitler’s continental defense, the Atlantikwall.175 While the German civilian 
administration in the Netherlands differed little between each province, Zeeland and the 
southern sector received particular attention because of its various estuaries and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Hans Sakkers, “De Atlantikwall en Zeeland,” Nehalennia: bulletin van de Werkgroep Historie en 
Archeologie van het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen en de Zeeuwse Vereniging voor 
Dialectonderzoek 149 (2005), 9-13. 
 77 
tributaries, some of which lead directly to Antwerp. Because of its topography and 
waterways, the Schelde became a focal point in German strategy from 1940 onward. This 
also broaches questions about why the Dutch military did not focus on this region during 
the Meidagen. Beginning in September 1940, the people of Zeeland, together with those 
residing on the islands of Zuid-Holland, were forbidden to leave their domiciles and non-
residents were forced to leave. The coasts of Schouwen, Walcheren, and Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen effectively became forbidden territory.176 The Germans declared this region a 
Sperrgebiet, or restricted zone. By 26 September 1942, however, the restriction of 
mobility was loosened in some coastal areas. For example, the ban on traveling between 
Brabant to Sint-Philipsland, Tholen, Zuid-Beveland, or Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen was lifted 
at the behest of Hanns Rauter, Generalkommissar für das Sicherheitswesen and Höhere 
SS-und Polizeiführer.177 The proclamations that curtailed civilian mobility, however, 
were within the purview of the civilian administration. However restrictive the 
Sperrgebiet was, many Zeeuwen rarely left their part of the province and thus did not 
represent a significant disruption to daily life.  
Significant changes came on 14 December 1941 when Hitler ordered the 
construction of coastal defenses across the Netherlands.178 By the invasion of the Soviet 
Union on 22 June 1941, the construction of a western defense system became imperative 
as Nazi Germany opened the eastern front and faced the prospect of a two-front war. On 	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23 March 1942, Hitler issued his more detailed Führerweisung number 40, which 
authorized major construction projects across Zeeland. This order effectively gave 
highest priority to the construction of defenses in Zeeland over all other regions in the 
Netherlands.179 By April 1942, the first group from the Organisation Todt (OT), whose 
headquarters for western European operations was located in Paris, arrived in Vlissingen 
to assess the region.180 Over the course of April and May, OT, along with elements of 
Pioniere of the Wehrmacht, reinforced existing positions and built new ones as part of the 
Atlantikwall. OT was tasked with building an intricate system of bunkers, coastal artillery 
batteries, anti-aircraft positions, minefields, and machinegun nests. By the time of the 
Dieppe raid in August 1942, construction on Zeeland’s defensive positions was well 
underway. By 1 May 1943, over 15,000 bunkers had been completed, 200 of which were 
built between Den Haag and the Oosterschelde (the estuary between Noord-Beveland and 
Schouwen-Duiveland). That 445 were constructed on Walcheren and in Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen alone indicates the importance of the region in German strategy.181 
Both the pace at which construction took place and the magnitude of the program 
broach questions about the manpower and resources required to complete a project so 
extensive. On issues of manpower, the paucity of Dutch literature surrounding qualitative 
experiences of those Zeeuwen forced to work for OT and the Nazi regime precludes a 
balanced assessment of this part of occupation.  However, many families, particularly on 
Walcheren, were forced to evacuate their homes because of the danger construction 	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presented to civilians. In total, some 15,000 Walchenaars (22 percent of the island’s 
population) were evacuated at the behest of Commissaris Dieleman in 1942. Those 
Zeeuwen unable to find alternative accommodations were relocated to Noord-Brabant, 
just east of Roosendaal. These measures were immensely difficult and disrupted life in 
many villages on Walcheren.182  
On 13 July 1943, Hitler mandated that 10 percent of all non-Germans working on 
the Atlantikwall in Zeeland were to relocate from their homes to Germany. OT required a 
large number of workers to help repair towns following Bomber Command’s extensive 
raids against Hamburg or the Ruhr, which on 16-17 May 1943 was heavily damaged.183 
But if being conscripted (or volunteering) to work on the Atlantikwall permitted many 
Zeeuwen to work close to home, then it is hardly surprising some might have chosen to 
work for OT, rather than the Arbeitseinsatz which would force Zeeuwen and other Dutch 
civilians to work abroad. Working on the Atlantikwall also provided an extra 70 to 80 
florins per week.184 In total, about 20,000 Zeeuwen were conscripted to work on the 
Atlantikwall in Zeeland, which greatly exceeds 13,000 and 1,000 civilians mobilized in 
Rotterdam and Dordrecht respectively, most of whom were sent to Germany.185 In short, 
while Nazi authorities implemented conscription, relatively fewer Zeeuwen left their 
home districts. In some cases, as Hans Sakkers and Hans Houterman have demonstrated, 
OT not only made use of local Dutch labor, but also conscripted POWs captured on the 	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eastern front and in Africa. On Walcheren, for example, a concentration camp was 
established at Koudekerke to house French colonial POWs, mostly from Morocco and 
Algeria, and they were used extensively in the construction of the Atlantikwall in that part 
of the province.186 As this suggests, life under occupation in this particular part of the 
country allowed locals to work in their home provinces, rather than being forcibly 
removed and conscripted for work outside the country.  
 
Economy in Zeeland and Occupation 
 As Ralf Futselaar reminds us, the reasons for the invasion of the Netherlands lay 
not in the economic advantages for the occupiers, but rather its strategic position.187 Yet, 
for agrarian provinces and economies like Zeeland, occupation had provided 
opportunities for businesses and farmers. One of the first tasks for the Nazi regime in the 
Netherlands involved the devaluation and assimilation of the Dutch currency. On 17 May 
1940, the Thoolsche Courant informed their readers that the German regime declared that 
1.5 Reichmarks would be henceforth equal to one guilder, 10 pfennig to 7 cents, 25 
pfennig to 16.5 cents, and so on.188 While the switch to a foreign currency within the 
Netherlands was certainly unfamiliar, some of the controls the civilian administration 
placed on farmers and business in Zeeland were not unlike those imposed on the 
agriculture sector during the First World War and the depression years. However, the 
German devaluation of currency eventually put a strain on the Dutch economy. As the 	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previous chapter has demonstrated, the Dutch government had already restricted and 
strictly regulated agricultural imports and exports during the 1930s so, in this respect, 
wartime agricultural controls did not represent a monumental caesura in agrarian 
economies. B.A. Sijes estimates that the total number of unemployed in the Netherlands 
just before the invasion reached roughly 500,000.189 By the end of 1940 there were 
325,000 Dutch men and women registered as unemployed (114,000 more than in the 
previous month), in addition to 70,000 demobilized and jobless soldiers, all of whom 
were seeking work.190 For many, occupation provided employment. Indeed, under 
occupation Zeeland’s rich agricultural sector provided foodstuffs for not only the 
province, but also elsewhere in the country.191  
 To help stimulate the Dutch economy Hitler declared that the majority of non-
professional soldiers captured during the invasion were to be released by 30 May 1940. 
In a communiqués, he wrote that because the Dutch civilian population had followed the 
“Laws of Humanity” (Gesetze der Menschlichtkeit) and cared for wounded German 
soldiers, the majority of Dutch prisoners of war were to be released.192 This, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Sijes, De Arbeidsinzet, 663. 190	  Sijes, De Arbeidinzet, 663.	  
191 van der Ham, Zeeland, 1940-1945, 116. 
192 NIMH, Duitse Bezetting, 419, inv. 138. “Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, Nr. 
32/40,” 30-5-1940. “Der holländische Soldat aber hat überfall offen und ehrlich gekämpft und unsere 
Verwundeten und Gefangenen entsprechend gut behandelt. Die Zivilbevölkerung hat nicht am Kampfe 
teilgenommen und ebenfalls die Gesetze der Menschlichkeit gegenüber unseren Verwundeten erfüllt. 
Ich habe mich daher für Holland entschlossen, die Genehmigung zur Freilassung der gefangen 
holländischen Soldaten zu erteilen. 
Die Hälfte der holländischen Armee wird mit sofortiger Wirkung entlassen. In erster Linie 
kommen holländische Wehrmachtangehörige in Frage, die in der Landwirtschaft, in Bergwerken, in der 
Nahrungsmittelindustrie, in der Bauindustrie und in verwandten Betrieben tätig sind. Die übrigen 
Angehörigen der holländischen Wehrmacht sollen allmählich demobilisiert werden, um die Wirtschaft 
nicht zu überlasten und Arbeitslosigkeit hervorzurufen. Sinngemäß gelten dieselben Bestimmungen für 
diejenigen holländischen Soldaten, die sich in Deutschland in Kriegsgefangenschaft befinden. Für die 
holländischen Berufssoldaten werde ich eine Entscheidung noch treffen.	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had more to do with the economic advantages of gradually mobilizing the POWs into 
industrial and agricultural projects than it did with Hitler’s good will. 
 Shortages of horses and the scarcity of fertilizers were perennial problems with 
which the Zeeuwen had to deal during occupation. These were just some of the 
consequences occupation had on the most important sector of the provincial economy.193 
The output and rationing of food was also controlled, but some of these measures came 
into effect during the mobilization of the Dutch armed forces during the Meidagen.194 
German economic policy under occupation generally favored agricultural foodstuffs at 
the expense of livestock. In so doing, the ways in which land was used in Zeeland also 
changed. Beginning in 1941, many plots of pasture land were transformed into arable 
land for agricultural produce. However, as Jan Zwemer has argued, this shift required 
many more drainage points than the province offered. New drainage points lowered the 
ground enough to transform the parcels of land from pasture into arable land, or to build 
bunkers and above-ground constructions. The surplus of livestock was then slaughtered, 
which in large measure accounts for the scarcity of local fertilizers.195   
 Until 1942, when the German military presence in the region crested, farmers in 
Zeeland experienced increased wages for their produce or work. Unemployment, which 
rose steadily during the 1930s, virtually vanished. Additionally, Zeeuwen saw increased 
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193 Zwemer, Zeeland 1945-1950, 72. 
194 Zwemer, Zeeland 1945-1950, 72. “De controle op de voedselvoorziening verscherpte bovendien. In het 
kader van de mobilisatie waren in augustus 1939 trouwens al maatregelen getroffen: instelling van de 
akkerbouw-, veehouderij, groente- en fruitcentrales.” 
195 Zwemer, Zeeland 1945-1950, 72. He writes “In Zeeland was zo'n verandering van bodemgebruik ook 
mogelijk en vanaf 1941 werd veel grasland omgezet in bouwland. Daarbij liep men natuurlijk aan tegen een 
snel groeiend tekort aan draineerbuizen die nodig waren om de lagere weidepercelen geschikt te maken 
voor de bouwprodukten. Zo kwam de Zeeuwse landbouw in dienst te staan van de voedselvoorziening van 
het Derde Rijk en het bezette Nederland: "handelsgewassen" was een irrelevant begrip geworden door de 
teeltvoorschriften en leverantieplicht, de overtollig verklaarde veestapel werd deels afgeslacht.” 
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changes as the product of National Socialism and part of the regime’s promise for a better 
future, although, as noted above, sizable numbers of inhabitants were forced to relocate. 
Nonetheless, resistance to the regime in Zeeland from 1940 to 1942 was almost non-
existent, a topic discussed in greater detail below.196 There were, however, cases in which 
German economic policy disrupted and interfered with daily life in Zeeland, but the 
extent to which policy interfered with daily life corresponded to the progress of war. For 
example, as German construction projects preoccupied more local labour, authorities 
recognized potential shortages in agricultural production. Both Dutch and German 
authorizes also noted a shortage of workhorses.197     
 Zeeland’s provincial archive in Middelburg holds an extensive collection of 
documentation pertaining to agricultural development in the province. One such holding 
is that of the Rijkslandbouwconsulent voor Zeeland (State Agricultural Advisory of 
Zeeland), which covers the period from 1893 to 1958. Although the advisory board 
remained active during occupation, the documentation covering the occupation is 
curiously thin and contains only a series of fragmented correspondence in both Dutch and 
German regarding a debate between the Generalkommissar für Finanz und Wirtschaft 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, who then directed the 
Rijkslandbouwconsulent voor Zeeland in Goes.198 The initial correspondence indicates 
that some of the areas used for Luftwaffe airfields were on plots of fertile grassland, 
which farmers could use for feeding or grazing livestock.199 Local farmers in and around 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 J. Kramer-Vreugdenhil, “Walchenaars over hun verleden,” Zeeland Tijdschrift 12, no. 2 (Juni, 2003), 
44. 
197 van der Ham, Zeeland 1940-1945, 117. 
198 Zeeuws Archief (ZA), 18.1 Rijkslandbouwconsulent voor Zeeland, inv. 256. 
199 ZA, 18.1 Rijkslandbouwconsulent voor Zeeland, inv. 256. Letter to Ministry for Agriculture and 
Fiseries, Den Haag, 22 April 1941. The letter reads “Das auf den Flugplätzen anfallende Futter kann seitens 
der Wehrmacht Dienststellen nicht immer seiner Verwendung zugeführt werden. Damit das Futter aber 
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Vlissingen noticed that excess feed was spoiling and they wanted to use the feed for their 
own purposes. This, however, sparked a lengthy debate about the rate at which the 
Germans should let out the parcels of grassland to local farmers. The debate ran parallel 
to the discussions that took place between farmers during the 1930s. The type of 
arrangement many of the farmers in the area wanted to agree upon had been implemented 
elsewhere in the country, notably in Leeuwarden (Friesland).200 Unfamiliar with the 
rental prices and the average cost of land in Zeeland, the German authorities relied on C. 
Zwagerman in Middelburg who worked for the advisory board. He argued that prices be 
set at 5 Gulden per hectare. The Germans responded unfavorably and claimed that 5 
Gulden was far too low. They wanted to set the price to pre-war standards, which 
fluctuated between 50 and 80 Gulden per hectare, and almost always 80 Gulden when the 
surroundings were promising.201 It took well over three months to decide exactly how 
much the Germans could charge the farmers. The Dutch authorities advised that it would 
take great effort to ensure that the grass would be removed from the land evenly and 
quickly, and this meant that Zeeuwse farmers would have to leave their own land to tend 
rented plots and possibly disrupt the local economy. The solution came when the 
Generalkommissar für Finanz und Wirtschaft, headquartered in Den Haag, gave into 
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nicht verdirbt, wurde mit dem Luftgaukommando Holland vereinbart, dass überflüssige Futtermengen den 
in der Nähe des jeweiligen Flugplatzes ansässigen Holländischen landwirten zur Verfügung gestellt wird. 
Hierbei ist es unbedingt notwendig, dass das anfallende Grünfutter zu dem von dem Luftgaukommando 
bestimmten Zeitpunkt abgenommen wird. Zum Zweck einer reibungslosen Abwicklung dieser 
Angelegenheit wurde mit dem Luftgaukommando vereinbart, dass sich bei notwendigwerden einer 
Futterabgabe an die holländischen Landwirte der Platzlandwirt des betreffende Flugplatzes mit dem 
zuständigen Reichslandbaukonsulenten in Verbindung setzt, um eine zweckmässige Verwetung des 
anfallenden Futters sicherzustellen. Ich bitte daher die Reichslandbaukonsulent anzuweisen, im 
Bedarfsfalle mit den Platzlandwirten der Flugplätze in dieser Frage eng zusammenzuarbeiten.” 
200 ZA, 18.1 Rijkslandbouwconsulent voor Zeeland, 256. Letter to Ministry for Agriculture and Fiseries, 
Den Haag, 22 April 1941. 
201 ZA, 18.1 Rijkslandbouwconsulent voor Zeeland, inv. 256. Letter from Rijkslandbouwconsulent to 
Abteilung Landwirtschaft, 26 May 1941. 
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would remove the grass from airfields and ensile it with acid to prevent the feed from 
spoiling.202 The final correspondence between German and Dutch officials emphasizes 
the speed at which the proposed system should be implemented to avoid further conflict 
with the local farmers and administration. As this example suggests, confrontation 
between the Germans and locals was often circumscribed to economic affairs. More 
importantly, this case highlights the German effort to control the provincial economy for 
the benefit of the German regime. While German authorities were sometimes lenient, 
they sought to devalue the prices of Dutch land and labour. At the same time, however, 
this case shows that the Germans wanted to deal more leniently with the local population 
in this region. 
Quantitative data pertaining to German efforts to recruit labor in Zeeland is 
unavailable, and the only comprehensive study to analyze the Dutch labour force sent to 
Germany was written in 1966. Gijs van der Ham argues that between April 1942 and 
May 1943 a total of 167,000 Dutch civilians were sent to Germany for work, around 
2,350 of whom were Zeeuwen representing just 1.4 percent of the total number.203 This 
represented a small number compared to the Dutch civilians outside of Zeeland forced to 
work in Germany. For better or for worse, Zeeuwen were allowed to stay in their homes. 
Despite the lack of more detailed data, anecdotal evidence exists to support the claim that 
efforts to mobilize the Dutch labour force in the province were largely limited to the 
construction of the Atlantikwall mainly after 1942, and not to be sent abroad as foreign 
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  ZA, 18.1 Rijkslandbouwconsulent voor Zeeland, inv. 256. Letter from Generalkommissar für Finanz 
und Wirtschaft to Rijkslandbouwconsulent voor Zeeland, 23 June 1941. “Unter Mitwirkung von meinem 
Ambtsgenossen Zwagerman, Reichsviehzuchtkonsulent für Zeeland ist eine Organisation zu Stande 
gebracht, wabei eine Anzahl Bauern das Gras vom Flugplatz wegholen und mit Säure ensilieren.”	  
203 Gijs van der Ham, Zeeland, 1940-1945, 150. Van der Ham employs data from the Rijksarbeidsbureau 
(RAB). 
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labour. Later, in West Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen, for instance, daughters, mothers, and wives 
were sometimes targeted by the NSB if male family members had absconded or avoided 
German labour duties. In some cases, hundreds of women were intimidated and 
threatened with prison sentences.204 These threats, however, often came from local 
NSBers and not from the German authorities.  
 
Rural Resistance 
 Perhaps no other subject in Dutch history has been couched in more mythic 
terminology than that of resistance (verzet). Almost immediately following liberation 
Dutch individuals, families, groups, and businesses alike became associated with de 
Duitsers (Germans), de collaborateurs (collaborators), or het verzet (the resistance).205 
This rigid division was part of a larger, and often brutal, socio-political process known as 
Zuivering, or “purification.” The de-nazification of the Netherlands aimed to cleanse and 
bring to justice those individuals who worked with the Nazi regime to pursue ideological 
goals. It affected burgemeesters, members of the NSB, women who had relationships 
with German soldiers, or shops whose owners provided various forms of support for the 
Germans during the war. Post-war statesmen and politicians created a very rigid 
dichotomy between collaborators and resistors that did not allow space for Dutch 
civilians whose very survival depended on the vacillation between goed en fout.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Sijes, De Arbeidsinzet, 394. He writes “De bemiddelaarster in Middelburg, lid van de NSB, bedreigde 
bijv. meisjes met maatregelen tegen de vrouwelijke familieleden, wanneer zij weigerden werk te 
aanvaarden of zouden onderduiken. In Westelijk Zeeuws-Vlaanderen vorderde de Wehrmacht honderden 
meisjes. De afdeling Vrouwen van het arbeidsbureau Nijmegen deed grote moeite, enkele vrouwelijke 
weigeraars in een strafkamp geplaatst te krijgen, waarin zij in enkele gevallen ook slaagde.” 
205 J.W.M Schulten, De geschiedenis van de Ordedienst: Mythe en werkelijkheid van een verzetsorganisatie 
(Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1998), 14. 
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In the early 1980s, however, historian J.C.H. Blom argued adamantly for a more 
nuanced approach to occupation experience, one which moved beyond the stale debates 
of the immediate post-war period.206 While Blom’s argument did not fall on deaf ears in 
the Netherlands, conventional wisdom, particularly in the English-speaking world, 
continues to bifurcate wartime experiences into either collaboration or resistance, with 
resistance as the standard.207 Pieter Lagrou, whose recent work compares the politics of 
memory in the post-war Netherlands, Belgium, and France, notes that in the Netherlands 
successive post-war governments “deliberately constructed a forced consensus around the 
myth of a unanimous resistance, at the expense of veterans’ movements and all forms of 
associative memory.”208 The Dutch government, according to Lagrou, was perhaps the 
most resolute of all European countries to maintain a unanimous resistance myth. 
 The issue of dividing an occupied population along these lines is compounded by 
another problem that historians have failed to highlight: the rural-urban dynamics of 
occupation. Central to any exploration of a rural region during the war is to question the 
extent to which the Zeeuwen were involved in active or passive resistance, and to ask 
whether resistance, as portrayed by Mulisch as well as other historians, was the norm. In 
a province that had a very small Jewish population and relatively small German police 
presence, was Zeeland’s experience of occupation different from other parts of the 
Netherlands?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 J.C.H. Blom, “In de ban van goed en fout? Wetenschappelijke geschiedenisschrijving over de 
bezettingstijd in Nederland,” in Crisis, bezetting en herstel: Tien studies over Nederland, 1930-1950 (Den 
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207 Blom, “Verzet als norm,” in Crisis, bezetting en herstel: Tien studies over Nederland, 1930-1950 (Den 
Haag: B.V. Universitaire, 1989), 151-163. 
208 Pieter Lagrou, “The Politics of Memory: Resistance as a collective myth in post-war France, Belgium 
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 There was a small resistance movement in Zeeland. Almost immediately after the 
capitulation and the capture of the province in May 1940, a small group of former 
soldiers began to organize around ex-mariner A.C. van Beest from Middelburg. Van 
Beest contacted the Inlichtingendienst Nederland (ID, Netherlands Intelligence Service) 
in London. Before their activities could begin, however, the SD infiltrated their circle and 
arrested the participants.209 Dienst Wim, another underground organization, established 
throughout the Netherlands and facilitated by Dutch and Britons in London, was also 
active in Zeeland. In Zuid-Beveland, for example, Kees de Graaff, helped organize the 
spread of an underground newspaper called Trouw (Allegiance). This group also had 
contacts on Walcheren, but specifically within the shipbuilding firm De Schelde in 
Vlissingen. In 1943, an active collaborator, Anton van de Waals, informed the German 
authorities of the group’s aspirations and several of its members were apprehended.210 
More arrests took place in Goes in August 1943 after civilians in that town tried to help a 
German deserter escape. Following the failed attempt, the leaders of Dienst Wim 
reorganized under the name Geheime Dienst Nederland (Netherlands Secret Service). 
This group, as one of its former members recalled, operated in Zeeland but was 
particularly active in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen.211 Another group that operated in Zeeland was 
Groep Albrecht, spread mainly by Kees Bouwer whose family came from Dordrecht but 
had a holiday home in Domburg (Walcheren). Eventually, Bouwer came into contact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 J.P. van Alten, “Spionage—een Zeeuwse bijdrage aan het geallieerde inlichtingenwerk,” Zeeland 
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210 van Alten, “Spionage,” 49. “Via infiltratie door een zogenoemde v-Mann, Anton van de Waals, wist de 
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211 van Alten, “Spionage,” 49. “Daarbij kwamen arrestaties in Goes in Augustus 1943, ten gevolge van een 
mislukte poging tot hulp aan een Duitse deserteur. Na het eind van Groep Wim werd door enkele 
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with Wim Jobse from Aagtekerke (Walcheren).212 Together this small group worked to 
collect information and forward it to London. 
Before exploring what types of resistance existed in the province, it should be 
emphasized that armed resistance, such as the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1943, was 
unwonted and exceptional. Much less extraordinary, and much more pertinent to Allies 
and military authorities, was the collection of troop movements, battery installations, and 
enemy strengths.213 The collection of intelligence, as a form of resistance, did exist in 
Zeeland, although operations were extremely minute and sometimes inconsequential for 
Allied purposes. 
 This brief outline argues that most groups were both highly localized—even when 
organized from London or elsewhere in the Netherlands—and ephemeral. They were 
often quickly and quietly suppressed. More importantly, the efficacy of their work is also 
questionable. By the end of 1943, Dutch intelligence being sent to London regarding 
German troop strengths was generally accurate and extensive. This, however, cannot be 
said for information regarding Zeeland. For example, a top-secret report compiled by one 
resistance network on 31 December 1942, offered information regarding German troop 
strength and movement was limited. The report provided as much as was known about 
the Germans in Zeeland on that date: “’?’ Division (Infantry Division, unknown, Nr. 
Unknown, Emblem unknown.) has been reported at the Zeeland Islands of Noord 
Beveland, Zuid Beveland an [sic] Walcheren with Div.H.Q. at Oostburg, Z.Vl. No further 
information about this Division as yet.”214 The lack of information regarding German 
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214 NIMH, Duitse bezetting, 419, inv. 17. “Netherland Battle-Order (Situation as on 31st December 1942),” 
no. 4. 
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troops is striking when compared to other regions listed in the same report. For example, 
the report details information of troops around Alkmaar (Noord-Holland):  
“the ‘CHALET’ Division (infantry Division, Nr. Unknown) (Emblem: a Chalet in 
circle- Units drawn from Bavaria, Tyrol) Arrival in Netherland in May 1942. 
Division on full strength, Batteries of the divisional artillery in fixed positions, 
very immobile. positions in between and partly behind the Coastal Artillery. 
Fixed slits and weapon-pits all along the coast for the Infantry…This Division has 
one year fighting experience on the Russian Front. It is likely that this division 
will still be more contracted and take up a final position along the Coast from 
approximately The Amsterdam-Noord Zee canal down to The 
Hague/Wassenaar.”215 
By this account, German efforts to maintain Zeeland as a restricted area had kept details 
of their extensive construction all but hidden from the Dutch resistance. Although the 
effects of the aforementioned groups are dubious, one resistance group, which established 
a network in each province and modeled itself on a military hierarchy, was the 
Ordedienst, or Order Service (OD). Of all resistance networks in the province, the OD 
was most effective.  
 In his magisterial work on the OD, J.W.M. Schulten suggests that as an armed 
resistance network the OD saw itself as the dominant resistance organization entrusted by 
the exiled Dutch government, though in reality relations between the OD, other 
movements, and the government were unclear and sometimes strained. After the 
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215 NIMH, Duitse bezetting, 419, inv. 17. “Netherland Battle-Order (Situation as on 31st December 1942),” 
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Interior, NBS) in September 1944, many leading figures in the OD eventually secured 
important positions within the NBS. In the end, the most important contribution of the 
OD was its ability to maintain public order and contribute to the Government’s efforts to 
control other armed resistance groups in the country immediately following the war.216 
 The OD was established in Den Haag almost immediately after the Meidagen and 
began to operate across the Netherlands the following year. Shortly thereafter a large 
number of arrests led to the movement’s denouement. In summer 1942, however, the 
organization regrouped under the leadership of P.J. Six.217 The OD became most active in 
Zeeland when Allied troops pushed out of Normandy in 1944. In Zeeland, the OD 
established district 15 (Gewest-15). The commander of G-15 was a reservist named C.A. 
van Woelderen, who on 30 April 1943 was arrested by the SD because the Germans 
suspected that he had connections with the OD. After many interrogations, however, the 
Germans failed to connect him with the organization, and on 2 December 1943 van 
Woelderen was released from German custody. In practice, van Woelderen worked 
closely with A.F.C. de Casembroot, who had been a deputy in the Provinciale Staten for 
the Province of Zeeland from 1940 to 1941, at which point he became a member of the 
OD. By June 1944, the German authorities once again came searching for van 
Woelderen, which forced him into hiding in Kortgene on Noord-Beveland. On 31 
October 1944, following liberation, van Woelderen went to Goes to meet Militair Gezag 
voor Zeeland captain C.W. Slot to work alongside the Militair Gezag. In the meantime, 
however, the OD had worked to activate radio contact with the Allies upon the capture of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Schulten, De geschiedenis van de Ordedienst, 287ff. 
217 Schulten, De geschiedenis van de Ordedienst, 135. 
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Antwerp in early September 1944.218 Much of the OD’s work in G-15 centered on radio 
communications during the crucial period of September-November 1944. 
 Yet, even this description, based on Schulten’s research on the OD, only permits 
speculation about the extent to which the OD operated in Zeeland. Kramer-Vreugdenhil 
has argued that underground actions, even helping onderduikers, on Walcheren was 
virtually impossible. She claims that the operations of the OD were initiated from those 
outside the province.219 The topography of Walcheren made resistance an extremely 
challenging enterprise, as one former OD member recalled: “you could not stick your 
nose outside of the door without running into a German. Elsewhere, resistance fighters 
were in all directions and they were not trapped like us on Walcheren.”220 Because the 
Germans had declared the islands a restricted zone and imposed a Sperrgebiet, restricting 
mobility and the transfer of personnel. Nonetheless, the OD executed some tasks, 
although opportunities to do so only arrived with the Allies. At that point, the 
responsibilities of the OD included liaising with Allied authorities and maintaining public 
order. These types of tasks were different compared to those executed by Belgian 
resistance groups. As Martin Conway has noted in his book, The Sorrows of Belgium, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Schulten, De geschiedenis van de Ordedienst, 301. 
219 J. Kramer-Vreugdenhil, Eilandbewoners, 156. “Ondergrondse actie, zelfs onderduikers herbergen, was 
op de eilanden lang vrijwel onmogelijk. Toen de Ordedienst toch van de grond kwam, was dat veelal op 
initiatief van mensen die niet op de eilanden geboren waren. Dat had ook te maken met het feit dat uit de 
beroepsgroepen van boeren en arbeiders weinig illegale werkers kwamen, maar veel uit die van 
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220 As cited in J. Kramer-Vreugdenhil, Eilandbewoners, 157. “Je kon je neus niet buiten de deur steken of 
je liep tegen een Duitser op. En elders konden verzetsstrijders alle kanten op, ze zaten niet voor een gat 
gevangen zoals wij in Walcheren.” 
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some resistance fighters guided Allied tanks through Belgian towns and cities, including 
Antwerp.221 
 Piet de Kam, whose wartime experiences are well documented in Kramer-
Vreugdenhil’s local study, was born in Grijpskerke (Walcheren) in 1914. In the 1930s he 
became a reserve officer in the infantry and also worked as the director of Zeeland’s 
Christelijke Boeren- en Tuinersbond (Christian Farmers and Gardeners Association, 
CBTB). During the Meidagen de Kam was mobilized with the 2nd Battalion of the 14th 
Infantry Regiment (3-II 14 RI). In 1941, the CBTB was shut down at the behest of the 
NSB, at which point de Kam joined the OD. Upon liberation, de Kam was made a 
commandant in the NBS and remained in Zeeland until being mobilized in the 8th 
Battalion of the Regiment Stoottropen, which was sent to the Dutch East-Indies 
immediately after the war.222 In October 2012, shortly after his death, de Kam’s personal 
papers were donated to the NIMH in Den Haag. He was part of a small group of OD 
members in the province, the majority of whom were active in radio-communications 
only. Found within his personal archive were lists of men along with their aliases and 
where they had operated. Piet de Kam, or “Black Piet” (Zwarte Piet), was listed as 
“device builder and wireless operator” and worked in this capacity from 1941 onward. 
Likewise, W.M. Jansen or “Redhead Wim” (Rooie Wim) operated as a “code officer,” 
perhaps because of his civilian background as a ship’s draughtsman. Just nine men 
worked in radio communications for the OD operating in Middelburg. In Zeeuws-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Martin Conway, The Sorrows of Belgium: Liberation and Political Reconstruction, 1944-1947 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 60-61. 
222 I am grateful for the permissions granted to me by drs. E.J.J.F. Rossmeisl and the staff at the NIMH for 
permitting me to look through an incomplete and unfinished collection. During my stay, the collection was 
tentatively named, NIMH, De Kam, 510, inventaris.  
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Vlaanderen, only four men operated in the radio service.223 According to this 
documentation, the list details the names, function, and date on which they joined the 
OD. In total, 30 individuals from Zeeland are listed as part of the radio-communications 
service (Radiodienst).224 It is almost certain more men considered themselves part of the 
OD, but the number indicated in de Kam’s documentation suggests very few men could 
create and operate clandestine radios in service of the OD, especially considering their 
civilian professions. Perhaps most instructive is the date on which these men appear to 
have joined, most of whom joined in late 1944. 17 of the 30 men listed by de Kam joined 
in late 1944, while only six joined in 1941. The documentation also shows that by 1943, 
only two men were being trained in Middelburg and an additional two trained in Noord-
Beveland.225 Additionally, these documents are instructive in that they give some idea 
about what type of civilians took part in OD activity. For the most part, the men listed 
here were not agricultural labourers, but often listed as a draughtsman, bookkeeper, 
electrician, telegrapher, and in one case a journalist. Only one man, L. Leendertse from 
Noord-Beveland, was listed as a farmer (veehouder).226Together, these documents found 
in de Kam’s archive show how limited in resources and personnel the OD in Zeeland 
was.  
 In 1947, former burgemeesters were required to answer questions about 
occupation, resistance, and liberation in their respective communes. These sources, 
known as burgermeestersverklaringen (mayors statements), offer some insight into 
various activities in each commune. When asked which notable acts of resistance took 
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place in Breskens, the burgemeester responded with “unknown.”227 In Goes, the 
burgemeester responded to the same question by attaching a small booklet entitled Bezet, 
Verzet, Ontzet (Occupied, Resistance, Relief), while in Middelburg the burgemeester 
claimed two men were shot and killed by German authorities.228 In Middelharnis (Zuid-
Holland), liberated in May 1945, the burgemeester wrote that no notable acts of 
resistance took place in his commune.229 The burgemeester of Terneuzen (Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen) provide the most detail. These responses show that beginning with Dolle 
Dinsdag (Mad Tuesday) in September 1944, about 10 civilians were killed in resistance 
action, although details about the type of action are unclear.230 These documents also 
highlight the diversity of wartime experience from one commune or town to another. 
They tell us that resistance in the rural areas of the Netherlands, and Europe in general, 
requires closer scrutiny. In a dominantly agricultural society, very few individuals 
possessed the technical acumen to build and operate devices for radio and 
communications. This does not necessarily suggest that the people of this province were 
relatively complacent or ambivalent society under Nazi rule. Instead, it indicates that the 
people of this region were pragmatic when it came to enduring occupation, and further 
substantiates the claim that historians have often ignored some common factors that 
dictate whether and how Europeans resisted against the Nazi regime. Occupation was 
characterized by an accommodation in Zeeland, which often blended the lines between 
collaboration and resistance.   	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 Conclusion: Dolle Dinsdag in Zeeland 
 “It was not what one called an orderly retreat,” recalled the burgemeester of 
Terneuzen (Zeeuws-Vlaanderen). “Streets, squares and roads to the town were covered 
with abandoned cars, tanks, lorries, and weapons of all sorts. Heavy guns and tanks were 
arriving in Terneuzen so quickly through canals; munitions trucks and other lorries 
burned. The whole thing was a chaotic sight.”231 The scene in Terneuzen on Dolle 
Dinsdag was played out in innumerable communes throughout Belgium and Zeeland 
following the capture of Antwerp in September 1944.232 From a civilian perspective, it is 
hardly surprising that the war appeared as though it was coming to an end, for the 
German units that had occupied Zeeland for four years had hitherto maintained a stolidly 
calm and orderly image. That calmness gave way to frenetic movements northward. But 
Dolle Dinsdag belied the arduous and destructive battles that lay ahead for the Allies 
pushing through northern France and Belgium. The German units that had abandoned 
their posts in Belgium were preparing to push north and, eventually, across the Schelde to 
reestablish a new defensive line. Zeeland saw an increased military presence, greater 
restriction of civilian mobility, all while civilians could here fighting between Allies and 
Germans across the Schelde in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen in late September-October 1944. 
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The summer of 1944 was one of relative calm for some in Zeeland. Life in the 
province can be characterized by an increasing degree of Nazi interference. Initially, the 
German regime left much of the bureaucracy intact and negotiated with Zeeland’s 
agricultural economy. As the war progressed, however, the nature of occupation changed. 
The Nazi regime utilized the land differently, constructing massive defensive systems and 
uprooting local families. Resistance, too, was ineffectual and did little to hinder Nazi 
plans for the province. In other words, the German occupation of Zeeland might be 
characterized as a successful occupation. As we will see in the next chapter, the Allied 
campaign to open up the port of Antwerp devastated many Zeeuwen, ruined homes, 
businesses, and was arguably more destructive than life under Nazi Germany. It was, to 
borrow William Hitchcock’s words, “a bitter road to freedom.”233 Liberation would be 
the most destructive event in Zeeland’s recent history. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Caught in the Crossfire: The Destruction of Zeeland, 1944-1945 
 
 After four years of occupation, many Zeeuwen had come to terms with daily life 
under Nazi dominion. Despite some resistance to the Arbeiteinsatz proclamations, life for 
many in Zeeland continued under relatively normal circumstances. Most were neither 
resistors nor collaborators, and many had accommodated pragmatically when it appeared 
Nazi Germany had achieved victory in Europe. But in the months following the D-Day 
invasion in June 1944, and the rapid advance of Allied troops through Western Europe, 
Zeeland became the centre of a strategic debate that would have enormous consequences 
for the province. By mid-September, General Bernard Law Montgomery believed he 
could push to the Ruhr without Antwerp and its fully intact port. General Dwight 
Eisenhower doubted Montgomery’s certitude. The approaches to the Port of Antwerp 
needed to be secured for the Allies. This put the Schelde and the Province of Zeeland 
directly into the broader strategy of the war and operations in northwest Europe in 
general. It was a fundamental part of Allied victory in Europe. Walcheren, because of its 
seminal position within the Atlantikwall, garnered the attention of all branches of the 
German and Allied armed forces. Although other parts of Zeeland—Schouwen-
Duiveland and Tholen for example, were also defended, the mouth of the Schelde was the 
best-defended German position replete with its vast array of coastal batteries and 
minefields. This put Walcheren, Zuid-Beveland, and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen at the heart of 
Allied strategy and operations. Indeed, it was also at the heart of the German defences. 
 This chapter explores a relatively short period, from the capture of Antwerp on 4 
September to December 1944, during which the people of Zeeland were caught between 
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Nazi occupation on one hand and Allied attempts to liberate them on the other. This 
chapter provides an inventory of destruction as a result of the costly fighting, which will 
be surveyed following a brief discussion of both Allied and German strategies and 
operations in the province. This chapter is organized around the following questions: 
what strategic considerations led the Allies to bomb Walcheren and other parts of 
Zeeland, and what effect did the decision to inundate the island have on the population of 
Zeeland? What type of aid would be required to facilitate reconstruction in the region? 
Although the battle for the Schelde was part of a European-wide strategy, we must 
necessarily circumscribe this chapter to the effects of war in Zeeland. This is neither a 
military history nor an operational one. The purpose here simply is to provide, as much as 
it is possible, a brief strategic and operational overview to show how essential opening 
the port of Antwerp was for the Allies, and to demonstrate that nothing was too costly 
from a military perspective. This chapter follows a period that coincides with the Battle 
for the Schelde. This chapter argues that, while the Allies considered the civilian 
causalities associated with military operations, military exigency trumped all other 
considerations including civilian casualties and physical destruction. The Allied armies 
had everything to lose if they could not clear the mouth of the Schelde. In the same way, 
the Germans had everything to lose if they gave it up. 
*** 
 
Zeeland and the Port of Antwerp: Allied Strategy and Operational Overview, 1944 
The Allied armies that broke out of Normandy in late August 1944 faced 
shortages in resources and manpower that pressured them to capture more port facilities. 
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The Allied advance was remarkable. Paris fell with little resistance on 25 August, and the 
expected German stand along the Seine and the Somme rivers failed to materialize. By 4 
September 1944, elements of 11th British Armoured Division and the Belgian Resistance 
had captured Antwerp and its port intact. But Antwerp is an inland port, leaving its 
approaches in Zeeland heavily defended by elements of the German Fifteenth Army 
under the command of General der Infantrie Gustav von Zangen. Following the 
Normandy campaign, the Fifteenth Army gradually withdrew to the northeast facing the 
Channel coast in northern France and western Belgium. Just before the capture of 
Antwerp, von Zangen withdrew his forces across the Westerschelde towards Breda in 
Noord-Brabant. With Antwerp captured, Hitler ordered von Zangen to move northward 
with elements of Fifteenth Army, while at the same time in mid-September German 
command designated Walcheren a “fortress.” At this time, Hitler also made clear the 
instruction to breach dykes and locks in northern Belgium to stymie Allied operations.  
These movements resulted in the Fifteenth Army withdrawing to a large area 
around Breskens in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen by 8 September. This area, which the Allies 
referred to as the Breskens Pocket, was gradually reduced to a permanent bridgehead 
centred on the heavy coastal batteries in Breskens, Knocke, and other points on the 
southern bank of the Schelde.234 The Germans called it Festung Süd-Schelde. In the face 
of only minor Allied air attacks, as many as 100,000 men of the Wehrmacht, 6,000 
vehicles, and over 750 pieces of artillery were ferried across the Westerschelde to 
reinforce positions north of Antwerp, leaving 64th Division to defend the pocket. The 
Kriegsmarine conducted these challenging logistical operations day and night over two 
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weeks beginning on 6 September.235 With Hitler declaring Zeeland a fortress, the mission 
of German forces involved defending Zeeland’s coastline, which included the northern 
islands of Schouwen-Duiveland. At the same time, however, by 10 September the Allies 
began to intensify their ground and air operations against the Fifteenth Army in Breskens. 
By mid-September large elements of the German Fifteenth Army had readjusted their 
lines and were forced northward to defend the islands of Zeeland.  
Meanwhile, the decision to proceed with Operation “Market Garden,” the 
airborne operation to cross the Rhine near Arnhem, on 17 September meant that First 
Canadian Army held an increasingly long list of tasks in northern Belgium and Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen. Montgomery’s continued attention to “Market Garden” through the rest of 
September and into October also meant that resources were diverted from First Canadian 
Army. Established in 1942, First Canadian Army replaced the existing unnumbered 
Canadian Corps.236 The Canadians, already well short of manpower and resources by the 
fighting in Normandy, had the unenviable job of opening the Channel ports of Le Havre, 
Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk, before it could turn to Zeeland and the 
approaches to Antwerp.  
The tasks were formidable, and had to be carried out by three understrengthed 
Canadian divisions. To eliminate the German defenses in the Breskens Pocket, the Allies 
devised Operation “Switchback,” which Canadian Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds thought “may 
be a major operation.”237 Simonds argued that an assault across the Schelde could not be 
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ruled out if Walcheren were to be taken, and claimed that preliminary bombing 
operations were absolutely necessary “to break the dykes and completely flood all parts 
of the island below high water level” in early October. Once this was accomplished, 
Simonds maintained, aerial bombardment would concentrate on coastal battery 
installations and radar stations.238 While the discussions about the advantages of flooding 
Walcheren were underway, Simonds issued a preliminary plan for “Switchback” on 30 
September. The two-stage operation required a bridgehead to clear the Knocke-sur-Mer 
fortress area. The 3rd Division, which by 30 September was still fighting in Boulonge and 
elsewhere, was then to penetrate into the pocket in two places: across the Leopold Canal 
from the south and then across the Savojaards Plaat to the east, all of which were planned 
for 6 October 1944.239 The operation began on 6 October and, by 12 October, elements of 
3rd Canadian Division had accomplished their objectives and closed the gap between the 
two bridgeheads. This was a necessary step to launch an amphibious assault on the other 
parts of Zeeland.240 The Canadians faced innumerable challenges during these operations, 
including German strategic flooding, an extremely determined and well focused defence, 
as well as cold weather and materiel shortages. As Lt.-Gen. Simonds recalled, “Neither 
the terrain nor the weather were favourable. The low-lying fields were a honeycomb of 
polders, often flooded, affording scanty cover to attacking troops but enabling the 
defenders to dig in at the base of the dykes with comparative immunity from artillery 
fire.”241 
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During this period the civilians living around the Schelde witnessed an unprecedented 
level of destruction and chaos, especially when one considers Zeeland’s experience 
throughout the twentieth century. On Monday morning on 2 October, many of 
Westkapelle’s 2,369 inhabitants gathered around their radios, which, according to one 
contemporary, were in abundance during occupation.242 At around noon the Allies 
warned the people living near the mouth of the Schelde to preare for “an immediate 
evacuation! Warn your neighbours—Leave without delay!” The message from across the 
Channel quickly enumerated several other warnings: 
1) It is highly probable that the enemy troops and installations on your islands will 
soon be exposed to a severe and prolonged aerial bombardment. 
2) It is the desire of the Allied High Command [SHAEF] that the civilian population 
will be spared the consequences, as much as possible, of this necessary military 
action. 
3) Not only the aerial bombardment, but also the danger of flooding threatens your 
life and that of your families. 
4) Leave the islands or, if that is not possible, then immediately move your family to 
a safe place on the islands.243 
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The warning concluded that all military targets—roads, canals, transport lines, power 
stations, train yards, depots, warehouses, enemy concentrations of all sorts—should be 
avoided at all costs. “Travel only by foot and take nothing with you that you cannot 
easily wear,” the broadcast continued, “keep away from main roads and travel only by 
fields, and not in large groups which may be erroneously mistaken for enemy 
formations.”244 The bombing of Walcheren island began the next day.  
The decision to bomb Walcheren island was a complex one that continues to draw 
attention. Some Dutch historian Tobias van Gent has criticized the Allied strategy and 
has argued that “sinking” the island by breaching its major sea dykes was unnecessary. 
Furthermore, van Gent claims that the Allies were hindered more by the flooding than the 
defenders as the water made mobile warfare increasingly difficult.245 However, a look at 
the changing Allied strategy helps appreciate the context in which the decision to bomb 
Zeeland took place. The decision to inundate parts of the Province must be examined in 
the context of the German orders to push northward and hold their positions to the last 
man. It must also be looked at against the various shortages in elements of 21 Army 
Group. In the end, the destruction that befell the Province presented the Allies with an 
unprecedented task of helping the Zeeuwen recover following liberation. As we shall see, 
the challenges posed by the destruction put immense pressure on the ingenuity and 
resources of both the Allies and the people of Zeeland. 
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Meanwhile, as Terry Copp has shown, the capture of Antwerp ushered in an 
intense debate between Eisenhower and Montgomery, the latter of whom tried to 
convince Eisenhower to adopt a narrow-front strategy aimed at the Ruhr.246 On 8 
October, SHAEF officials learned that high winds and storms had again severely 
damaged the Norman ports at Arromanches and Cherbourg. The next day, the Royal 
Navy reported on the shortages of ammunition in First Canadian Army, which 
Montgomery appeared to have denied, as well as shortages in manpower. These issues 
broached logistical questions about resupplying armies in the west. Yet, in light of the 
failure of “Market Garden,” Montgomery’s directive of 9 October reemphasized 21 Army 
Group’s commitment to the Ruhr, and also promised to reinforce First Canadian Army in 
the near future. As head of SHAEF, Eisenhower might have yielded to Montgomery’s 
persistence if it had not been for the Royal Navy and its Commander, Admiral Bertram 
Ramsay. As early as 5 September, Ramsay recognized the importance of opening up the 
Schelde and how Antwerp’s large port could supply Allied armies.247 Additionally, on 10 
September, Eisenhower explained the condition of Allied supplies.248 In their 
correspondence, Eisenhower stressed to Montgomery the many problems Antwerp 
presented, but Eisenhower rarely directed Montgomery on how to execute tasks.249 
 In his oft-quoted letter to Montgomery on 9 October 1944, Eisenhower noted the 
damage done to the port of Cherbourg and wrote that “this reemphasizes the supreme 
importance of Antwerp. It is reported to me this morning by the Navy that the Canadian 
Army will not repeat not be able to attack until November 1 unless immediately supplied 
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with adequate ammunition…Unless we have Antwerp producing by the middle of 
November our entire operation will come to a standstill…I consider Antwerp of first 
importance, and I believe that the operations designed to clear up the entrance require 
your personal attention.”250 Montgomery’s reply was prompt, visceral and denied that 
there was a shortage of ammunition. He reminded Eisenhower that he had agreed that the 
main effort should be directed toward the Ruhr, to which Eisenhower stated “Let me 
assure you nothing I might ever say or write with respect to future plans in our advance 
eastwards is meant to indicate any lessening of the need for Antwerp…”251 Montgomery 
had received Eisenhower’s letter on 15 October.  
The crisis in command put pressure on all of First Canadian Army, but 
particularly 2 Canadian Division, which was told on 9 October that “the limit to artillery 
ammunition expenditure has been removed.”252 From 1 October onward, 2 Canadian 
Division had been pushing north of Antwerp, while Operation “Switchback” unfolded in 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. 
By 16 October, Montgomery finally admitted to Eisenhower that Antwerp would 
be the top priority in all operations of 21 Army Group. On the same day, Montgomery’s 
directive put his words into action. The offensives of Second British Army directed 
eastwards were cancelled and it would now attack westwards. Additionally, Montgomery 
redirected First Canadian Army which could now head for Antwerp, so its operations 
could influence the battles north of Antwerp in Bergen-op-Zoom, Roosendaal, in Noord-
Brabant as well as the push into the islands of Zeeland. 
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The port of Antwerp itself lies some 80 kilometers from the North Sea and the 
Germans had defended both the southern and northern sides of the Schelde. The powerful 
coastal batteries on Walcheren and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen made any naval approach to 
the Schelde deadly. The Allies knew that before any approach to the port could be made, 
these vital parts of the Atlantikwall needed to be destroyed and secured. On Walcheren, 
the Germans had constructed heavy coastal batteries along the coastline from Vlissingen 
to Westkapelle, which included six batteries totaling 25 guns manned by 202nd Naval 
Artillery Battalion. They could fire out at sea to any approaching vessel as well as across 
the Schelde to Breskens and other parts of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Additionally, anti-aircraft 
guns positioned on Walcheren provided effective defence against Allied air strikes. 
Walcheren island was defended by the 70th Infantry Division, a force of about 7,500 led 
by General Wilhelm Daser. This division was given the sobriquet the 
Magenkrankendivision (Stomach-Illness Division), since many of its troops suffered from 
a variety of stomach-borne ailments. The 64th Division, under the command of General-
Major Kurt Eberhard, defended Zeeuws-Vlaanderen to the south of Walcheren. 
Originally, this force consisted of 11,000 men, 500 machine guns, 200 anti-tank guns and 
70 field guns. By mid-September, it was reduced to about 2,500 men.253 Many from this 
division were on leave from the Eastern Front and were experienced and battle-hardened 
troops.254 Given the extent of German defenses, and the materiel and personnel strength 
of Allied troops, the Allies needed to consider how to combine airpower and amphibious 
landings to capture key parts of Zeeland.  
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 SHAEF officials knew that Antwerp needed to be opened and fully operational 
before winter in order to supply armies in the west. To accomplish this, the Allies 
developed a three-part plan to capture Walcheren that involved: (1) sealing off the 
isthmus leading to Zuid-Beveland and clear the area south of the Schelde; (2) clearing 
Zuid-Beveland by an advance along the Sloedam in conjunction with an assault across 
the estuary from the south; and (3) clearing Walcheren by attacks from east, south, and 
west, which involved a second crossing of the estuary and a seaborne expedition from 
one of the Channel Ports. Crucially, the fixed defences and coastal batteries were to be 
neutralized by bombing the sea dykes and flooding the island.255 Proposals to flood 
Walcheren had been considered at Army Headquarters and discussed among Lt.-General 
Henry Crerar, GOC, First Canadian Army, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, Major-General 
Francis de Guingand, and Naval Commander in Chief, Admiral Ramsay. Ramsay, the 
Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, approved the plan to bomb the dykes if only because 
it would alleviate pressures for the amphibious assault by creating beachheads large 
enough for vehicles to pass through.256 On 1 October 1944, Eisenhower, without 
consulting Queen Wilhelmina or the Dutch Government exiled in London, authorized the 
bombing of Walcheren.257 Beginning on 3 October 1944, Bomber Command launched 
2,219 sorties and dropped 10,219 tons of bombs over Walcheren. On 3 October 
Westkapelle’s main sea dyke was breached and flooded the town, while on 7 October the 
dykes east and west of Vlissingen were breached. A few days later on 11 October, the 
dyke in Veere was bombed. On 17 October alone, 1,500 bombs were dropped between 	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Zoutelande and Westkapelle.258 This action effectively began to “sink” the island and, 
according to the Allies, softened the defences enough to mount an effective amphibious 
assault. A report entitled “Joint Planning for the Assault on Walcheren,” stated that the 
decision to flood the island was only taken after most careful consideration of all possible 
alternatives. However, from a strategic point of view, the Allies agreed that flooding the 
island would offer the Allies a number of important advantages, namely that Walcheren 
would be divided into three sections—the northwest strip of dunes and wooded areas; the 
southwest strip of dunes; and the Vlissingen area which included higher land. In addition, 
the report maintained, the movement of enemy reserves would have been greatly 
hindered and many field batteries would be submerged and therefore not operational.259 
Under the command of Admiral Ramsay, Force ‘T’ consisting of 200 landing and close 
support craft would make a seaborne assault, using a variety of Landing Vehicles 
Tracked (LVT) known as Buffaloes. This assault was supported by a bombardment 
squadron of HMS Warspite and monitors Roberts and Erebus.260 
  
Operational Planning to Capture Zeeland 
 The capture of Walcheren and the liberation of Zeeland was an Anglo-Canadian 
operation of several constituent parts. The Allies delegated the task to clear the Schelde 
to First Canadian Army, commanded by Lt.-General Henry Crerar, which consisted of 1st 
British Corps and 2nd Canadian Corps. By late September, however, Lt.-Gen. Guy 
Simonds replaced Crerar as Acting Army Commander for medical reasons. Simonds was 
the commander of II Canadian Corps, so this was his first opportunity to command a two-	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corps army. Whilst Bomber Command flew myriad sorties over Zeeland and breached 
many of the dykes in October, plans for Operation “Infatuate” were underway at the same 
time and slated to begin on 1 November 1944. Because the assault of Walcheren came 
from the west and south, joint planning was required to coordinate the attack between 
naval and military operations. This meant that the intentions of the ground forces needed 
to be disclosed to Admiral Ramsay.  
 The forces allocated to capture Zeeland were 1 British Corps, then under First 
Canadian Army, who were tasked with clearing the area between the Antwerp-Turnhout 
Canal and the Maas.  2 Canadian Corps was to clear the Schelde. 2 Canadian Infantry 
Division had to seal off the isthmus and clear Zuid-Beveland. 3 Canadian Infantry 
Division, along with 4 Canadian Armoured Division, were to destroy the enemy south of 
the Schelde in mid-October, and 4 Canadian Armoured Division moved east of Antwerp 
to operate on the right flank of 2 Canadian Infantry Division. The opening of the Schelde 
involved four concurrent operations, but the first task was to clear the area north of 
Antwerp across the Schelde to Zuid-Beveland. Operation “Switchback,” mentioned 
above, was devised to clear the Breskens pocket in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Operation 
“Vitality,” which was divided into two phases, aimed to seal off and capture Zuid-
Beveland. Operation “Infatuate,” the capture of Walcheren, represented the final stage in 
the battle. All of these operations were to commence after the RAF had breached 
Walcheren’s sea dykes. By 1 November 1944, most of Walcheren had been inundated 
except for parts of Vlissingen and Middelburg, and the narrow dune belts along the 
northern, western, and southern sides. 
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It would take just over a month of extremely bitter fighting over torturous terrain 
for the Anglo-Canadian force to defeat the German army and capture the Province of 
Zeeland. As early as 4 November 1944, the first minesweeper reached Antwerp. For the 
next few weeks, over 100 minesweepers cleared a 115 kilometer-long channel, which had 
to be swept 16 times.261 On 28 November, the first convoy of 18 ships reached Antwerp 
and eventually allowed the port to bring in 40,000 tons of cargo per day.262  
This has necessarily been a truncated presentation of a much more complex series 
of decisions and operations, but the operational history of the battle for the Schelde has 
received a great deal of attention in the English-speaking world. The key point here is 
that the province of Zeeland became the focal point for both Allied and German armies in 
the west. It was fundamental to Allied strategy in the west, and it was the first time that 
the Allies employed air power to sink an island in preparation for an amphibious assault. 
While the campaign for the Schelde was relatively short, it was extremely costly and 
destructive. But, as this section has shown, the decision to flood Walcheren and other 
parts of Zeeland was made amidst changing circumstances involving German intentions 
to defend Zeeland at all costs. These decisions and readjustments in the German army 
were made throughout September immediately following the capture of Antwerp.  
 
German Reaction to Allied Offensive 
By the end of September, the Germans understood full well that the situation in 
the Schelde was dire. The evacuation from the south side of the Schelde from 6 to 20 
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September seemed to substantiate this. One German report from September 1944 noted 
the terrible conditions of German naval resources and highlighted that they understood 
the enemy’s attempts to exploit the Belgian coast as a “foothold” (Nachschuhbasis). This 
indicated that a much more forceful offensive would soon unfold. However, the report 
continued, German resources were numerically too weak to represent a real threat to the 
enemy.263 By 13 October 1944, German war diaries indicate that morale among the 
troops stationed in Veere (Walcheren) was at an all time low because of Allied flooding. 
The diary continued, “The dyke breach created a strong depressing effect upon the 
soldiers in Veere.”264 But the Allied bombardment that breached the dyke at Veere on 11 
October was only part of the problem. The constant troop movements from Walcheren to 
both Zuid- and Noord-Beveland added to the logistic chaos, since many troops stationed 
in Veere had been ordered to move elsewhere. The remaining troops posted there after 13 
October were tasked with double the number of patrols to confront increasing levels of 
looting during the night, cattle theft, and black marketers.265 The people took advantage 
of the chaotic situation in this chaotic stage of the war.  
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A report from 15 October 1944 by one Kriegsmarine admiral suggests bravely 
that the navy had remained steadfast in their defence against Allied troops. The diary 
entry notes that without the heavy and medium naval and anti-aircraft batteries in 
Vlissingen and elsewhere on Walcheren, the enemy would be able to land on Walcheren 
more easily.266 In realty, however, fighting was vicious. But, regarding the population of 
the Province, this entry warned that resistance movements were gaining influence.267 The 
Germans also recognized that they were incapable of supplying Zeeland’s population 
with foodstuffs, electricity, gas, and water, as they now began to rely more on railway for 
transport rather than ships.268  
At the same time that the battle for the Schelde was being fought, the Germans 
were growing desparate. In Zeeland, the Germans received preliminary orders to begin 
conscripting civilian men between the ages of 17 to 40 in preparation for a new line to be 
established.269 As new research from Hans Sakkers has shown, some Germans saw that 
enduring the impending assault was futile and, instead, tried to desert their units. Sakkers 
has claimed that to provide a precise statistic of how many deserters were executed from 
September to November is not possible. However, the execution of 20 German military 	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wird bald kritisch werden.” 
269 NIMH, Duitse bezetting, 419, inv. 31/3 “Oorlogsdagboek-54: 15 October 1944,” 1104. “Erfassung 
wehrfähiger Holländer im Alter von 17-40 JAhren für den Arbeitseinsatz befindet sich bei den zuständigen 
zivilen usw. Dienststellen in Vorüberlegung. Durchführung wird bestimmt nicht leicht sein.” 
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personnel stationed in Zeeland can be confirmed with some degree of accuracy.270 As 
early as 1942, two Germans were executed in Ritthem (Walcheren), while on 15 
September 1944 Günther Rademacher was executed in Nieuwdorp (Zuid-Beveland).271 
 
Conceptualizing Destruction in Zeeland 
 For many North American readers, the extent of devastation inflicted upon parts 
of the Netherlands during the Second World War is immensely difficult to conceptualize. 
More to the point, the people of Zeeland found it difficult to conceptualize their 
experience. Historians, and particularly non-Dutch historians, often overlook the 
destruction and reconstruction of the region because this component is largely irrelevant 
in terms of constructing a narrative of Canadian or British combat experiences and their 
role in liberation. Instead, operational and military histories of the Schelde campaign 
almost always measure the aftermath of the war by the number of casualties meted out by 
each side. This puts the Canadian sacrifice disproportionately high, comprising more than 
90 percent of the Allied figure, which included 1,418 men killed in action and 4,949 
wounded.272  
The impact of war on Zeeland’s landscape, infrastructure, as well as the 
mentalities of its people has not received treatment in English-language literature. Only 
recently have historians, like Keith Lowe, emphasized the extent of destruction inflicted 
upon Europe.273 The loss of civilian life in Zeeland, which was relatively high, was only 
one consequence of the war. Aerial photographs of towns along the southern bank of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Hans Sakkers, Duitse militaire standrechtelijke executies in Zeeland, september-december 1944 
(Soesterberg: Uitgeverij Aspekt, 2013), 47. 
271 Sakkers, Duitse militaire standrechtelijke executies in Zeeland, september-december 1944, 47-48. 
272 Copp, Cinderella Army, 173. 
273 Lowe, Savage Continent, 3-11. 
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Schelde highlight the devastating effects fighting had on civilian homes and villages (See 
Appendix V). As we will see in later chapters, both Allied and German operations 
flattened the majority of homes in places like Breskens (See Appendix V, Figure 1.2). 
These aerial photographs offer not only insight into the bitterness of the battle, but also 
the degree to which concerted reconstruction efforts were required.  
When Bomber Command began its sorties over Zeeland on 3 October 1944, 152 
Westkappelaars were killed instantly, while 28 more died later. Appendix V, Figure 1.1 
demonstrates the destructiveness of the initial bombardment against Westkapelle. Out of 
a total population of 2,369, about 200 citizens, or over 10 percent of the town’s 
population, were killed by Allied bombardment.274 Similar percentages of civilians were 
killed in villages like Biggekerke in Walcheren where 46 civilians died.275 Yet, even 
when measuring the war’s effects on the population, the numbers alone fail to convey the 
extent to which the province was razed. For a dominantly agrarian region, the loss of vital 
infrastructure, arable land and cistern wells significantly disrupted daily life for the 
Zeeuwen. This was perhaps more damaging than four years under Nazi occupation. 
While Allied bombing raids were responsible for inundating Walcheren and 
flattening much of Breskens, the Germans also used flooding as a tactic to slow down 
Allied advances (See Appendix V, Figure 1.5). This was especially true for Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen and the areas north of the Leopold Canal, as well as on Tholen and 
Schouwen-Duiveland. As Gijs van der Ham has shown, the Wehrmacht had begun 
flooding parts of northern Belgium and southern Zeeland as early as 1 September 1944, 
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275 Ligthart-Schenk, Westkapelle voor en na 3 October 1944, 3. 
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which, in some towns like Oostburg near Sluis, forced burgemeesters to evacuate their 
citizens to safer ground much earlier than in other parts of Zeeland.276 
The first and most pressing problem facing both the Allies and the Zeeuwen was 
obviously the flooding. Since the Allies destroyed four major sea dykes, and much of the 
island was flooded during high tide, Walcheren’s dykes needed to be repaired before 
anything else could be assessed. Although radio communications and pamphlets dropped 
in towns like Westkapelle warned civilians of the impending Allied bombardment, many 
Zeeuwen stayed in their homes. While most of the fighting took place in Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen, Walcheren, and Zuid-Beveland, other parts of Zeeland were also inundated. 
Nonetheless, the people’s reticence to flee may be explained by the German Sperrgebiet 
imposed on the population, which required the majority of civilians to obey curfews. 
After all, most of Zeeland’s population had lived under a relatively benign occupation for 
four years without any major resistance or violent action that would force them from their 
lands. The result of many Zeeuwen remaining in their villages and towns meant that the 
Allied and Dutch authorities had to orchestrate evacuations from the countryside to towns 
like Middelburg, which largely remained above water throughout the fall and winter of 
1944-1945. The demographic and logistical challenge of evacuation presented the Allies 
and Dutch authorities with a growing set of tasks. Problems of closing the dykes meant 
that other infrastructural issues could not be resolved, while overcrowding in Middelburg 
as a result of the forced evacuations posed a number of health and sanitation concerns. 
Temporary housing needed to be constructed and basic services, like electricity, policing, 
and providing drinking water, needed to be restored. Families whose loved ones had been 
mobilized to fight in the Wehrmacht (either voluntarily or involuntarily) or who had been 	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forced to work in Germany were anxious to visit other parts of the Province or travel to 
Germany directly. This, however, was a prominent problem elsewhere in the 
Netherlands. As we have seen, most Zeeuwen were conscripted to work within the 
province and comparably few were sent beyond the province’s borders.  
For many Zeeuwen the war was over and they could start rebuilding, but for the 
Canadians, British, and Americans much bitter fighting still lay ahead as they moved into 
northern parts of the Netherlands and penetrated the Reich itself. Even still, the war was 
not over for some Zeeuwen still under Nazi occupation. In fact, the Germans had flooded 
much of Schouwen-Duiveland in an attempt to defend approaches to the island. The 
people of that island were forced to fend for themselves amid rising water while the 
Germans readjusted their lines, with Schouwen-Duiveland behind them. This part of 
Zeeland would be liberated along with the rest of the country on 5 May 1945.277  
In the absence of a formal Dutch government, quasi-military institutions worked 
alongside Allied Civil Affairs. Despite the good intentions of SHAEF Civil Affairs (CA) 
to help rebuild a province which they in large measure had to destroy, attempts to recover 
local socio-economic and political life should not obscure the overarching importance 
attached to military objectives. As we will see in the following chapter, SHAEF CA 
worked in concert with the Dutch authorities (Militair Gezag, MG) to assess all the 
physical and economic damages resulting from war, before formally passing sole 
jurisdiction to the MG. Throughout the processes of reconstruction that took place during 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Jan Zwemer, Zeeland 1945-1950: De wederopbouw van Zeeland na de oorlog (Vlissingen: den Boer de 
Ruiter, 2000), 85. Zwemer writes “Ook Sint-Philipsland en Tholen, onder water gezet op Tholen-stad na, 
waren op vier November zonder veel moeite bevrijd. Daarmee was het front voor een half jaar vastgelegd: 
Schouwen-Duiveland hoorde bij dat deel van Nederland (boven de rivieren) dat pas op 5 mei 1945 de 
Nederlandse vlag kon laten zien. In de tussentijd had het eiland te lijden onder beschietingen van de 
geallieerden en van verhevigde Duitse terreur- om van het zeewater binnen de dijken maar niet te spreken. 
Het was dat merkwaardige halfjaar waarin Zuid-Beveland bevrijd was, maar het grootste deel van het land 
nog onder de Duitse bezetting zuchtte.”	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the war, however, relations between Dutch and Allied authorities were often strained as 
SHAEF directed resources to the war effort while Dutch authorities waited anxiously for 
supplies and assistance. As Schrijvers has shown for the CA mission to Belgium, SHAEF 
authorities made clear to Belgium that their primary objective was the prosecution of the 
war.278 
  
Conclusion 
 The level of destruction that resulted from the Allied assault on Zeeland must be 
considered against the backdrop of severe resource scarcity and the inability to supply 
armies in Western Europe. In order to continue the war effort, the Allies were willing to 
employ almost any tactic to drive Nazi Germany north and west. Antwerp was the 
quintessential element in all of this. Civilian casualties were to be expected, especially 
when flooding large parts of the province below sea level, and damage to homes, 
businesses, livestock, and other properties was also understood to be an unfortunate 
consequence of the fighting.  
The civilian perspective, however, was much different. Beginning with Dolle 
Dinsdag, some believed victory in Europe would come just as rapidly and easily as it had 
in Belgium. Beginning on 6 September 1944, many civilians witnessed a mass exodus of 
German personnel and munitions across the Schelde. It seemed clear, at least as far as 
civilians were concerned, that the war would soon be over. However, the long wait from 
September to October showed that this was not going to be the case in the province of 
Zeeland. Nothing in their collective memory prepared the people for such as destructive 
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event. When the Allies dropped pamphlets demanding immediate evacuation, Zeeland’s 
expectations for a liberation that involved very little fighting on their soil were dashed. 
 The cost of battle for all three belligerents involved—Allies, Germans, and 
civilians—also marked the beginning of a memory in the province. For Canadians, the 
disproportionately high casualty rate remains the salient feature in Canada’s military role 
in the Netherlands. For the Germans, their manipulation of the land, the construction of 
myriad bunkers, and munitions were the only elements left after they fled north to 
Schouwen-Duiveland in late 1944. In other words, forgetting this battle was likely 
paramount for the Germans. As a result, the construction of a German memory in the 
region is largely incomplete. However, for the people of Zeeland, this short period proved 
to be fundamental in shaping memories of the war. It was so chaotic and destructive that 
it could not be forgotten—even more chaotic than the occupation. Writers like den 
Doolaard used this period as a point of departure for his story of life in Zeeland during 
the war, as did others. This period in Walcheren’s history was above all characterized by 
water. As we shall see in a later chapter, this inchoate memory that began in 1944 
changed little in some parts of the province, while in others it changed dramatically.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Institutional and Operational Context: Civil Affairs and Militair Gezag, 1944 
 
 “In the Netherlands, the reaction to Civil Affairs was quite different from that 
which had been encountered in either France or Belgium,” one 1947 report on the 
Canadian role in liberation and civil affairs stated.279 “In the Netherlands,” the report 
continued, “more was expected of it than Civil Affairs was intended to provide and the 
people never understood that it was merely part of the war machine and existed only to 
assist in the prosecution of the war and the defeat of the enemy. For this reason alone the 
Netherlands produced the most difficult Civil Affairs problems of the whole 
campaign.”280 To be sure, the wake of Anglo-Canadian operations in Walcheren, Zuid-
Beveland, and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen left countless homes and towns destroyed or 
inundated and presented the Allies with a host of problems they needed to address 
expeditiously. Reconstruction in Zeeland would be an immensely difficult process. The 
difficulties encountered by both Dutch and Allied officials were a result of the wartime 
history of the province. 
 This chapter examines the institutional background of immediate post-war 
reconstruction and focuses on two organizations responsible for recovery in Zeeland: 
Allied Civil Affairs (CA) and the Dutch Militair Gezag (MG). It first explores the 
operational and military context of late 1944 and early 1945. The military challenges put 
pressure on the Allies to prosecute the war against Nazi Germany at the expense of 
putting the necessary resources in the hands of Dutch authorities. A discussion of the 
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institutional background to reconstruction provides a foundation on which a more 
detailed investigation of reconstruction can build. This chapter begins to outline the 
enormous challenges facing both officials, the sometimes strained relations between both 
authorities during this crucial period, and the extent of preliminary reconstruction 
undertaken in Zeeland while Allied armies were still fighting Nazi Germany in the 
Netherlands and into Germany. 
*** 
Operational Context, November 1944-1945 
 On 18 October 1944, just two days after he promised to prioritize opening the port 
of Antwerp, Field Marshal Montgomery met with Eisenhower to discuss how best to 
defeat German forces in northwest Europe. The strategy for operations following the 
capture of Zeeland involved ambitious plans “to defeat decisively the enemy west of the 
Rhine; then to seize the Ruhr and, subsequently, to advance deep into Germany.”281 In 
the meantime, elements of 2nd Canadian Division had captured Woensdrecht, while on 17 
October 4th Canadian Armoured Division attacked the town of Bixgen to isolate German 
forces defending Zuid-Beveland. In the coming days, a number of simultaneous 
operations would take place including Anglo-Canadian attempts to gain the Zuid-
Beveland Canal as well as the attack on Breskens and towns in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. On 
26 October 2nd Canadian Division captured Krabbendijke and, two days later, Zuid-
Beveland had effectively been cut off by 4th Canadian Armoured Division. By the end of 
October, 3rd Canadian Division and the Scottish 52nd Lowland Division launched 
amphibious attacks from Breskens across the Schelde to Zuid-Beveland. 2nd Canadian 
Division also captured Goes, at which point elements of the division accompanied by 	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members of the OD gained Noord-Beveland. From 29 October to 1 November, 
Canadians launched a series of attacks on the well-defended Sloedam, attempting to gain 
the narrow and low-lying strip of land leading directly onto Walcheren. By 3 November 
52nd Lowland Division successfully crossed the Sloedam into Walcheren. From 1 to 8 
November, operations continued in Walcheren until the Germans formally capitulated on 
8 November in Middelburg. 
 From a military and operational perspective, the battle orchestrated by First 
Canadian Army under the leadership of Simonds was considerably effective.282 The 
human toll was high. From 20 September and 8 November 1944, First Canadian Army 
reported 3,244 men killed in action and an additional 6,784 wounded.283 In 1944, over 
8,000 other ranks and 742 officers were killed in battle, while an additional 2,390 men 
died of wounds suffered in battle during that year.284 Despite these losses, there was a 
steady flow of reinforcements into First Canadian Army, notably a gradual increase in the 
strength of some infantry battalions like those comprising 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. 
Following operations in the Schelde, Montgomery sought to attack German forces in 
Venlo (Province Limburg) on the border with Germany, but south of the Canadian sector. 
This provided the Canadian army an opportunity for the first break from fighting in about 
five months. The two infantry divisions were given a week-long rest period in Belgium 
before moving to Nijmegen (Province Gelderland).285 While fighting in Nijmegen sector, 
logistics and the supply of rations for the military proved increasingly difficult. 21 Army 	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Group failed to provide sufficient calories for soldiers who were required to take on 
difficult operations in the area.286 In this respect, it is hardly surprising that the Allies 
continuously rejected channeling invaluable resources into Dutch reconstruction efforts 
in Zeeland. Given the exigencies of military operations in Nijmegen and into Germany 
itself, the Allies simply could not afford to divert resources and materiel from non-
essential military objectives. The essential point here is that while Anglo-Canadian 
operations came to an end in Zeeland, and civilians had to come to terms with liberation’s 
corollaries of destruction and recovery, operations to defeat Nazi Germany continued 
unabated for the next eight months, with a German counter-offensive beginning on 16 
December 1944. Allied armies pushed further north and eventually into the Reichswald 
and Rhineland in the final stages of the war in Europe. These brief operational details are 
necessary to understand the difficulties to separate essential military objectives from what 
some military officials saw as the tangential civil affairs projects in the newly-liberated 
regions of northwest Europe. 
 
A Costly Liberation 
Almost immediately after towns in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen were liberated in early 
October 1944, burgemeesters issued proclamations ordering the collection of materiel 
required for the demanding reconstruction projects that lay ahead.287 One newspaper in 
Terneuzen told its readers that the commune promised to repair homes damaged by the 
war, but also reminded them that taking damaged material from other property without 
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the expressed approval of the Department of Public Works was strictly forbidden.288 
Civilians who were victims of plunderschade (wartime plundering) were required to file 
their complaints with a special committee established for this purpose, the Schade-
enquête-commissie, whose headquarters were in Terneuzen. Farmers in the commune, 
whose barns had been damaged by the fighting, were permitted temporarily to use 
surrounding polderland for a variety of purposes. Additionally, the commune recognized 
the need to construct emergency cattle barns.289 
 While the communes of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen were trying to coordinate 
reconstruction in the south, Anglo-Canadian operations in the central part of Zeeland 
reached their apogee. De Zeeuw, the Reformed newspaper in Goes, reminded its readers 
that civilians should restrict water usage, as Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland witnessed 
increasing war damage.290 It also prepared its flock for intense fighting in their region. 
One article enumerated tips to protect civilians if and when fighting were to occur close 
to their homes: “by exercising self-protection [zelfbeschermingsmaatregelen] the risk of 
hazards is significantly reduced.”291 Aside from reminding civilians that “inside your 
house provides a greater chance of preserving your life than outside,” De Zeeuw also 	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emphasized that people should “remain calm. The consequences of thoughtless acts are 
enlarged.”292 
 Other newspapers continued to provide readers as much news about the progress 
of the war in the province as was possible. One underground newspaper, Vrije Stemmen 
Uit De Ganzestad, paid close attention to the Canadian advance towards Zeeland. “The 
Canadians [are] approaching Bergen op Zoom, the longer the closer. More and more 
reinforcements to be brought to the bridgehead at Hoofdplaat. Oostburg, Sluis and 
Schoondijk were bombed.”293 
 The progress of liberation in one province was not a uniform process. As the 
Canadians pushed from the Leopold Canal into Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, communes and 
villages in the central and northern parts of Zeeland awaited the arrival of Allied armies. 
As the mayor of Terneuzen began to think about reconstruction, other parts of the 
province either remained firmly in the hands of the Germans or were inundated by Allied 
bombardment. Some areas experienced both. Reconstruction followed the process of 
liberation and therefore took place at different times and often with different degrees of 
enthusiasm by civilians and authorities alike. 
By 17 October 1944 16,010 of Walcheren’s 18,800 hectares of surface area were 
flooded with saltwater.294 At Westkapelle, the Allied bombardment destroyed the 600-
meter wide gap near the dyke that protected the town from inundation, while bombing 	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raids took out dykes east and west of the industrial town of Vlissingen. On the east side 
of the town, now Ritthem, an 850 meter gap led to complete inundation and, on the west 
side at the Nolledijk, a 350 meter wide opening completed the flooding of the area.295 
Although Walcheren witnessed the most flooding because of Allied operations, other 
parts of the province suffered from flooding as a result of military operations. In Zuid-
Beveland, for example, around 1,500 hectares were covered with saltwater beginning in 
October 1944, 738 hectares of which were considered uncontrolled.296 As early as 
February 1944, the Germans also flooded swathes of territory in northern Zeeland. In Sint 
Philipsland, for instance, the Germans released sluiceways to cover 1105 hectares of the 
island. The only areas that remained dry were polderland Oude van St. Philipsland and 
Henriette Polder, a surface area of 1619 hectares.297 The Germans almost entirely flooded 
the island of Tholen with saltwater on 22 February 1944, actions which covered some 
10,800 hectares of the island.298 Schouwen-Duiveland, the northern most part of Zeeland, 
remained in German hands and was flooded by the Germans to control approaches to the 
River Maas. Beginning on 1 March 1944, the Germans released sluiceways to cover 
almost 15,800 hectares of the island’s surface area. They remained underwater until 
September 1945.299 
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Given the scale and severity of war damage inflicted by both Allied and German 
forces, SHAEF authorized the implementation of a Civil Affairs branch, whose main 
objective in this region was to assess the various types of war-related damage. It was 
tasked to work alongside a Dutch administration authority known as the Militair Gezag 
(MG). Once the province was liberated in early November 1944, how would both 
institutions go about rebuilding a province that had been bombed, inundated, and, in 
many places razed? Who would have jurisdiction over what and under whose authority 
would reconstruction projects in Zeeland fall? 
 
SHAEF Civil Affairs (CA) and Zeeland 
 In 1944, CA, or “military government,” was a relatively recent addition to 
SHAEF. By the time Zeeland was liberated, approximately one tenth of the CA personnel 
in 21 Army Group was Canadian, and “in order that some records of its achievements 
may be kept, an Historical Officer (Civil Affairs) [had] been added to the War 
Establishment of the Historical Section at Canadian Military Headquarters.”300 At its 
core, CA was to ensure civilian populations in liberated regions would not interfere with 
military operations. In the liberated countries of Belgium, France, and the Netherlands 
the administration was known as CA, as opposed to a similar organization that would be 
established in Germany in 1945 called “Military Government.” CA was predicated on an 
existing form of civil administration created by the British Army during the Palestine 
Campaign from 1914-1918 and later used in other places under British imperial 
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occupation.301 Early in the Second World War, the War Office in the UK appointed 
Brigadier S. Swinton Lee the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer to train CA officers to 
fulfill positions as CA officers. Not until 1944, however, did CA become an integrated 
part of the army in theatres of operations, though CA officials did operate in Sicily in 
1943. Officials in London envisaged that CA would remedy problems with civilian 
populations in the “highly industrialised areas in Europe over which fighting was 
expected to pass,” and not necessarily rural regions.302 This was crucial, for most of 
Zeeland’s rural regions required a significant reconstruction program. From its inception, 
therefore, CA sought to recover industrial regions, likely in an effort to rehabilitate post-
war Europe. While early on CA had been referred to as “AMGOT” (Allied Military 
Government of Occupied Territory), Amgot “was widely, if scurrilously, rumoured to be 
an Arabic word meaning ‘horse manure’.” This may have contributed to the decision to 
change its name.303 
 One of the important principles on which CA operated was that the Allied 
administration needed “to exercise administrative control and supervision, in such areas 
as may be directed by the competent authority, in order that the civil machinery may be 
set going as early as possible and in such a way as to benefit the allied war effort and to 
ensure the preservation of law and order.”304 This prioritizing of military issues over 
domestic ones caused some problems between CA and Dutch institutions. This is 
particularly true in Zeeland, as assessment and reconstruction took place at the same time 	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as the Allies were fighting the Germans elsewhere. Peter Schrijvers identified the same 
problems between the Belgian government and CA in Belgium.305 
 A lack of personnel was a persistent issue for the CA branch, just as it was for the 
wartime army. The CA staffs were supplemented by officers who worked in detachments 
of a minimum of two administrative officers and two “Public Safety” officers, in addition 
to other ranks (OR), which were sometimes augmented by certain specialist officers. 
Michelle Fowler’s work has explored CA efforts to preserve historical artifacts and 
archives in Germany in the midst of operations, demonstrating some of the areas in which 
CA specialized.306 Selected personnel from 21 Army Group were organized into groups 
containing 240 officers of which half were available to form basic attachments and the 
remainder were “functional specialists,” with expertise in financial, legal, labour, supply, 
or public health issues.307 In theory, CA worked in “friendly and close cooperation” with 
the governments and civilian population of the liberated countries. In order to begin their 
work, CA required legal agreements between acting governments, which were then 
signed by the appropriate authorities. The first CA officers from First Canadian Army 
were interviewed and selected in January 1943. Fourteen Canadian candidates attended 
the first course which began at the CA Staff Centre in Wimbledon in February 1943. 
Candidates were required by CA to have experience in at least one or more specialized 
areas, as well as a “sound knowledge” of one or more European language, though in 
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practice a “sound knowledge” often meant little to none—later recruits would study 
elementary French through the adventures of Bill et Tommy en France.308  
The curriculum for the course covered a variety of fields, ranging from military 
issues to the study of local government and historical background of the countries in 
which the candidates would likely operate.309 Between February 1943 and November 
1944, 250 Canadian Army candidates had attended CA courses, and 131 graduates of the 
three Canadian CA Staff Courses represent the main source from which Canadian CA 
officers had been drawn. An additional 23 Royal Canadian Air Force officers were 
trained for CA duty. Some of the earliest Canadian CA officers were sent to Italy, where 
trained CA officers were badly needed.310 At that point in 1943, there had been no 
exclusively Canadian CA unit. On 31 December 1943, however, the Director of Civil 
Affairs at the War Office suggested that “Canada may wish to raise a purely Canadian 
unit or units for employment with the Canadian Army, in so far as that may prove 
practicable in the field” and “in view of the part to be played by the Canadian Army in 
the forthcoming operations.”311 By February 1944, Canada’s commitment amounted to 
34 officers and 62 other ranks at First Canadian Army Headquarters, 9 officers and 16 
other ranks at 2 Canadian Corps Headquarters, while an additional 244 officers and 366 
other ranks were added to the pool of CA officers. At the same time, 30 officers were 
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already operating in the Mediterranean theatre.312 As the war put pressure on personnel 
selection, CA went to greater lengths to develop officers and staff. 
 The circumstances facing CA operations in the Netherlands were unique in many 
ways, not least because the sheer scale and scope of reconstruction needed in Zeeland. 
Other differences lay in the type of regime the Nazis set up in the occupied Netherlands 
in 1940 and the lack of historical reference point the Dutch government had regarding 
war and occupation. The standard agreement regarding CA operations between the Allies 
and the Dutch government in exile was signed in May 1944. Unlike in Belgium where the 
local administration planned to work directly with SHAEF until the Allied authorities 
would pass sole jurisdiction to the Belgian government, the Dutch created an additional 
organization called the Militair Gezag (MG), or the Netherlands Military Authority. The 
precise details of the arrangement were sent to every burgemeester and representative of 
the Queen at the provincial level.313 Initially, the Dutch government placed the MG at the 
disposal of the Allies, and later the MG effectively became a transitional government 
until the exiled government was repatriated.314  
The reasons for this decision to create another level of Dutch authority are subject 
to debate. Unlike the Belgian and French governments, the Dutch government had no 
experience or memory of political dislocation in their country. According to one 
observer, the pre-war Dutch administration was virtually destroyed by four years of Nazi 
occupation and it was “unable to function satisfactorily without the aid and control of the 
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Netherlands Military Administration [MG].”315 In the 1960s, F.S.V. Donnison has 
claimed that a military-type of administration was imperative in the Netherlands because 
“there had been and perhaps still was a not inconsiderable proportion of Nazi 
sympathizers in the population at large.” There was also a strong communist element 
within the various resistance organizations throughout the Netherlands, though not 
necessarily in Zeeland, and the government believed the MG could deal with these types 
of political threats.316 While Donnison might have been correct for local and provincial 
governments in the northern provinces, NSB influence appears to have been weak in 
Zeeland. It is more likely that the lack of historical reference to such devastation, coupled 
with a political culture that favours bureaucratic influence at the most local levels, led the 
Dutch government to establish the MG. On the other hand, it is unclear whether this 
Dutch decision facilitated or hindered recovery efforts, for, as Schrijvers has shown for 
CA in Belgium, the “prewar local [Belgian] authorities…were out of the loop or in 
disarray.”317 
 From its inception, therefore, there were a number of reasons why the Allies had 
very different experiences in the Netherlands than in other places. Before exploring the 
types of recovery projects CA and MG units orchestrated and completed, the MG as an 
institution of reconstruction requires some discussion. 
 
Militair Gezag (MG) and Zeeland 
 The most pressing issue facing the people of Zeeland was inundation and 
therefore the loss of livestock, homes, and sources of income. The MG was given 	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sweeping powers to remedy the problems of reconstruction under the command of 
General-Major H.J. Kruls. The MG oversaw the functioning of public services, provided 
shelter for the influx of evacuees and displaced persons, sought out Nazi sympathizers 
and “collaborating” politicians, and worked to reconstitute the economy.318  Particularly 
problematic in the southern Netherlands was to get coal supplies moving along damaged 
waterways and rail links. Without coal there could be very limited transportation, 
industry, electricity, and gas.319 The MG oversaw other issues as well, such as the 
reconnection of telephone and telegraph lines and the reorientation of newspapers and 
other press organizations that were banned or strongly influenced during occupation. 
Additionally, repatriating the 380,000 Dutch civilians who were in Germany for work 
projects would pose an immense logistical challenge after 1945.320 This, however, as we 
have discussed in Chapter II was not as pressing in Zeeland. 
 The origins of the MG lay in political discussions of 1942 and 1943 when the 
government decided that a military authority would be established under the purview of 
Pieter S. Gerbrandy, then Minister of War. On 28 January 1943 the government formally 
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established the Bureau Militair Gezag, promoting Major Kruls to Colonel.321 Just like its 
counterpart CA, the MG also consisted of constituent functioning bodies with specialists 
that dealt with policing, water and rail transport, judicial, economic and financial affairs, 
as well as public health, employment and public works.322 From its inception some of the 
portfolios of the MG complimented and sometimes overlapped with those of CA. 
 Zeeland’s experience provided both organizations with the first opportunity to 
work in the Netherlands. On 23 September 1944 the headquarters for the MC of Zeeland 
was established in Axel in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Following the liberation of Walcheren in 
November 1944, however, the PMC headquarters were moved to Middelburg where it 
would remain until the MG was decommissioned in March 1946. As the Allies continued 
to liberate provinces of the Netherlands, the MG established separate districts under the 
command of a Provinciaal Militaire Commissariaat (PMC). Zeeland was under the 
leadership of kapitein-luitenant ter zee C.W. Slot. The PMCs were further divided into 
Districts Militaire Commissariaten (DMC). In Zeeland, the PMC divided the province 
into three subsequent districts: Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen; Zuid- en Noord-Beveland, Tholen 
and Sint Philipsland; and Schouwen-Duiveland, the latter of which would be liberated 
along with the rest of the country in May 1945. Walcheren received particular attention 
and the island’s reconstruction fell within the purview of the PMC itself and not as a 
separate DMC. In addition to C.W. Slot’s role as PMC, Major Dr. M. Bokhorst also held 
a key position in which he acted as military commissioner attached to the 2nd Corps of 
First Canadian Army. Bokhorst worked directly under Slot until 5 February 1945 and was 
instrumental in orchestrating the evacuation of civilians from Walcheren. Following his 	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work in Zeeland, Bokhorst would be transferred to perform similar functions for the MG 
in Noord-Holland.323 
 
The MG and the Ordedienst (OD)  
With the provincial structure of the MG in place, the Dutch government had other 
issues to flesh out, not least of which was how the MG would treat resistance 
organizations in general and the OD particularly, since the latter was the dominant 
resistance network in the country. Chapter two demonstrated that the OD was among the 
few organizations consistently active in Zeeland during occupation and there was some 
debate at the political level about the way in which the MG should use the organization’s 
assets. D.C.L. Schoonoord has argued that, at the national level, “the end of 1942, even 
before the creation of the MG, the government already intended to use the services of the 
OD.”324 In Zeeland, Piet de Kam, a reservist from Grijpskerke on Walcheren, became a 
member of the OD in 1941 and performed a number of important operations in the 
province during the Allied assault. In this capacity, de Kam and his co-resistors worked 
alongside the Canadian army in Zuid-Beveland in October and November 1944. In the 
initial days of liberation, de Kam’s primary role was to maintain public order, especially 
on 30 October when civilians in and around Goes came to the town, not necessarily to see 
the Canadians, but “to ask for permission to leave Goes,” which had been forbidden by 
the Canadian army and strictly enforced.325 During this transitional period, de Kam noted 
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that the role of the OD was to maintain contact with the Canadians and remain with them 
as part of the military authority.326 According to one of de Kam’s reports, the total 
number of members in the OD was around 1,200, although this figure is probably too 
inflated to be a provincial one.327 Among other functions de Kam and the OD performed 
during this crucial period was to requisition pistols and other firearms, which were to be 
handed over to Canadian authorities, as well as to survey war damages in Zuid-
Beveland.328 De Kam was also part of preliminary attempts to account for casualties in 30 
different towns in Zuid-Beveland (See Appendix IV). 
Some newspapers detailed the destruction war brought to the region.329 In Rilland, 
liberation resulted in 15 civilian deaths and 24 others wounded, while in Hoedekenskerke 
26 were killed and another 2 wounded. In Kapelle-Biezelinge, an additional 16 civilians 
were killed in the fighting.330 In short, the OD operations of which de Kam was a part 
were tasks that would later fall within the jurisdiction of the MG. Although initiated by 
the OD, the MG would build on the preliminary attempt to account for civilian casualties 
and maintain public order. In other words, the relationship between the MG and the OD 
added an additional layer of jurisdictional complexity to the immediate post-war 
reconstruction process. Inchoate efforts to recover the province were therefore begun by 
an illegal wartime organization in the wake of liberation. In this political vacuum, the 	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Beveland gedurende het tijdvak 29 October t/m 11 November 1944,” Bijlage C—Staat van Oorlogschade. 
329 Vrije Stemmen uit de Ganzestad, “Oorlogsverwoestingen op Zuid-Beveland,” 14 November 1944, 1. 
330 NIMH, De Kam, 510, inv. 13. “Rapport betreffende de werkzaamheden der O.D. in het District Zuid-
Beveland gedurende het tijdvak 29 October t/m 11 November 1944,” Bijlage D—Slachtoffers.	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Dutch government made use of the OD before the MG could take over. As the type of 
work the OD completed bore increasing resemblance to the mandate of the MG, Kruls 
demanded that the OD understood that it was a subordinate organization. The OD would 
in short order be displaced by the MG.331 
 
Conclusion 
 The circumstances of Zeeland’s liberation and the fact that operations against 
German armed forces elsewhere in the country continued meant that CA units were 
necessarily a matter of secondary importance. The decision by the Dutch government to 
establish a separate military authority during the very chaotic and transitional months 
from occupation to liberation presented the Allies with a completely different set of 
challenges than CA missions to France and Belgium. The expertise of MG units 
sometimes overlapped with those of CA, complicating jurisdictional matters and adding 
to an already complex institutional framework. CA training went according to established 
protocol, but the destructive nature and breadth of liberation in Zeeland represented a 
departure from other CA operations in which the Allies were involved. While villages in 
Sicily were destroyed, Zeeland was different. The extent of flooding, the first major 
obstacles over which CA and MG units were required to hurdle, differed drastically from 
operations in Belgium or France. While there had been flooding in France and Belgium, 
Zeeland’s flooding covered entire islands that were swallowed by the sea, making 
reclamation and reconstruction particularly challenging. The issue of topography and 
environmental consequences of battle further complicated the situation facing both sets of 
authorities. Zeeland’s composition as a series of islands, some of which were completely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 Schoonoord, Het ‘Circus Kruls’, 103. 
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flooded, meant that any reconstruction team or objective needed to consider the natural 
challenges posed by the environment, as well as issues of the winter weather in 1944 and 
1945. The challenges of the natural world, therefore, perhaps more than anything else, 
influenced the course of reconstruction and recovery in the province. While Dutch 
authorities had some degree of experience with flooding and the reclamation of land, the 
major issues occluding reconstruction efforts in the region were fundamentally foreign to 
CA units. No amount of training at Wimbledon and elsewhere could prepare CA units for 
the challenges to recovery in Zeeland. In short, the liberation of Zeeland in 1944 required 
civilians and Dutch authorities to take the lead in the reconstruction efforts of their 
province. 
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CHAPTER V 
Immediate Recovery: Evacuation, Accommodation, and Reluctance, 1944-1945 
This chapter details the ways in which both Allied and Dutch authorities began to 
assess and rebuild vital sectors of the province. Requisite to any type of reconstruction 
effort, however, was a series of evacuations aimed to remove civilians from severely 
inundated villages and hamlets on Walcheren and Tholen, and allot accommodation to 
families elsewhere in the province, mainly in Zuid-Beveland.  
The documentation used in this chapter primarily comes from the archive of the 
MG found in Zeeland’s provincial archive in Middelburg. Dealing with these sources 
requires an important caveat. Dutch contemporaries, and especially the Allies, gave 
considerable attention to the recovery of Walcheren and the themes explored here reflect 
a greater contemporary concern with the recovery of that island. One report stated simply 
“it should be noted that connections with Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen and with Tholen are not 
yet regulated, so what follows is generally not valid for these areas.”332 This can be 
explained for a number of reasons, not least because the Allies bombed much of 
Walcheren, the industrial and administrative heart of the province. In this respect, 
reconstruction efforts cannot be examined systematically according to constituent parts of 
the province, but rather thematically across time and space. For that reason, this chapter 
adopts a thematic approach. 
 Nonetheless, this chapter begins with plans for the evacuation of thousands of 
families from Walcheren and, to a lesser extent, Tholen and Schouwen-Duiveland. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4297 “14 daags overzicht over de positie der 
voedselvoorziening in het bevrijde gedeelte der provincie Zeeland,” 29 November 1944, 1. “Allereerst 
moet worden opgemerkt dat de verbindingen met Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen en met Tholen nog niet regalmatig 
zijn, zoodat wat hieronder volgt in het algemeen niet geldig is voor deze gebieden.” 
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demonstrates the central place of the environment in preliminary reconstruction efforts, 
and the challenge of reconciling local cultural and economic norms with Allied and 
Dutch recovery projects. This chapter argues that out of any event in Zeeland’s history 
from 1900 to 1945, Allied liberation was in fact the most destructive and devastating. It 
was not a period during which civilians celebrated or experienced euphoria. 
*** 
 
 “On October 17th the sea-dykes were breached in four places by R.A.F., and as 
the vast majority of the island (over 90%) is below high water level 85% of the island 
was flooded,” wrote CA officer H.P. Rickard in February 1945. “As the flood waters 
rose,” Rickard continued, “the rural population retired to the higher levels in the villages, 
to the easterly section of the island which, being protected by inland dykes forming 
polders, was not flooded, and to the city of Middelburg.”333 By November 1944, a total of 
52,548 hectares334 of Zeeland’s land had been flooded with salt water.335 Given the extent 
of flooding in the province, the most fundamental part of the immediate liberation and 
reconstruction era was the evacuation of Zeeuwen from parts of the province that were 
completely or partially inundated. Once these operations were completed other types of 
recovery projects could be initiated. Together, Allied CA and the Dutch MG worked to 
construct an evacuation scheme in late 1944. Reflecting on one of his first trips he took to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on the Evacuation Scheme, Island of 
Walcheren” 7 February 1945, 1. 
334 1 hectare is equal to 2.47 acres. 
335 Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie (NIMH), Duitse verdedigingswerken en inundaties van 
Nederlands grondgebied in de oorlog, 575, inv. “Staat van de Inundaties in Nederland: tengevolge van 
oorlogshandelingen in de jaren 1944-1945,” 2. 
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Walcheren, Rickard wrote in February 1945 of the devastation wrought by war and what 
appeared to be an impossible task of reconstruction: 
“The flood waters rendered 1/3 of MIDDELBURG and 1/2 of FLUSHING and 
1/3 of OOST-SOUBERG (including their environs) uninhabitable…The semi-
inundated villages of the island also were crowded with refugees, even the upper 
stories of houses whose ground floors were covered with two feet of water being 
used to the extent that whole families of up to twelve people were living in one 
room…Public utilities with one exception were not functioning: there was no rain 
water (rain water only from house cisterns was available), practically all wells 
were salted: there was no electric light or power; there were however limited 
supplies of gas in certain urban areas up to 1 hr. per diem at low pressure; there 
were no telephone facilities; the railroad was out of commission; the FLUSHING-
MIDDELBURG-VEERE canal was tidal, due to the destruction of all locks and 
badly blocked, whilst the only road into Walcheren island was so damaged as to 
be available only for essential military traffic. The weather was unfavourable, 
autumn gales anticipated and an extreme shortage, often amounting to entire lack 
of fuel and warm clothing, still further complicated an already unpromising 
situation.”336 
For these reasons, CA and MG officials seriously considered the evacuation of the entire 
island, but mainly to prevent anticipated epidemics and “other disasters,” which had 
already been noted by doctors in Middelburg.337 Authorities also expressed concern for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on Evacuation Scheme, Island of Walcheren,” 
7 February 1945. 
337 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Letter from Inspector for Public Health, Dr. L.J.H. 
Brongers to Militair Gezag voor Zeeland,” 16 November 1944. 
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the lack of fresh water since some towns relied on rainwater.338 But there were also 
strategic considerations at play: the Allies were still fighting German forces just north of 
the liberated areas of Zeeland. In light of the situation facing Walcheren’s civilians, CA 
and MG officials agreed upon an evacuation scheme, a task given to 609 (P) Detachment 
CA to implement.  
From 10 to 30 November 1944 there were several important changes in the 
military command that exacerbated the complexity of evacuation operations, one of 
which was the passing of military authority from 2 Canadian Corps to 1 British Corps on 
10 November 1944.339 But there were other serious problems as well. One was the 
cultural dissonance between Anglo-Canadian CA units and the Zeeuwen who the Allies 
sought to aid. On this issue, Rickard wrote “by religion they are Protestant with a devout 
faith in God, which even extends to a firm conviction that any effort to avoid the 
consequences of the divine punishment of the floods would constitute mortal 
sin…Religious scruples against inoculation were difficult to overcome although 
diphtheria threatened, whilst with one exception it was impossible to move refugees from 
their communes on SUNDAY.”340 To combat this issue, the MG and CA established a 
separate office for spiritual affairs (Geestelijke Verzorging), headed by a Reformed 
preacher from Middelburg named Dr. N.J. Hommes.341  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4288, “Evacuation of Walcheren Island: Record of 
agreement between commander SLOT, Military Commissioner for the province of ZEELAND and Colonel 
L. Gueney, SCAO, L of C 21 Army Group on 28 December 1944,” 1. 
339 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on Evacuation Scheme, Island of Walcheren,” 
7 February 1945, 3. 
340 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on Evacuation Scheme, Island of Walcheren,” 
7 February 1945, 3. 
341 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Rapport over de geestelijke verzorging der 
geëvacueerden in Zuid-Beveland” 10 February 1945, 1. 
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Another problem was an economic one. Many people in Zeeland became actively 
engaged in the black market during occupation in the same way that the black market 
flourished during the First World War. Some Zeeuwen accumulated stockpiles of food, 
butter, eggs, cheeses, salt, and meats, which they had sold to both Germans and 
neighbours at a profit. By the time of the floods in October 1944, the prices for goods on 
the black market inflated exponentially, which often resulted in a reticence to leave their 
homes during evacuation operations. The evacuation of some villages was made more 
challenging by the fact that civilians refused to leave their cattle and livestock. In 
Biggekerke, for example, DMC Bokhorst noted that still more villagers should be 
evacuated with their cattle to facilitate the process.342 “These people, therefore,” Rickard 
opined, “were unwilling to be evacuated as they had plenty of food, representing a high 
money value, strong religious objections, and a lack of experience of the world outside 
their own commune which almost amounted to a fear of the unknown: furthermore, they 
were extremely well-to-do and the high rate of evacuation pay made little difference.”343 
Despite these challenges noted as late as February 1945, operations to evacuate 
large numbers of Zeeuwen from Walcheren, Zuid-Beveland, and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 
continued from November 1944 onward. Officials began by forming a Dutch Evacuation 
Committee on 16 November 1944 in Middelburg, which adopted the Technical School as 
an evacuation centre on 20 November. The PMC appointed an evacuation commissioner 
who assessed the availability of billeting and accommodation in Zuid-Beveland. The first 
civilians to be evacuated from Walcheren to Zuid-Beveland were 100 people already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. Evacuatie Walcheren I F 18, “Vergadering Burgemeesters 
Walcheren,” 21 December 1944, 1. 
343 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on Evacuation Scheme, Island of Walcheren,” 
7 February 1945, 4. 
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living in the Technical School in Middelburg, space that was needed as a transit nexus for 
further evacuation. On 19 November, a small party consisting of just two Allied soldiers 
in a FBE (Folding Boat Equipment)344 with an outboard motor sailed for Ritthem, just 
east of Vlissingen, which was completely inundated and badly damaged. There they 
arranged to have civilians assemble and prepare for evacuation on 30 November. Five 
small boats were sent to pick up civilians, but the process was long and problematic due 
to the outboard motors getting caught in submerged barbed wire and other obstructions, 
including minefields. The party arrived in Ritthem at 11:30 am, but did not reach Oost-
Souberg until 8:00pm, a distance of only three kilometers. Eventually, the evacuees 
arrived at their destination in Middelburg at 1:00 am on 21 November, and only after one 
of the vessel’s motors became unserviceable from water-borne obstacles.345 The 
following day, another trip to Ritthem resulted in the evacuation of additional civilians 
for a total of 74 villagers from the village. A few days later, however, CA and MG 
officials learned that 57 people from the village had avoided evacuation and had since 
returned to their homes, which were almost entirely flooded out.346 
The experience in Ritthem forced officials to take a hard look at their policy. On 
24 November 1944, Lt.-Col. Lloyd moved to Middelburg bringing with him 509 Field 
Company, which was under the command of Major W.C. Wilkinson. CA thus drew up a 
more detailed and systematic evacuation scheme that separated Walcheren into sectors 
and tasked certain units with evacuating people from each sector. The “Northern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Adopted by the British army in 1928, this small vessel could carry up to 16 individuals and used a 7.5 
horsepower outboard motor. The boat typically contained a range deck or small fold away bridges. See for 
example, “Folding Boat Equipment,” www.thinkdefence.co.uk, accessed 12 October 2013. 
345 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on Evacuation Scheme, Island of Walcheren,” 
7 February 1945, 6. 
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Section,” for example, comprised the northern region of the island bound by the coastline 
running south to Domburg, Oostkapelle, and Vrouwenpolder. 509 Field Company was to 
clear the beach of mines northwest of Veere, which made the road from the beaches at 
Vrouwenpolder, Oostkapelle, and Domburg useable for DUKWs. DUKWs were mass 
produced six-wheeled amphibious trucks designed move on land and water. CA would 
accompany 509 Company to evacuate the estimated 2,000 civilians from the sector using 
four DUKWs provided by the military.347 The Allies considered the evacuation of this 
sector to be more easily executable, as opposed to the “Central Section,” which officials 
labeled all villages on Walcheren accessible only by boat. These villages, such as 
Grijpskerke, Serooskerke, Meliskerke, Biggekerke, Zoutelande, and Koudekerke, were 
covered by water of varying depths, some of which reached 20 feet, and therefore also 
obscured submerged obstacles like anti-glider poles, trees, fences, barbed wire 
entanglements, and minefields.348 In two days, 139 people from Koudekerke and 160 
from Serooskerke were evacuated in early January 1945.349 Based on these factors, CA 
and MG estimated the type of materiel the evacuation of each subsequent sector would 
require: 
Evacuation Sector on Walcheren350 Equipment Required 
Northern Section: trips by land and sea. 
Estimated number: 3,000 + 
Enough DUKWs to maintain a serviceable 
fleet of 20. 
Central Section: trips require safe passage 
over varying depths of flood waters, wholly 
submerged obstacles. 
10 RE Motortugs shallow draft as used for 
towing pontoons; 20 Ships Life Boats. 
Service personnel to operate. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on Evacuation Scheme, Island of Walcheren,” 
7 February 1945, 7. 
348 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on Evacuation Scheme, Island of Walcheren,” 
7 February 1945, 8. 
349 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4287, “Medische Richtlijnen voor de Evacuatie,” n.d. 
350 Adapted from chart provided in ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on Evacuation 
Scheme, Island of Walcheren,” 7 February 1945, 10. 
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Estimated number: 3,000 + 
Urban Section: partial evacuation presents 
no problems, route connected by dry roads 
with the mainland. 
Estimated number: 1,000 + 
A VHK team and equipment to be sent to 
Middelburg to operate evacuation centre 
under C.A.O. 
Personnel: 1 complete unit VHK; 5 
qualified nurses; 1 dispatch rider. 
Equipment: 1 3-ton lorry; 2 15-owt trucks; 
1 ambulance; 1 canteen; 1 motor trailer; 1 
pick up; 1 motor cycle 
 
As this table suggests, the CA officials were the only ones who could lead the evacuation 
given resource and materiel constraints. 
The evacuation process hinged on the effective cooperation of the burgemeesters 
in each commune. The PMC and DMC instructed burgemeesters to prepare lists of 
civilians who were to be evacuated from their communes. These numbers were then 
passed on to the evacuation commissioner in Zuid-Beveland who would in turn provide 
accommodation according to family size and necessity. Importantly, “the evacuation 
responsibility of CA was to cease when the refugees were delivered to their 
destination.”351 Allied authorities were to relinquish responsibility once civilians reached 
their billet homes. The handling of refugees in this province ran smoother during the 
Great War than it did in 1944. In practice, this smooth system as outlined in the scheme 
rarely functioned as such. Burgemeesters often changed lists of evacuees, committees 
were often not sent or were incompetent, and the allotment of billeting areas was often 
made without an exact assessment of capacity. For example, “this arrangement worked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland, inv. 4286, “Report on Evacuation Scheme, Island of Walcheren,” 
7 February 1945, 11. 
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very well except in Domburg where the incompetence of the burg master [sic] caused 
constant headache.”352   
Evacuations were especially difficult in the villages of central Walcheren, partly 
because some of the cultural and economic issues mentioned above and partly because 
miscommunication between Dutch and Allied authorities. En route to evacuations, many 
civilians refused to venture further and resistance to evacuation stiffened, resulting in 
many “divers” who would simply return to their homes. In other cases, baggage 
restrictions imposed upon rural evacuees were met with opposition. CA ordered that 
while families from the flooded parts of Middelburg could take with them 200 kilos per 
family, villagers from more remote areas were only permitted hand baggage.353 Civilians 
often “smuggled” bags of coal, flour, onions, and small containers of pickled pork in 
bedding or linen. Tags indicating family names on baggage often became soaked during 
evacuation and personal belongings were often lost en route.354 Some 500 pieces of 
luggage were lost during the evacuation process. They were often sent from one 
commune to the wrong billeting accommodation in Zuid-Beveland, causing more 
discontent among the evacuees, who lost bicycles, hand towels, linens, and household 
soap.355 Locating and retrieving these belongings was given to a separate detachment, 
629 CA Detatchment through orders of the MG.356 Not surprisingly, in his MG reports, 
Bokhorst stated that burgemeesters from Zoutelande, Koudekerke, and particularly 	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Biggekerke bemoaned that “the mood among the population is not particularly 
optimistic.”357 These were complex and difficult operations for which the training of CA 
official did not prepare them. 
By 10 January 1945, the partial evacuation of Walcheren was completed by 609 
CA detachment commanded by Rickard. From 20 November 1944 to 10 January 1945, 
CA claimed to have evacuated 6,603 civilians from Walcheren at a daily average of about 
140 people per working days (excluding Sundays and during poor weather).358 As a 
concluding note on Walcheren’s evacuation operations in February 1945, Rickard stated 
that “it was learned by experience that local Dutch Committees and municipal officials 
could not be relied upon, that over 4 years under German occupation had robbed them of 
all initiative and ‘drive’, and had left instead a stolid mental attitude varying from passive 
resistance to bleak indifference.”359 Whether it was occupation that robbed the people of 
their ‘drive’ or the fact that many lives had been completely uprooted because of 
liberation is debatable. What is most remarkable about the evacuation operations is that 
while many families in remote villages displayed an initial reticence or outright resistance 
to leave, CA and MG authorities nonetheless managed to evacuate them. The available 
evidence permits only speculation, but the eventual success of the operation begs 
questions as to whether by February 1945 civilians were running out of food in their 
inundated homes, or whether some more confessional civilians came to terms with their 
divine punishment. As late as April 1945, the medical advisor to the MG, Dr. C.F. 	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Frumau, argued that evacuation procedures should have continued in places like 
Domburg, as well as Serooskerke and Grijpskerke, where Dutch resistance had been most 
stiff, to prevent the continued spread of disease.360 Perhaps medical reasons contributed 
to the eventual evacuation of some villages. An additional contributing factor was 
certainly the winter weather. At any rate, according to CA officials, the original reasons 
for resistance to evacuation, noted early on, seemed to have lost significance in reports by 
winter 1945. 
While evacuations were most pressing in Walcheren following the battle, other 
parts of the province also required immediate assistance as a result of inundation. 
Beginning on 22 February 1944, the Germans flooded out about 10,800 hectares of 
Tholen’s surface area.361 In Schouwen-Duiveland, beginning on 1 March 1944, the 
Germans released sluiceways to cover almost 15,800 hectares of the island’s surface area 
and it remained underwater until September 1945.362 The difference, however, was that 
large evacuation operations could begin in Tholen since the Allies had liberated that part 
of the province, while Schouwen-Duiveland remained occupied by the Germans until 
May 1945. There were, however, civilians from Schouwen-Duiveland who were 
evacuated or managed to leave their homes. This meant that evacuation operations were 
conducted quite close to the German defenders, who had readjusted their lines to the area 
around the mouth of the River Maas. Nonetheless, in January 1945, when operations to 
evacuate Walcheren had been completed, MG and CA officials worked to find 	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accommodation for the people of towns like Scherpenisse on Tholen, a town which was 
badly damaged. There were about 60 civilians from Scherpenisse who had been 
evacuated and sent to towns in Zuid-Beveland like Yerseke and Krabbendijke and in 
Noord-Beveland near Kortgene.363 The town of ‘s Gravenpolder in Zuid-Beveland, for 
example, took in many displaced persons from Walcheren, Tholen, and Schouwen-
Duiveland. By the time of the liberation of Zuid-Beveland, ‘s Gravenpolder had around 
1,300 inhabitants. By January 1945, the town billeted about 150 military personnel, 91 
civilians from Schouwen-Duiveland, 147 from Walcheren, and 11 from Tholen for a total 
of 249 evacuees, all of whom were allotted accommodation in one of ‘s Gravenpolder’s 
300 homes. Out of those 300 homes, 33 houses were completely destroyed in the 
fighting, while an additional 45 were damaged.364 This situation was played out in other 
towns in Zuid-Beveland, often straining the already limited resources such as water and 
electricity. Such was the case in Krabbendijke where, in addition to its 2,600 inhabitants, 
the towns housed an additional 1,225 civilians from other parts of Zeeland, while access 
to resources like electricity was sometimes erratic.365 Towns in Zuid-Beveland that took 
in displaced civilians played an essential role throughout this period, putting pressure on 
families and parts of the province that emerged from fighting relatively unscathed. 
Throughout the winter of 1945, inspectors from various institutions made “house 
visits” to check up on the needs of evacuees in various communes. In some cases, up to 9 
individuals lived in a single house. One inspector noted that in the Commune of Nisse the 
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Breure family, evacuated from Tholen, “live, sleep, and cook, all in one room of 5 meter 
[squared]. 2 children sleep on the ground.”366 Overcrowding made possible the spread of 
communicative diseases, which in Krabbendijke led to 50 cases of scabies and 20 cases 
of diphtheria.367 These types of conditions, noted by inspectors and a variety of other 
authorities, are peppered throughout contemporary reports on situations facing communes 
across the province from liberation to mid-1945.368 
 
Closing the Dykes on Walcheren 
 The most fundamental obstacle to reconstruction was inundation. Following the 
evacuation of Walcheren, repairing the dykes was the most important task for CA and 
MG units. Only once this was accomplished could other issues be addressed. However, in 
the early stages of planning the repair of Walcheren’s dykes, the procurement of 
necessary materials and transport posed a number of challenges. In November 1944, 
SHAEF agreed that “the question of the rehabilitation and restoration of WALCHEREN 
ISLAND was of the utmost importance, urgency and magnitude, and could NOT be laid 
at the door of 21 A Gp alone.”369 Occupied by ongoing military operations outside of 
Zeeland, Allied authorities believed “the problem was beyond the scope of the available 
machinery and equipment at the disposal of the military authorities in the area” and that 
the MG should draw up their own plan for the restoration of the island in consultation 
with Dutch engineers in the region. SHAEF, “whilst fully appreciating the gravity of the 	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situation, regrets that the material and equipment required for the task cannot be found 
from military resources.”370 Instead, the Allies argued that the MG and the Dutch 
government “should take up the problem of the restoration of WALCHEREN ISLAND 
with the BRITISH and U.S. Governments, through normal governmental channels.”371  
Some authorities were unsure how best to proceed with reconstruction efforts, 
particularly the Dutch requests for material. R.L. Speaight of Foreign Office in London, 
for example, wrote that “SHAEF have refused to undertake the requirement as a military 
responsibility. It is true that the grounds for refusal quoted by the Dutch (that the material 
is not available with SHAEF) are bad; but it is still possible that the real grounds are 
good. Military responsibility in the matter is limited to ‘such repairs or maintenance as 
are necessary in the opinion of the Theater Commander to reduce the immediate military 
burden or to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to the military operation’…SHAEF 
may well have decided that the large scale works contemplated by the Dutch do not come 
within this definition.”372 Clearly, in the minds of some politicians in London, evacuation 
and reconstruction were mutually exclusive. Since SHAEF was a military authority and 
not a political one, its officials argued that reconstruction remains a political 
responsibility and not necessarily within the purview of the military. 
In cooperation with the MG, the restoration of Walcheren was given to chief 
engineer, P. Jansen, who propounded a feasible program that included the types of 
resources and materiel required to close Walcheren’s broken dykes and reclaim the land. 
While Jansen managed to acquire some of the necessary resources, some of which were 	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taken from Belgium on the condition that the Dutch government would pay the Belgians 
in the near future, the Dutch still lacked important machinery and pumps.373 A key figure 
in supplementing reconstruction on Walcheren was Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and 
the British Foreign Office. Eden emphasized the exigency of providing Dutch officials 
with the appropriate materiel, although Walcheren was always deemed most important. 
He also suggested that the military was not pulling its weight, noting that  “it was 
decided, that the Netherlands authorities [MGs] would at once take the repair works in 
hand, whereby both S.H.A.E.F. and the 21st Army Group would give their full assistance. 
However, neither S.H.A.E.F. nor the 21st Army Group dispose of the required materials. I 
have therefore been instructed and beg to approach your Excellency with the urgent 
request that His Majesty’s Government would, if possible, put the following materials at 
the disposal of the Netherlands Government, whilst at the same time providing for the 
necessary transport facilities from the United Kingdom.”374  
The representative of the Foreign Office at SHAEF, Charles Peake, responded to 
Eden’s inquiries about the required resources and manpower and, in January 1945, made 
clear “that after full consideration it turns out that they are not at the moment able to help 
in finding the equipment the Dutch need. In view of the general situation in those parts 
and the very heavy demands now being made upon our reserves for priorities even more 
urgent, I fear I cannot quarrel with this decision but I will have the question kept under 
review in the hope that later we may find some means of meeting the wishes of the 
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Netherlands Government.”375 The Allies would only be able to make limited resources 
available for reconstruction efforts while the war continued. For the Dutch, who had 
assumed that the Allied presence in the province after November 1944 implied a joint 
effort in reconstruction, the reticence of authorities to send resources and materiel in the 
immediate aftermath of battle was discomfiting.  
 The resources needed just to repair the dykes on Walcheren were extensive. The 
repairs required over 250,000 trees, mainly from Belgium, as well as 2000 tons of stone 
shipped in from Belgium each week in late December and January, and the use of several 
caissons during certain parts of the tidal cycle.376 But still, the UK contributed to 
Walcheren’s repair. The UK sent three stationary barge loading suction dredgers, one 
stationary pump-unit that could reclaim 1,000 cubic yards per hour, and two floating 
stone-transporter cranes with a capacity of carrying one ton each.377 Because of the 
deforestation caused by both German and Allied operations, and the destruction of 
Zeeland’s wooded areas, mainly on Noord- and Zuid-Beveland, the British government 
initiated a reforestation program that lasted until 1947.378 By February 1945, however, 
the major operations to evacuate civilians in completely inundated villages and to repair 
the largest sea dykes were complete. These were certainly fundamental to other post-war 
reconstruction efforts, which included the recovery of electricity, roads, railways, and 
other infrastructure. 
In spite of the level of destruction inflicted on the region, the pace at which 
recovery took place in Walcheren was quite remarkable. By February and March 1945, 
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the major sea dykes at Westkapelle, Veere, and east and west of Vlissingen had been 
closed largely by local workers. When it comes to the reconstruction of other parts of the 
province, the Allied authorities were either less inclined or unable to provide the 
necessary materials, particularly during the later phases of the war. In January 1945, the 
Dutch ambassador to the United Kingdom requested that the people of the province could 
“take in hand the repair of the dykes,” but, like Eden’s request in the same month, asked 
the UK to provide the necessary materiel.379  
In a dominantly agrarian economy many civilians and authorities expressed fear 
over the degree to which saltwater would affect the agricultural recovery of the province. 
One British engineer’s report on the situation in 1947 claimed that in some parts of the 
province “all vegetation is dead and a volume could be written on the time lag for new 
crops.”380 The salinization of the soil had great consequences for the local and provincial 
economy. In May 1946, one contemporary bemoaned the enormous task that lay ahead 
for Dutch farmers. He wrote “at present, the greatest handicap to the Dutch farmer is the 
shortage of machinery for soil cultivation—tractors, plows, harrows, cultivators, mowing 
machines, binders, and so forth.”381  
Yet, later that year, a report in the Journal of Farm Economics commented on the 
rapidity of agricultural recovery on Walcheren. The authors wrote that “common 
newspaper reports, at the time of the breaking of the sea wall…were to the effect that ten 
years would be required to bring back into production the land flooded by saltwater. In 
fact, however, around two-thirds of this land grew a crop of barley in 1946, or perhaps is 	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already seeded to alfalfa.”382 Walcheren managed to produce one successful crop of 
wheat on reclaimed land in 1946, although other parts of the province were not as 
successful. The next most successful crop to grow in Walcheren’s previously salinized 
soil was alfalfa because of its tolerance to salt and partially because it can be grown 
without plowing.383 In a report written for British authorities in July 1945, the 
Commissioner General for Dutch Economic Recuperation claimed that “several hundred 
tons of ploughs, drills, mowers, and binders have been removed and partly identified in 
Germany,” and that Dutch agricultural recovery depended on the arrival of farm 
implements.384 As these contemporary reports suggest, the Allied destruction of 
Walcheren received particular attention in the UK and elsewhere. In a way, Walcheren 
became a rallying cry around which international support for reconstruction grew in the 
immediate post-war. “Walcheren, the great Dutch island that guards the shipping route to 
Antwerp,” one bulletin read in December 1944, “is one of the areas most severely 
affected by flooding.”385 The same bulletin claimed that “between 60% and 65% of the 
entire population of the Netherlands has been affected by the floods let loose by the 
enemy,” but did not mention how many lives were affected by Allied operations.386 The 
reconstruction and restoration of other parts of Zeeland, however, remained out of 
English-language headlines. 
The operations to evacuate civilians and repair the dykes of Walcheren were 
immensely difficult operations for both Allied and Dutch authorities. Despite sporadic 	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disagreement between SHAEF and the British Foreign Office, Allied assistance greatly 
expedited the process of recovery. While the dykes were largely repaired by the labour of 
Zeeland’s civilians, they had been considerably aided by the materiel the Allies were able 
to dispose. 
 
Damage Assessment and Rebuilding Homes 
While both CA and MG officials worked to evacuate and transfer civilians from 
one part of the province to another from autumn 1944 to winter 1945, they also attempted 
to assess overall damages done to civilian property. While Dutch authorities canvassed 
for Allied support in Walcheren, the villages in other parts of the province received little 
attention. As early as 1941, the Dutch government had declared moral and economic 
responsibility for the reconstruction of property following the war. The government 
planned to compensate civilians for damages inflicted upon houses, businesses, and other 
private property. Compensation would be granted according to the value of properties or 
goods on 9 May 1940.387 Implementing this promise in practice, however, proved to be a 
chimera. In the immediate post-war period, provincial officials and civilians became 
increasingly disillusioned by the national government’s promises. One pamphlet 
distributed around Walcheren read “the population of the severely damaged Province of 
Zeeland asks for your warm interest: her wishes relative to materiel recovery.”388 But the 
Dutch government was also preoccupied with other issues, one of which was how they 
would approach the question of the Dutch East-Indies and other colonial possessions. It 
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seemed to the Zeeuwen and provincial officials that both foreign and domestic authorities 
had ignored many of their requests. In this context, section IX of the MG in charge of 
public works oversaw the development of The Service of Reconstruction in Zeeland 
(Dienst van den Wederopbouw in Zeeland, DWZ). 
In early February 1945, Dr. R.W. Graaf van Lynden of the DWZ compiled a 
preliminary report that detailed the extent of war damages in the province. It stated that 
some of the most severely affected towns in the province were found in the west part of 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and notably Breskens, Schoondijke, Oostburg, and Sluis, all of 
which were “almost entirely destroyed.”389 Breskens, for instance, had 1,000 registered 
homes before the war, 800 of which were totally destroyed by combat. Likewise, 460 of 
Oostburg’s 840 houses were completely destroyed and many more “serious” or “lightly” 
damaged.390 The author of the report indicated that a chief concern for Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen was how agricultural work would resume, since most of the houses of those 
employed in the agricultural sector were either destroyed or damaged. “As soon as the 
supply of materials allows [the reconstruction of homes],” the report continued, “the 
rebuilding of farms there will have to be taken in hand strenuously.”391 Like the evacuees 
of Walcheren and Tholen, many civilians from west Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen were 
evacuated to the eastern part of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen leaving their homes, livestock, and 
businesses. 
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Assessments of Zuid-Beveland show that many towns on that island were also 
severely damaged. Only two of Ellewoutsdijk’s 127 homes were undamaged, while 
Hoedekenskerke lost 16 per cent of its 380 houses.392 Other villages experienced 
commensurable consequences as a result of fighting, and officials recognized that 
because Zuid-Beveland accommodated evacuees from Walcheren and Tholen, “it is 
highly necessary that at least the slight damage caused to roofs and windows will be 
repaired soonest [sic] possible.”393 Noord-Beveland had not been subjected to intense 
fighting and was, for the most part, spared from war-related damage. For example, only 
11 out of 970 houses in Kortgene were destroyed, a small price in comparison to other 
parts of the province.394 Walcheren’s largest town, Vlissingen, paid a high price: 1,600 
homes in the commune were completely under water, while 465 were partially inundated. 
For Vlissingen, “all other buildings in the town were damaged, some more, others less. 
Undamaged buildings were not to be found in Vlissingen.”395 Tholen, however, was 
heavily damaged and inundated, but was too close to military operations in the winter of 
1945 to be assessed by reconstruction teams. 
The assessment concluded that “the state of things in Zeeland is serious. 
Thousands of families are accommodated in a most primitive way; hundreds of houses 
have to be rendered habitable and the materials to effect this in the simplest way, are 
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beschadigde panden zijn in Vlissingen niet meer te vinden.” 
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lacking. They will therefore have to be supplied from elsewhere. For that purpose 
attempts are being made with the cooperation of many authorities; particularly efforts 
will have to be made, to obtain material (asphalt-paper, plastic glass) from England as 
otherwise the untenable conditions which now prevail in the domain of housing of the 
people and public health will continue this winter, while it will also be impossible to meet 
the demands made for the recovery of economic life.”396 Based on their assessment, the 
DWZ requested 82,000 windowpanes, 5,200 units of timber, 1,716 bricks, and about 
1,000 kilograms of cement.397 As long as the war continued, however, the Allies could 
only offer the heavy machinery and implements used to repair the dykes on Walcheren. 
To be sure, towns and cities in the United Kingdom also required immediate attention. 
Whether or not the materiel listed by the DWZ was available at all is doubtful. The 
British believed what they had contributed was extensive enough; indeed, without it 
closing the dykes of Walcheren would not have been possible. Yet, despite Allied efforts, 
more aid was required for smaller-scale projects, such as home and property repair, than 
was available at the time.  
 
Food Production and Economic Recovery 
 The people of Zeeland did not commiserate during the “Hunger Winter.” During 
the evacuations and the transportation of large numbers of civilians, the MGs began to 
assess the availability of foodstuffs in the province. In some areas like Tholen and 
Walcheren, the regional economy suffered considerably as arable land remained 
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inundated, farms were damaged, and livestock killed. But reports compiled by the 
Kantoor van den Provincialen Voedselcommissaris voor Zeeland (literally, Office of the 
Food Commissioner for Zeeland) on 29 November 1944, show that the situation facing 
the Zeeuwen in Noord- and Zuid-Beveland was different from that facing the central 
provinces.398 Under authority of the MG, authorities introduced the rationing of certain 
goods until regular-scale production could begin. The consumption of certain products 
was initially restricted to children and the infirm, and scarce products went to evacuation 
centers for distribution. The commissioner noted that foodstuffs like “bread and flour 
offer us no difficulties,” while the fields of Zuid- and Noord-Beveland continued to 
produce great quantities of potatoes.399 The flooding of Walcheren had a profound effect 
on meat and dairy products. This is one of the reasons why the MG emphasized the 
importance of evacuating cattle along with villagers from Walcheren. The commissioner 
wrote “butter or milk fat are two products that have given us the most difficulty” and 
therefore placed these items on the ration list.400  
Comparing average diets based on caloric consumption before liberation and 
during the early weeks of November 1944 shows a decrease in the consumption of certain 
goods following the arrival of the Allies. According to one food distribution centre in 
Middelburg, the average daily caloric intake for a person from Zeeland before the war 
was 1,662 calories, while in the first weeks of November 1944 this number declined to 
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1,211 calories.401 Rations of apples allotted to civilians, for example, went from 4,000 to 
3,000 grams per person. In this sense, the end of war in Zeeland saw a decrease in the 
availability of certain goods. Salt, a staple product to preserve certain meats, was one 
item in very short supply. The commissioner noted that “the position of salt demands a 
rapid supply.”402 Based on assessments of civilian needs, the provincial commissioner 
compiled a list of items required for the next six months while evacuation and 
preliminary reconstruction efforts took place. Among other items, this included 320,250 
kg of beef, 3,116,750 liters of milk, 889,200 kg of salt, and 222,625 kg of laundry 
detergent. According to the MG, CA officials were obliged to transport these goods by 
cargo ship beginning on 9 December 1944 and, if rationed properly, would probably last 
until the war came to an end.403 Reports on the rationing situation in the southern 
Netherlands demonstrate that the initial scarcity of certain goods was assuaged by April 
1945 and the daily caloric intake surpassed that of the pre-liberation level, reaching 1,763 
per day.404 By the end of the war in the Netherlands, the daily caloric intake for Dutch 
civilians reached 1,912.405 This was accomplished by rationing out existing stores of 
items to create “uniformity” in consumption.406 The CA provided these foodstuffs and 
accomplished their objective. 
The rationing of foodstuffs was one matter, but it is worth mentioning some of the 
challenges to providing fresh drinking water to evacuees and civilians. This required 	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t/m 28 April ’45,” 1-2. 
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immediate attention as well. Inundation had effectively wiped out the principal source of 
clean water on which some villages relied. The fighting had also broken vital watermains 
outside of Middelburg, which both CA and MG officials worked to fix on 5 January 
1945. The burgemeester of Middelburg suggested constructing a new waterline to one in 
Ossendrecht in neighbouring Noord-Brabant some 60 kilometers away. In addition, 
repairs could be made to the damaged part of the existing waterline near the mill in St. 
Laurens, just outside Middelburg. The primary obstacle to repairing this vital 
infrastructure was the wreckage of a British tank lying on top of the broken watermain. 
Dutch authorities had requested the Allies move the tank, but no action was taken.407 
Canadian CA officers were involved in similar repair projects, notably between Zuid-
Beveland and Walcheren around 18 November 1944.408 The Canadian CA engineer 
specialist of 627 Detatchment, Captain Kirkpatrick, went to Goes along with PMC Slot 
and agreed that repairing the watermain between Zuid-Beveland and Walcheren was 
essential. However, while he agreed that the supply of water in this sector required 
immediate attention, the repairs were to be done by the MG provided that the pipe could 
be supplied to them.409 Other problems, as H.P. Rickard identified in his earliest visits to 
the province, included the salting of all wells that were affected by flooding. In each 
scenario, the reconstruction efforts were dictated by the availability of resources and 
materiel. 
While reports often commented on the availability of foodstuffs, documents from 
the food commissioner made little reference to the situation facing farmers and the 	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fishing industry. But it took considerable time to recover both of these sectors after the 
war. As a province situated in the North Sea, the fishing industry had long characterized 
life for many in Zeeland. During occupation, a number of factors considerably affected 
the industry, including the German decision to construct extensive coastal defenses, the 
restriction of civilian movement which often prevented fishermen from going out to sea, 
and finally, Allied bombardment and fighting. These factors significantly disrupted life 
for civilians, as well as local economies. To compensate for the consequences of 
occupation and war on the fish market, CA and Dutch officials agreed to supplement 
local food supplies by allowing fishing to begin as soon as the waters were deemed safe. 
The Allies had successfully demined the Schelde by 26 November 1944 and the first 
cargo ships were unloaded in Antwerp on 1 December, but military authorities continued 
to restrict mobility in other parts of the province that required minesweeping. Mines had 
shifted during the Allied bombardment of Walcheren and authorities still considered 
some of the coastal areas around Veere and Domburg dangerous.  
Even before operations to defeat the Germans in Zeeland began, SHAEF sent a 
curious directive to all MG officers on 28 August 1944 anticipating some of the 
challenges to the recovery of fisheries in the region.410 CA divided the regional fishing 
economy of the “Liberated Areas,” including parts of France and later Belgium, into 
three separate sectors: domestic fishing (Binnenlandsche vischvangst), coastal fishing 
(Kustvischvangst), and deep-sea fishing (Diepzeevischvangst), although Zeeland’s 
economy primarily relied on the latter two. In so doing, SHAEF and CA hoped to 
monitor better the movement of seagoing vessels and this was particularly important 	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while operations to defeat Nazi Germany continued. To accomplish this CA designated 
certain officers as “fishery officers” (Visscherij-officieren) who worked alongside local 
marine commandants as well as British naval liaison officers. These officers generally 
oversaw fishing activity in shipyards and harbours. Because of the damage caused by 
fighting, a certain number of harbours were immediately available to both the military 
and civilians, though the Allies often curtailed the use of these harbours for civilian 
purposes. CA designated the harbours in Tholen, Yerseke, Colijnsplaat, Veere, and 
Terneuzen as useable, while those at Vlissingen, Breskens, and Hansweert were partially 
useable.411 There were therefore few fully useable harbours and the ones available were 
used primarily for military purposes. 
CA granted permission to begin fishing again in certain areas on 18 December 
1944. Authorities imposed strict time limits, from sunrise to sunset, and CA “accepted 
that time will be lost as a result of this restriction on account of the effect of tides on 
navigation.”412 CA and MG officials tasked mayors and fishery officers with 
administering fishing permits to civilians. The commune issued permits based on 
individuals and not vessels, so both the master of each vessel and his deputy were 
required to carry permits. The CA officers emphasized that each vessel could only use 
one base or habour and that each vessel needed to return to that base each afternoon and 
must “not have contact with the land at any other point. Vessels may, however, moor off 
SOUTH BEVELAND, for instance at YERSEKE, whilst awaiting favourable tides.”413 
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Mussel extraction received particularly close attention from both CA and MG 
officials, which suggests that it was perhaps the most affected local industry during 
occupation. Since mussels had been a chief export from Zeeland to other parts of the 
Netherlands and Belgium for centuries, it was a key industry to rehabilitate. PMC Slot 
requested from CA a number of resources including 58,000 liters of diesel oil, 2,300 
liters of kerosene, and 140 kilograms of waterproof grease, all of which would be allotted 
to the fishing industry. Given access to these resources, fishing companies and MG 
authorities estimated in January 1945 that Zeeland could produce a total of 6,000,000 
kilograms of mussels and 3,000,000 oysters by March or April 1945.414 
While on its surface these measures aimed to recover local fisheries, the Allies 
were most interested in furthering military objectives and not necessarily returning fish 
production to preexisting levels. Allowing civilians to fish again, CA recognized, “will 
initially be able to meet civilian needs to reduce shipping and allied support.” The report 
also made clear that “where the amount of fish available is greater than necessary for 
civilian needs, or in case of emergency, fish can also be used to meet military needs.”415 
Barges and seagoing vessels were strictly monitored in the region, but particularly near 
the Oosterschelde where Allied seafaring traffic was most needed.416 CA also noted that 
“it must be clearly understood by all applicants for passes that NO mine clearance has 
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been carried out and vessels putting to sea can expect NO protection from Allied 
services.”417 Here, too, recovery efforts could not be separated from military objectives. 
By winter 1945, some civilians filed complaints with the PMC or DMC about 
Allied requisitioning of private property. One civilian, Adriaan de la Houssaije, from 
Vlissingen allegedly saw British soldiers drive away in his motor boat in November 
1944, but it took until February 1945 to have his issue addressed. He filed his complaints 
with the MG, who in turn submitted the report to 612 Detachment of CA. The man wrote 
that “Owing to the fact, that even if I should now get back the total cost of the ship, I 
should not be able to get another ship for that amount, it is impossible for me to mention 
a sum that would represent the value of the ship, after depreciation, on the day of the loss. 
The ship is equipped with a worm-steering gear with a steering-wheel on deck.”418 Given 
the resource pressure on the Allies in the winter of 1945, the ship described by this 
disgruntled civilian could have been requisitioned by Allied authorities for other military 
objectives. The evidence permits only speculation about the reason behind the 
requisition. While CA units dealt with civilian complaints, the MG continued to purge 
every sector of Nazi sympathizers and this included the fisheries. In Yerseke, for 
example, at least ten oyster farmers were identified and interned for collaborating with 
the Nazi regime.419  
Like the fishing industry, occupation and war had considerable consequences for 
agriculture in the province. The German use of land, the construction of airfields, and 
other defense-related changes made to the landscape affected farming and livestock. The 	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Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant, one of the most distributed daily newspapers in the 
province, covered a variety of stories about changes to agriculture in the latter years of 
the war. One of the most serious was the trade in contraband goods (smokkelhandel), or 
the black market. This is another case of continuity between the First and Second World 
Wars. As we have seen, black marketeering was certainly not isolated to 1945. In at least 
one case, a veterinarian in IJzendijke (Zeeuws-Vlaanderen) reported a foal dead upon 
birth to regulate sales in the market, and probably also to avoid requisition orders from 
German authorities. By June 1944, as the Allies pushed further into France, the stories 
regarding illegal practice of cattle and livestock trade became more frequent.420 By 
November and December 1944, the livestock industry in Zeeland had suffered greatly, 
not only because the Allied bombardment of Walcheren had largely put a hold on 
agriculture, but also because the statistics regarding agricultural production and livestock 
were dubious. In this context, the MG section for economic affairs had to reconstitute 
agricultural and livestock production, as well as regulate a skewed agrarian market. 
Under authority of the MG, committees were established to assess the progress of 
recovery in agriculture, fishing, as well as the procurement of fuels.421 
 
Growing Discontent 
 From a military and strategic perspective, the possible failure to open the port of 
Antwerp by late autumn 1944 and early 1945 meant that operations in northwest Europe 
would have to come to a halt. In this sense, the Allies had everything to lose and, for that 
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reason, the most extreme measures were considered and eventually taken to neutralize 
Walcheren and other vital parts of the Atlantikwall in Zeeland. From a civilian 
perspective, however, news of “Mad Tuesday” on 5 September 1944 led many civilians 
just north of Antwerp to believe that the end of war was insight. The curious lull between 
5 September and 3 October 1944 belied what lay ahead for the people residing at the 
mouth of the Schelde. Beginning with the flooding and evacuations of Walcheren, 
Tholen, and to a lesser extent Schouwen, it is understandable that, for many reasons, 
Zeeuwen greeted their liberators with a degree of reluctance. Evacuation and 
accommodation elsewhere in the province uprooted entire families, many of whom had 
never before left their islands. The efforts to assess and compensate civilians for damages 
appeared to be far too slow, while the Dutch saw Allied reticence to dispose resources 
and materiel as a sign that recovery would be an even longer process than they had 
initially anticipated.  
That military operations continued so close to the central part of the province 
meant that civilians were still not entirely safe. On 3 January 1945, for example, a group 
of a dozen farmers came under intense machine gun fire while working in the polderland 
just outside of Wilhelminadorp (Z.-Beveland). According to the police deposition, which 
was submitted to CA by the burgemeester of Kattendijke, a sixteen year-old boy 
accompanying the workers had been shot during the assault. The victim, Cornelis van der 
Hoeven, as well as the other witnesses claimed that the firing came from the Zandkreek, 
where they had noticed two British patrol vessels just before the incident. Shortly 
thereafter, two farmers, Gommert Lindenberghe and Abraham van de Velde, ran towards 
the seawall, where they saw the two British vessels sailing in the direction of Kortgene 
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(Noord-Beveland). The depositions highlight the frustration of the civilians who claimed 
that there were no Germans anywhere near either Zuid- or Noord-Beveland and simply 
wanted to work their fields. The victims, interviewed by police and represented by the 
burgemeester, claimed that the civilian casualty was a result of carelessness and 
negligence on the part of the Allied soldiers.422 
The Allied response, which came several days after the incident, was short. Lt.-
Col. R.W. P. Dawson of 4 Commando Bde. wrote: “I have investigated the crime myself, 
and so far as I can judge reasonable precautions were taken to fire the weapons out to sea. 
All craft comds have detailed instrs regarding weapons on coming into harbor, and I 
believe these to be complied with. I think it is reasonable therefore, to exclude any idea of 
negligence on the part of the craft comd or gunner concerned and to attribute the 
occurrence to accidental causes.”423 
This anecdote illustrates that the proximity of the military to civilians caused 
some friction between civilians and military personnel. Zeeland was not the only place 
where civilians and the military clashed.424 Similar issues caused waves of discontent 
among Belgian civilians.425 In this particular case, military objectives and patrols blended 
into the rhythm of civilian life while operations to defeat the German armed forces north 
of Zeeland continued. Other complaints, like those regarding lost baggage during 
evacuation procedures, outright refusal to comply with evacuation, or Adriaan de la 
Houssaije’s requisitioned boat may have been symptomatic of a broader sentiment in the 	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extremely volatile period of 1944 and 1945. These instances demonstrate that any initial 
euphoria associated with liberation had subsided quickly and that recovery at the most 
basic civilian level was often hindered by Allied objectives and their presence. The 
liberation narrative of the Netherlands is almost entirely disrupted. 
 
Conclusion 
 The evidence explored in this chapter highlights a variety of problems that the 
people of Zeeland faced from late 1944 to early 1945. After four years of occupation, 
which grew more stringent as the war progressed, civilians heard rumours about the 
Allied advance to Antwerp. This had led some to believe that a clear-cut liberation would 
soon follow. However, stiff German resistance to the Allied advance signaled to civilians 
that the war was far from over.  
The traditional periodization of the Second World War from 1940 to 1945 is 
wholly unsatisfying to explain the wartime experiences of civilians in Europe. Recovery 
had begun in earnest in 1945-1946 and, even then, the ways in which reconstruction 
materialized were slow and uneven across the province. The central part of the province 
received the most attention, especially at the international level, because of Walcheren’s 
administrative and economic importance, while the people of Schouwen-Duiveland 
waited until May 1945 for German occupation to end. Ending the war in 1945 ignores the 
immense problems posed by the war’s aftermath and the many challenges faced by 
civilians in the post-war era. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
Rehabilitating a Rural Province in the Post-War World, 1945-1948 
 
 For most historians in the English-speaking world, the periodization of the Second 
World War is clear. The Allied victory over Nazi Germany in May 1945 meant that 
hostilities in Europe came to an end. While the repatriation of Allied soldiers from the 
continent and the United Kingdom presented each country with a set of challenges, the 
narrative of the Second World War, insofar as combat experience is concerned, 
understandably ends in May 1945. This, however, is not true for the histories of countries 
ravaged by the war, on whose soil intense battles were fought and whose lands, cities, 
and populations were devastated. 
 The decision to end this chapter in 1948 has been considerably influenced by 
French historian Henry Rousso, whose recent work on experience and memory in Europe 
has demonstrated the value of a concept he refers to as “sortie de guerre” (exiting wars). 
“Exiting wars” refers to processes during which local populations are left to 
conceptualize their own memories following the official and diplomatic declaration to 
end hostilities.426 Applying this notion to the context of Zeeland is apt. Although the 
hostilities of the Second World War in Zeeland ended in early November 1944, much of 
the region remained flooded until 1945. As we have seen, it took great efforts on behalf 
of Dutch and Allied governments to help Zeeland recover from the destruction brought 
on by liberation. A full “recovery” in all facets of civilian life was a chimera in 1945, 
something hoped for but in the end unrealistic. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 See Chapter 1 in Jörg Echternkamp and Stefan Martens. Experience and Memory: The Second World 
War in Europe. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010). 	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 This chapter, therefore, explores some of the problems associated with ending 
wartime narratives in 1945. It examines a number of themes that together demonstrate 
that Zeeland’s war had not ended in 1945, but continued throughout the mid- to late-
1940s. To use but one example, in 1946 the Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant reported a 
number of children who had been killed by mines laid by the Germans during 
occupation.427 War was still very much a reality of everyday life. The destruction left 
behind and the contorted landscapes were a physical reminder to the civilian population. 
In short, the rehabilitation of Zeeland had only begun during this period and there was no 
ultimate conclusion to recovery during the 1940s. 
*** 
 In 1946, provincial authorities sought to expedite economic recovery in Zeeland 
by repairing and reopening vital lines of infrastructure, such as bridges connecting certain 
parts of the province, as well as rail lines that connected Zeeland to Brabant and Zuid-
Holland. One article in the Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant noted that authorities 
between provinces had worked to repair the Moerdijkbrug, an important rail and traffic 
bridge that connects Zuid-Holland to Brabant and Zeeland. The vital link was destroyed 
by the Germans to prevent the Allies from reaching Zuid-Holland in 1944. The article 
claimed that repairing the bridge would have great implications for many Zeeuwen, who 
could now visit Holland by either bus or train.428 Indeed, many articles published in 
Zeeland’s daily newspapers explored the increasing relationship between Zeeland and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, “Twee kinderen gedood door landmijnen,” 2 January 1946, 1. 
428 Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, “De Moerdijkbrug opengesteld. Groote verbeteringen in verkeer 
tusschen Zeeland en Holland,” 2 January 1946, 1. 
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other provinces, perhaps a result of worsening relations between Zeeland and the 
Allies.429  
Jan Zwemer has demonstrated that the period between 1946 and 1949 was one 
characterized by infrastructure repair in Zeeland, all of which aimed to bring economic 
recovery. In 1947, Dutch authorities initiated projects to repair or build bridges over 
canals in Vlake, Sluiskil, and Sas van Gent, as well as the bridge connecting Tholen. 
Construction on the bridge connecting Tholen, however, was delayed because of the 
particularly bad winter conditions of 1946-1947.430 One of the major recurring problems 
that hindered the recovery of infrastructure was the shortage of materiel. Many of 
Zeeland’s harbours, such as those in Terneuzen, Vlissingen, and Breskens, were badly 
damaged. Resources and materiel were so scarce that even by 1948 Breskens’ port, once 
a vital part of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen’s economy, was still undergoing preliminary 
reconstruction. No definitive work on the port, other than what the province referred to as 
“disaster recovery,” had been completed. Likewise, the harbour Ellewoutsdijk still 
required attention in 1949.431 The lack of attention, or simply the incapacity, to recover 
such provincial ports and harbours directly affected the rehabilitation of local economies. 
As Zwemer has shown, by 1946 Belgium had managed to ship about 200,000 tons of 
mussels from its ports.432 Once strong producers and exporters of shellfish, the ports of 
southern and central Zeeland fell behind in the market because of a general and slow 
infrastructure recovery. Schouwen-Duiveland, the part of Zeeland not liberated until May 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 See for example, Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, “Rotterdam helpt Walcheren en W.Z.-Vlaanderen,” 2 
January 1946, 1. 
430 Zwemer, Zeeland, 1945-1950: De wederopbouw van Zeeland na de oorlog, 400. 
431 Zwemer, Zeeland, 1945-1950: De wederopbouw van Zeeland na de oorlog, 402. 
432 Zwemer, Zeeland, 1945-1950: De wederopbouw van Zeeland na de oorlog, 402.	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1945, profited following the war from an influx of reconstruction materiel, likely because 
of its conflation with Zuid-Holland. 
 Despite modest progress to Zeeland’s infrastructure, provincial newspapers  
characterized the postwar era as one of uncertainty for many civilians. It seemed to them 
that no matter how hard they worked to recover their lands, buildings, and lives in 
general, there was still much work to be done. Reflecting on what the new year of 1947 
could bring the residents of Zierikzee in Schouwen-Duiveland, one daily newspaper 
spoke of still growing skepticism about the central government and its priorities, but also 
reminded its readers to persevere and continue working: 
“The new year continues to force on [sic]. As all other years, 1946 is only a 
milestone in the [eirkelgang] of time, but not the end. Hand to the plow in the new 
year. That signifies the struggle against everything our national resurrection could 
inhibit and the continuation of all of what the hand begun in the past year. Do not 
follow misleading whispering voices, nor float away on a sea of sentiments, but 
continue in the clear awareness that our generation should prove to be able to pass 
on the good of this century to posterity”433 
The authors concluded that for each civilian “the journey should be continued, a return is 
not possible.” They issued the rest of their message in a tone that blended Reformed 
rhetoric with a cautious optimism for recovery: “Everyone in each district must collect 
the building materials, which are used to offset [our] violated world. To this end, idealism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 Zierikzeesche Nieuwsbode, “Op den drempel van 1947,” 1 January 1947, 1. “Het nieuwe jaar dwingt tot 
verder gaan. Als alle andere jaren is 1946 slechts een mijlpaal in den eirkelgang van den tijd, maar geen 
eindpunt. De hand aan den ploeg in het nieuwe jaar. Dat beteekent strijd tegen alles wat onze nationale 
herrijzenis zou kunnen remmen en voortzetting van alles wat de hand in het afgeloopen jaar begon. Geen 
gehoor geven aan misleidende fluisterstemmen, geen wegdrijven op een zee van sentimenten, maar verder 
gaan in het klare bewustzijn dat onze generatie moet bewijzen in staat te zijn het goede van deze eeuw aan 
het nageslacht door te geven.” 
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is necessary and true idealism is often a sick plant (een kwijnende plant) in our lives.”434 
Recovery, according to these authors, was both an individual and communal process, 
which could not always depend on provincial and national authorities. 
 Such widespread sentiments reflected a broader provincial feeling of 
disappointment in the slow pace of rehabilitation and one that questioned the priorities of 
the country. The tone of newspapers in the western part of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, for 
example, an area that was devastated as a result of both German flooding and Allied 
bombardment, was scathing. It adopted very little optimism found elsewhere. A similar 
reflection on the progress of recovery was published in a newspaper from Oostburg 
called De Schakel (The Switch). In January 1947, the authors wrote: 
“When we look behind us, as we take stock of the past year, there is not much that 
pleasant memories can hide. The reconstruction of our region, which we 
announced with so much enthusiasm has not progressed very far.	  When the plan 
was published in 1946, we accepted it with cheerfulness and confidence. That 
plan was so beautifully put together, everything was thought out to the last detail, 
the number of laborers who were available and necessary could be found in 
beautiful tables, the amount of material that was necessary and available, one 
could see all the different areas divided, it was in a word a wonderful report. But 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Zierikzeesche Nieuwsbode, “Op den drempel van 1947,” 1 January 1947, 1.De tocht moet worden 
voortgezet, een terug is er niet. Ieder in eigen kring moet de bouwstoffen verzamelen, die worden 
aangewend tot herstel dezer geschonden wereld. Daartoe is idealisme noodig en juist het idealisme is vaak 
een kwijnende plant in ons leven. De taak van wereldwijde beteekenis, die in 1947 voor ons ligt is evenwel 
juist zonder idealisme niet te volbrengen. Het is nutteloos de keeren te tellen dat wij zijn teleurgesteld, wij 
moeten telkens weer met goeden moed op weg gaan. 
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what became of it? If this pace of reconstruction is maintained, we will all have to 
be very old to see any results.”435 
The central point of this article criticized the priorities of the government, and notably 
those of the minister of reconstruction. But the authors also mocked the bureaucratic 
planning involved in recovery projects. The article echoed a sentiment shared by many 
civilians at the time, one that questioned the vehemence with which the Dutch 
government pursued their colonial possessions, particularly the Dutch East-Indies. 
“Surely there is a connection between the Indies and the construction policies,” the author 
alleged. This, for some at least, helped explain the slow pace of recovery in the 
province.436 The considerable expenditure the Dutch government devoted to reclaiming 
its colonial possessions will be explored in greater depth later. While rural regions of the 
country struggled to sustain themselves in the post-1945 era, the government prioritized 
reclaiming their international prestige following the emasculating experience of 
occupation at the expense of domestic issues. 
 In this context, by mid-1947, many Zeeuwen who were disenchanted by the 
government’s actions called for the decentralization of reconstruction efforts, placing 
more resources in the hands of companies, individuals, and the province. This came as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 De Schakel, “Nieuwjaar,” 2 January 1947, 1.“Als wij achter ons zien, als wij de balans van het 
verstreken jaar opmaken, dan is er nog niet veel, dat prettige herinneringen achterlaat. De wederopbouw 
van ons gewest, die men met zooveel enthousiasme heeft aangekondigd is nog niet zoo heel hard 
opgeschoten. Toen het Bouwplan 1946 gepubliceerd werd, hebben wij dat met blijmoedigheid en 
vertrouwen aanvaard. Dat plan zat zoo prachtig in elkaar, alles was tot in de puntjes uitgekiend, de 
aantallen werklieden, die noodig en beschikbaar waren, kon men in mooie tabellen vinden, de hoeveelheid 
materiaal, die noodig en beschikbaar was, kon men precies over de verschillende gebieden verdeeld 
aantreffen, het was in een woord een pracht rapport. Maar wat is er van geworden? Als dit tempo van 
wederopbouw wordt aangehouden, moeten wij wel heel oud worden, om de resultaten er van te zien.” 
436 De Schakel, “Nieuwjaar,” 2 January 1947, 1. “De Minister van Wederopbouw, de man, die ons 
voorgehouden is als de man, die de zaak der opbouw aan kon, verlaat het schip, omdat hij het niet eens is 
met de Indische politiek der Regeering! Zeker is er verband tusschen de Indische en de opbouwpolitiek, 
maar dat verband is toch niet zoo groot, dat een Minister daar voor wegloopt. Het achter ons liggende jaar 
is voor het land van Cadzand geen opbeurend jaar geweest.” 
 178 
former Minister of Reconstruction, Ir. Ringers, was replaced by L. Neher. The most 
widely distributed paper in Zeeland, the Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, followed this 
development quite closely and claimed that “responsibility [for reconstruction] should lie 
in their own region.”437 The authors alleviatingly wrote “finally there is a new minister 
for reconstruction appointed to replace Ir. Ringers. L. Neherms, up to this point director 
of P.T.T., is the new adminstrator of the most important portfolio for the emergency 
areas.” “we will have to wait [to see] what he does in this capacity,” it continued 
reluctantly.438 Nonetheless, the appointment of a minister, not from the government but 
rather with experience in the business world, inspired a degree of confidence in Neher, 
who some thought could effect change in the process of recovery. The Provinciale 
Zeeuwsche Courant took the opportunity to make clear what the Zeeuwen wished for 
when it came to Neher’s function as the minister of reconstruction. It first criticized the 
lack of comprehensive financial regulations governing compensation for private losses 
during the war. The paper claimed that “the long wait for Zeeland is fatal. In the great 
uncertainty that prevails there, the people dare not build.” Some civilians, therefore, 
thought that a “legal, final settlement should be established as soon as possible.”439  
 Fundamental to the issue of unsatisfactory war damage compensation at the 
civilian level was the centralization of reconstruction and recovery. Centralization of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, “Zeeland wenscht decentralisatie van wederopbouw,” 3 March 1947, 
1. 
438 Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, “Zeeland wenscht decentralisatie van wederopbouw,” 3 March 1947, 
1. “Eindelijk is er dan een nieuwe minister voor de wederopbouw benoemd als opvolger van ir. Ringers. De 
heer L. Neher, tot dusver directeur der P.T.T., is de nieuwe beheerder dezer voor de noodgebieden 
allerbelangrijkste portefeuille en... wij zullen moeten afwachten, wat hij in deze functie presteert.” 
439 Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, “Zeeland wenscht decentralisatie van wederopbouw,” 3 March 1947, 
1. “dat het lange wachten voor Zeeland fnuikend is…	  n de allereerste plaats dient er dan op gewezen te 
worden, dat er nog steeds geen bevredigende financieele regeling is voor het probleem der 
schadevergoeding. Het is ons natuurlijk bekend, dat deze zijde van de wederopbouw tot de compententie 
van minister Lieftinck behoort, maar dit neemt niet weg, dat het lange wachten voor Zeeland fnuikend is. 
Bij de groote onzekerheid, die er thans heerscht, durven de menschen het bouwen niet aan. Een wettelijke, 
definitieve regeling dient er zoo spoedig mogelijk te komen.” 
 179 
government and bureaucracy ran counter to the political culture of local administration. 
Critics of the existing system of reconstruction claimed that the centralization of recovery 
efforts inhibited progress or, at the very least, that the government incorrectly prioritized 
post-war reconstruction projects. While the Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant 
acknowledged that the government had aided the province in recovery projects, the 
authors maintained that “on the other hand, reconstruction that remains in bureaucracy is 
inhibited by an avalanche of forms, and prevented by too much government 
interference.”440 Instead, they advocated for a system in which “the responsibility for the 
implementation of the reconstruction should be located in the region where the recovery 
should take place.	  Lower administration, such as provincial administration and communal 
council, must obtain a leading role, especially when it comes to issues of urban plans.”441 
Finances governing reconstruction left out the commune and the burgemeester from 
allocating resources for reconstruction efforts.  
In many ways, this system of allocating finances and materiel contradicted a 
political culture in many parts of the country, one in which the commune and provincial 
estates played a central role in decision making. It is hardly surprising that the perceived 
lack of attention the province received had newspaper editorials speculating about what 
role the central Dutch government should continue to play in provincial recovery.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, “Zeeland wenscht decentralisatie van wederopbouw,” 3 March 1947, 
1. “Maar daar staat tegenover, dat voorkomen moet worden, dat de wederopbouw vastloopt in bureaucratie, 
geremd wordt door lawines van formulieren, door een te veel aan overheidsbemoeienis.” 
441 Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, “Zeeland wenscht decentralisatie van wederopbouw,” 3 March 1947, 
1. “Er dient voor gezorgd te worden, dat de verantwoording voor de uitvoering van de wederopbouw komt 
te liggen in de streek, waar het herstel plaats moet vinden. Lagere organen, zooals provinciaal bestuur en 
gemeenteraad, dienen een leidende plaats te verkrijgen, speciaal als het gaat om het onderwerpen der 
stedebouwkundige plannen. Thans hebben de gemeenten te weinig invloed terwijl toch plaatselijke plannen 
plaatselijk dienen te ontstaan, onderworpen overigens daarna aan de goekeuring door het Rijk.” 
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British Aid in Post-War Zeeland 
 The previous chapter underscored some of the frustrations civilians in Zeeland 
had when it came to civil-military relations from 1944 to 1945. While the MG was often 
frustrated with the allocation of Allied resources during military operations in the 
Netherlands and Germany, it is important to note that the British effort to repair 
Walcheren’s dykes was instrumental in Zeeland’s recovery. The Allies provided 
necessary resources, such as three stationary barge loading suction dredgers, one 
stationary pump-unit that could reclaim 1,000 cubic yards per hour, and two floating 
stone-transporter cranes with a capacity of carrying one ton each, without which closing 
the dykes on that island would have taken much longer.442 For civilians and Zeeland’s 
authorities, this assistance was vital to expedite the province’s recovery. Even after the 
war, when Allied troops were in the process of repatriation, the British Foreign Office 
remained involved in recovery efforts, if only as a nominal, political gesture. This, 
however, was an understandable position, as Britain was preoccupied with their own 
political and economic issues.443 
 On 28 May 1946, British ambassador to the Netherlands wrote to the Foreign 
Office about a newly established foundation in Zeeland called Stichting Nieuw 
Walcheren (Foundation New Walcheren). As part of reconstruction efforts, the 
organization dedicated itself to public works projects, including regeneration efforts to 
plant various trees and flowers. Because of the deforestation caused by the war, and the 
lumber required to repair all of Walcheren’s dykes and other buildings, the organization 
engaged in a reforestation program. News about the project spread through the Foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 NA, FO 371-49408, “Letter from Anthony Eden, 3 January 1945,” 2. 
443 Judt, Postwar, 69-70. 
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Office and Prime Minister’s Office, and soon the British had begun canvassing 
politicians and statesmen for donations to the “Walcheren Tree Fund.” When told about 
the initiative, Prime Minister Clement Attlee quipped, “I rather like this idea.”444  
The Foreign Office proposed three ways the British government could contribute 
to the organization’s mandate and the Tree Fund: personal cash contribution, personal 
visits to Zeeland, and a signed public appeal to the people of the UK. By 5 August 1946, 
the commander of the 52nd Lowland Division, which played a key role in the operations 
conducted by First Canadian Army, expressed interest in visiting Middelburg along with 
many veterans of the Schelde campaign. Municipal officials in Edinburgh and Glasgow 
also became interested in sponsoring Walcheren’s Tree Fund. The commander of the 52nd 
Lowland Division, General Edmund Hakewell-Smith, argued that trees could be taken 
from Scotland and brought to Zeeland by the veterans themselves. By September 1946, 
the British Foreign Office and military had 236 trees to send, while the Air Ministry 
contributed 320.445 
 By October 1946, the British ambassador in Den Haag met with the editor of the 
Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant and discussed the idea of a ceremonial planting. To 
bolster more support for the program, the Foreign Office contacted the Daily Telegraph 
and its agricultural correspondent to cover the development of the Walcheren Tree Fund. 
However, throughout the autumn and early winter of 1946, plans for the ceremony were 
losing momentum in the UK. On 23 December 1946, the air ministry threatened to 
withdraw its contribution of 320 trees unless plans to plant them were established 
immediately. The Dutch officials claimed that the earliest time for tree planting in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 NA, FO 371-67850, “Memorandum on the Walcheren Tree Fund,” n.d. 
445 NA, FO 371-67850, “Memorandum on the Walcheren Tree Fund,” n.d. 
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Zeeland was in either March or April 1947, mainly because the Stichting Nieuw 
Walcheren had experienced great difficulties in procuring enough trees in the province.446 
The British officials also raised the idea that a special area in Zeeland be allotted for 
“British” trees around the coast of Vlissingen and Westkapelle, hoping that “the British 
area would become a permanent memorial to the interest shown by our country in the 
rehabilitation of the island.”447 This correspondence between British officials continued: 
“the foregoing will show that, if these various plans materialise, the British 
participation in the tree-planting might prove of considerable political value; and 
the Ambassador suggests that, particularly if Lord Templewood’s scheme is a 
success, Mr. Attlee might feel able to spare a day to go over to the island and 
plant the first ‘British’ tree at the ceremonial planting in April…there is no doubt 
that if Mr. Attlee went over he would be most warmly received and his action 
very greatly appreciated. Alternatively, Mr. Attlee might feel able to show an 
interest either by subscribing to the fund which is being raised in the Netherlands 
or to the subscription list in this country, if one is opened.”448 
The British hoped to memorialize their role on Walcheren through the initiatives 
established by the Stichting Nieuw Walcheren. They sought to create a memory very soon 
after the Second World War. 
 On 4 January 1947, the Stichting contacted the Foreign Office informing the 
British about upcoming events. The president of the foundation, G. Ballantyn, claimed 
that they were not going to replant trees that mixed styles, but sought unity in the types of 
trees that were being planted. Whether or not the trees contributed by the British 	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448 NA, FO 371-67850, “Letter from J. Addis, PM Office,” 27 January 1947, 2. 
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government and military were of the same type remains unclear. The locations for the 
replanting, perhaps unsurprisingly, were primarily in Middelburg and Vlissingen, 
although other communities would receive trees at a later date. The major problem 
preventing the reforestation program was the high level of salt content in the soil, which 
botanists and gardeners in the province claimed were still far too concentrated to support 
the growth of trees.449 In fact, a post-war study commissioned and published in 1947 
claimed that without taking drastic measures the soil structure would not recover for 
about seven years. This is because, when soil is inundated with salt water, calcium ions 
are replaced by sodium ions, which results in the soil clumping in dry weather, while wet 
weather turns the soil into a pulpy substance.450 Additionally, Zeeland authorities had not 
yet approved plans to resettle refugees living in temporary homes in badly damaged 
towns like Westkapelle. Together these issues delayed the initiative. 
 The rest of the letter to the Foreign Office, written in poor English, tacitly 
compares the British involvement in reconstruction efforts with those of the Belgian 
government. Belgium played an extremely important role supplying raw materials to 
Zeeland in the immediate aftermath of the war, supplying some 250,000 trees and 2,000 
tons of stone each week in late December and January to repair Walcheren’s dykes.451 
Belgium also financed some of the reconstruction materials needed for other projects and 
was therefore a key player in Zeeland’s recovery.452 Following the war, Belgium 
established an initiative called “Plant a Tree in Walcheren,” and had sent “numbers of 
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considerable gifts—in Flushing the totally destroyed ‘Nollebosch’ is going to be 
replanted.”453 Ballantyn believed that  
“if, on the English side English givers will get accord with the plan and give their 
approval to a representative object of replanting, it would perhaps be probable to 
make the replanting of Westkapelle, where in October 1944 the landing of British 
troops took place and where the first lapse in the dykes was thrown by the R.A.F., 
the result of British donations. If money comes…the replanting of the foot of the 
stroke of dunes between Westkapelle and Flushing could fall under it…in it 
would lay a project for England, in an equal value to the Nollebosch at Flushing, 
that would carry its name for any length of time and would bear a name in 
memory of England and its help.”454  
While this might be an honest attempt to gain contributions from the UK, the letter gives 
the impression that the comparison between existing Belgian contributions and English 
ones was done to incite more action on the part of the British. On the British side, by 
February 1947, faith in the project had lost momentum. Lord Templewood resignedly 
wrote to the Foreign Office, stating “there is nothing more that I can do. I was principally 
interested in getting the R.A.F. to provide the actual trees. This idea seems to have been 
finally turned down. I doubt the advisability of trying to start a British fund. I do not 
believe any paper would take it up in present circumstances and, in any case, I fear that I 
could not involve myself in the project.”455 Bland’s response demonstrated a shared 
disappointment in the state of the initiative: “I entirely agree with what you say about the 	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inadvisability of attempting a nation-wide appeal, and you personally have certainly done 
more than your bit for Holland without undertaking any more.”456  
It was clear to both of these statesmen that from the time that preliminary 
proposals for the Tree Fund had begun to implementing the plan, enthusiasm for the 
project in Britain had deteriorated. With interest dropping, the Foreign Office asked 
Dutch authorities what sum of money, representing a contribution to the Fund, would be 
suitable. British officials claimed that an amount of 25 pounds in the name of Prime 
Minister Attlee was fitting, while the Air Ministry would donate 75 pounds, although 
Attlee’s contribution was pending approval by the Treasury.457  
The resigned disposition among British officials to contribute to the recovery of 
Walcheren might be explained by the damages caused by major floods in March 1947, 
when much of the Thames River valley was inundated. One official at the Foreign Office 
wrote “personally, I should not imagine that particularly at this time when a nation-wide 
appeal is being held in this country for the victims of our recent floods, there would be 
any great rush here to contribute towards a cause that most people have surely almost 
forgotten by now.”458 Once again, Britain had to dedicate resources to other tasks that 
were in its best interests. Despite the lack of interest among some British officials, Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee and his wife travelled to Walcheren and participated in the tree 
planting ceremony in autumn 1947.459 In practice, however, the contribution of the Prime 
Minister was much less than initially hoped for by the Stichting and was largely a public 
relations enterprise, likely because the Treasury reluctantly approved the funds to be used 
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for a foreign charitable cause when the Treasury would “consistently refuse to ordinary 
people” the type of donations given to Walcheren.460 Tied to the quarreling between the 
Foreign Office and the Treasury were the British austerity measures that limited the use 
of sterling in foreign markets. In the end, British aid to Walcheren following the Second 
World War was circumscribed according to broader economic conditions of post-war 
Europe. Attention from abroad was once again given to Walcheren at the expense of 
other parts of the province. 
 
Rehabilitation through Reclaimation? Zeeland and the Dutch East-Indies 
 For many decision makers in Den Haag, a national program of recovery implied a 
return to the Netherlands of the pre-1940 era. At the crux of national rehabilitation was 
the future of the Dutch East-Indies. Not only did recovery require the physical 
reconstruction of all facets of Dutch society, but there was also a degree of cultural or 
even psychological recovery that needed to occur within the political realm. The curious 
insistence to lay claim to existing Dutch colonies overseas is even more discomfiting 
when one considers the financial and materiel assistance still needed in Zeeland and 
elsewhere in the Netherlands.  
Jennifer Foray has explored the place of the Dutch East-Indies in the culture of 
the occupied Netherlands and how Dutch politicians and civilians understood the future 
of their colonies. She argues that the “Indies question” had become one of the most 
important problems for the Dutch government in exile, even before the Netherlands had 
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been fully liberated.461 As she points out, during occupation clandestine newspapers 
consistently told their readers that the Netherlands needed to reconquer the East-Indies. 
One newspaper posed the question “should the Netherlands liberate and ‘reconquer’ the 
Indies, or ‘win them back for the Netherlands’.”462 While the underground newspaper 
Trouw was circulated in very small numbers during occupation in Zeeland, and mainly in 
Zuid-Beveland, the occupation-era papers in Zeeland rarely discussed colonial matters. 
This, however, does not mean that civilians in the province did not discuss the future of 
the East-Indies. On the contrary, by the end of 1945, articles in most of Zeeland’s daily 
newspapers carried stories about the future of the Dutch colonies, especially the 
Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant which was distributed in Middelburg, Vlissingen, Goes, 
Breskens, and elsewhere. This suggests that by 1946 civilians in Zeeland were to some 
degree exposed to discussions about the Netherlands and the colonial question.  
 In 1946, around 130,000 Dutch troops were deployed to the East-Indies and of 
that number some 20,000 came from Zeeland, most of whom volunteered for service.463 
One volunteer from Tholen claimed that he wanted “to disarm the Japanese and to keep 
order” in the colony.464 Likewise, Piet de Kam, who had joined the OD in Zeeland during 
occupation and worked alongside Canadian troops as an interpreter in Zuid-Beveland 
from 1944-1945, was also sent to the Indies. Once the OD was disbanded, de Kam was 
named commander of the legal armed-organization, the NBS, like many other members 
of resistance movements. In 1945, de Kam and many other Zeeuwen prepared to set sail 
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from Vlissingen to the East-Indies as part of the 14 Infantry Regiment. Once in theatre, 
de Kam became part of the 8th Zeeuws Battalion, which saw action in southern Sumatra. 
In June 1948, the Zeeuws Battalion was repatriated and demobilized in Zeeland.465 As 
early as January 1946, the Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant triumphantly declared that 
“order and security are restored” in the Indies. According to commentators, the view of 
the Dutch government had remained unchanged about the mandate in the colony and, by 
instituting military measures, stability had been secured.466 Once in theatre, the Dutch 
military performed a variety of functions that the government subsumed under the 
general mandate of “the recovery of order and stability” (herstel van orde en rust). The 
Zeeuws battalion provided medical attention, built bridges, cleared mines, and protected 
the civilian population from local gangs.467 In total, 6,189 men were killed in action in the 
East-Indies, about five percent of the Dutch troop strength.468 
 Jan Zwemer has argued that the military exerted strong pressure on Zeeuwen to 
sign up for service. According to some veterans, like Daan Dekker from Zaamslag 
(Zeeuws-Vlaanderen), contracts stated that military service would only be required three 
months from liberation, or until August 1945.469 Zwemer has also rightly pointed out that 
in the immediate aftermath of the war in October-November 1944, during the evacuation 
and inundation period, many men in Zeeland were unemployed and service in the 
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military guarenteed a salary and accommodation.470 This claim can be substantiated by 
looking at the origins of the first battalions sent east. Some of the first men repatriated in 
1948 came from Zeeland and served with the Zeeuwse battalion. Less than one percent 
had come from Schouwen-Duiveland because it had not been liberated until May 1945. 
Thirty-nine percent of the troops came from Walcheren, where 20 percent of the 
population lived. Additionally, 24 percent came from Zeeuws-Vlaanderen.471 In this way, 
some of the earliest liberated areas in the Netherlands were the first regions from which 
volunteers to serve in the East-Indies were recruited. The lack of employment and the 
chaos that accompanied liberation often left no alternatives for many men in Zeeland. 
 The Dutch decision to send about 130,000 men to reclaim the East-Indies 
demonstrated that recovery in the Netherlands had more to do with the will of decision 
makers than the resources. When Indonesian leaders declared an independent republic in 
August 1945, leaders in Den Haag clung to the last vestiges of their pre-1940 world. 
Importantly, almost all of the great powers had begun the process of taking back their 
colonies. In 1946 and 1947, for example, Britain was fully engaged in both Palestine and 
India, as well as Burma and Malaysia.472 Almost all of liberated Europe had in some form 
or another engaged in the process of decolonization and the ability, at least as far as 
politicians were concerned, to dispose of resources needed for every reconstruction 
project in their countries was unachievable. In this way, Zeeland’s recovery, perhaps like 
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many other rural provinces and regions, suffered because of broader post-war objectives, 
ones that often ignored reconstruction at the communal or provincial levels. 
 
Conclusion 
 The periodization of the Second World War is problematic because it assumes 
that the conclusion of hostilities marked the end of war. This is perhaps not surprising 
given the dominant narrative of the Second World War. May 1945 marked the beginning 
of repatriation for Canadian and other commonwealth troops. Yet, ending the war so 
abuptly in 1945 does a disservice to the history of the regions on which we focus. A 
corollary of war is destruction, which almost always requires a significant degree of 
recovery and rehabilitation. For a variety of reasons, reconstruction efforts tend not to fit 
within an English-language narrative even though Canadian and British personnel played 
an integral role as Civil Affairs officers and worked alongside Dutch authorities. This 
chapter has demonstrated the problems associated with ending a narrative of the Second 
World War in May 1945 by highlighting the challenges the province of Zeeland 
continued to experience during the post-1945 era. The disappointment in the pace at 
which recovery materialized had vast implications for how Zeeland would come to 
remember this period of history. For Canadians and the British, the battle for the Schelde 
has been characterized as one in which a battered and resource-depleted Anglo-Canadian 
army prevailed over an increasingly vulnerable German enemy. In general, the Allied 
role in Zeeland is remembered as one that begins in September and ends in early 
November 1944. However, as this chapter has shown, public sentiment towards recovery 
 191 
remained sour, while leaders in Den Haag invested more in the reclamation of their 
empire. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
Rehabilitating the History of Zeeland: The Polderhuis Museum and 
Bevrijdingsmuseum 
 
 Far too often historians associate recovery with the physical and tangible 
reconstruction of homes, businesses, and infrastructure damaged as a result of war. 
Martin Conway has referred to political reconstruction in post-war Belgium and some of 
the ways in which Flemings and Walloons worked to rehabilitate the linguistic divide 
after Nazi occupation.473 Yet, there is another important and much more amorphous stage 
of recovery that takes place long after war and initial reconstruction commences. The 
writing of a region’s history is a form of rehabilitation that is sometimes overlooked by 
scholars interested in the corporeal process of dealing with war. In this way, the 
presentation of a narrative, history, or even stories at a communal level represents a form 
of cultural recovery. Following the Second World War, the German language adopted the 
cumbersome term Vergangenheitsbewältigung, literally “conquering one’s past,” to 
discuss the difficulties of dealing with Germany’s very destructive and malicious wartime 
experience. Similar terms might exist in the languages of those countries or regions 
almost entirely destroyed from 1940 to 1945, but what matters here is that history is a 
form of recovery and Europeans have dealt with it as a process. It can provide comfort to 
the peoples seeking answers to very difficult, complex, and sometimes incriminating 
questions. History, when relying on the memory of a region as opposed to a cautious 
probing of contemporary sources, often affords insight into a completely different 
narrative than that which exists elsewhere. 
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 This final chapter explores the construction of memory in Zeeland as a way of 
dealing with the province’s past. By examining the development of memory in two 
museums in Zeeland, this chapter demonstrates the communalization of history and 
memory, and that the narrative told by one museum in the province can be so vastly 
different from a history told just a couple dozen kilometers away. The first museum is the 
Polderhuis dijks- en oorlogsmuseum (Polderhouse, dyke and war museum) at 
Westkapelle, while the second is the Bevrijdingsmuseum Zeeland (Liberation Museum of 
Zeeland). This chapter does not claim that the two forms of memory are representative of 
a broader Dutch experience, but rather tries to illustrate the complexity of memory in this 
region. Before we investigate the construction of history using these two examples, some 
discussion about the differences of history, memory, and historiography are necessary. 
*** 
History and Memory 
Peter Moogk has claimed that of all countries liberated by Canadians during the 
Second World War “an exceptional relationship developed between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and Canada” one which he refers to as “a wartime love affair.”474 
Conventional wisdom, particularly in Canada, continues to reinforce the idea that there 
exists a special affinity for Canadians in the Netherlands. The Canadian government has 
called the liberation of the Netherlands in the spring of 1945 “The Sweetest Spring.” In 
this narrative, Dutch civilians pour into the streets of the Netherlands and shower the 
Allies, but especially Canadians, with kisses and whatever else civilians could offer.475 
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Yet, Peter Schrijvers’ recent research on the Allies in wartime Belgium demonstrates that 
after the initial euphoria of liberation subsided, significant conflicts between liberators 
and civilians began to surface. He therefore reassesses previous interpretations of 
Belgian-Allied relations from 1944 to 1945.476 In a similar way, we might question the 
pervasiveness of the “wartime love affair” between the Anglo-Canadian soldiers and the 
people of Zeeland. For instance, Dutch historians Ben Schoenmaker and Christ Klep have 
claimed that the operational advantages of inundating Walcheren were in fact quite 
minimal.477 Writing on the Allied assault on Walcheren, Tobias van Gent argues that “the 
truth of the matter is that the assailants were hindered more by the flooding than the 
defenders as the water made mobile warfare with tanks and armoured vehicles almost 
impossible.”478 For the province of Zeeland, there exists a disconnected memory between 
the liberators and the local population, one that is much more complex “than cigarettes, 
sex and chocolate.”479 
These are just some of the ways in which historians have constructed a narrative 
of the Netherlands and the Second World War. But if history can be defined as the 
conscious selection, manipulation, and presentation of the past, then it is by definition 
only part of the story. What, then, is memory? Memories of the past are much more 
amorphous, particularly because they are rarely subject to any methodological rule 
typically associated with the writing of history. They almost always change over time. On 
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the contrary, the memory of war particularly can be so disjointed, disparate, and 
multifarious as to render any single narrative inadequate. The key difference between 
history and memory, therefore, is a methodological one. History requires the use of 
contemporary sources and presupposes an impartiality of the subject on which one 
focuses. To be sure, some museums rely on historical researchers to provide content, but 
limitations and space in museums can influence to the extent to which research can be 
applied. But, as Dan Todman reminds us, perhaps incorrectly, “history is not what you 
thought. It is about what you remember.”480 The memory of certain events, such as the 
Allied role in the Second World War, is sometimes much more powerful and informative, 
especially among a general audience but also in the academic mainstream, than what 
actually took place. That the memory of liberation in the Netherlands among Canadians, 
for example, is celebrated is not wrong by any means, but it is certainly not wholly 
representative of Dutch experiences during the war. This problem likely stems from the 
language barriers between Anglo scholars and those in Europe, as well as distinct 
historiographies that are rigidly separated by those language barriers. One of the only 
ways English-language viewers, readers, and even scholars can access foreign narratives 
and histories is either through translations, which are usually circumscribed to very 
selective, key works and are very expensive, or through museums. In many ways, 
museums can have a much greater impact on viewers than any other medium, but the 
influence of a museum is limited by the fact that visitors must travel to distant locations, 
some of which are obscure or entirely unknown. This could very well be the case with 
Zeeland. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480 Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory, (London: Hambledon & London, 2005), xiii. 	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Jay Winter has rightly pointed out that there are “memory booms,” or periods 
during which generations choose to remember war. For the Second World War in the 
English-language world, he claims, a memory boom in the 1960s and 1970s was shaped 
by the veterans who had lived through the war and who became custodians of the 
memory associated with war. Whatever has been said about the Second World War, it 
must be affirmed by those who have experienced it. For example, when the Canadian 
War Museum installed a display questioning both the morality and efficacy of the 
strategic bombing campaign over Germany, veterans of the RCAF/RAF felt insulted 
because the exhibit cast doubt on whether the actions of Bomber Command were just.481 
The controversy, which was eventually brought to Canada’s Senate, demonstrated that 
the custodians of memory still possessed significant weight in what could be said about 
the war. To question traditional and nationalistic narratives was to question the sacrifices 
Canadians made in Europe. Whether the proposed exhibit would have generated such 
controversy in ten years from now, when veterans of the Second World War are no 
longer able to control the telling of history, is doubtful. In short, we remain in a period 
during which historians still cling to traditional narratives of wartime experiences, ones 
that usually emphasize the euphoria of liberation and an exclusively positive image of the 
liberators. 
 
The Polderhuis and Memory in Westkapelle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 Interim Report of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs of the Standing Senate Committee on National 
Security and Defence, “AN ENDURING CONTROVERSY: THE STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN 
DISPLAY IN THE CANADIAN WAR MUSEUM,” June 2007 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/391/defe/rep/rep16jun07-e.htm, accessed 18 June 2013. 
 197 
The history of occupation and liberation in Westkapelle is memorialized at the 
Polderhuis dijk- en oorlogs museum (Polderhuis Dyke- and War Museum), a deliberate 
choice which in itself highlights the connection between the town’s history and its 
relationship to water. Visitors begin with prehistoric developments and the reclamation of 
land during the Middle Ages, but the majority of the museum’s exhibits focus on 
occupation and liberation. Within the section on occupation, the panels give attention to 
flooding, bombing, and the consequences both had on the land. The occupation section 
primarily deals with Westkapelle’s place within the Atlantikwall. One exhibit informs 
readers that in January 1941 the people of Walcheren worked to repair Vlissingen’s 
airfield after the Luftwaffe bombed it by extracting large amounts of sand. Additionally, 
visitors are told that on 15 August 1943 an Allied bombardment destroyed the nearby 
village of Nieuwe-Abeele, mistaking it for Vlissingen’s airfield.482 On signage indicating 
key events in the chronology of the war, 3 October 1944 represents the terminal date on 
the placard, which reads “the RAF bombard the Westkapelle sea dyke.”483 Events 
following that date are not listed. Later in the exhibit, visitors encounter another placard 
entitled “the Destruction” (De Verwoesting) on which more details about the 
bombardment on 3 October 1944 are given. It reads “Westkappelaars are tied strongly to 
their land and village…the bombardment lasts more than two hours; with new waves of 
attacks every quarter. The first bombs hit not only the dyke, but also a large part of the 
village. The mill De Roos of the Theune family is hit hard and crumbles. Some people in 
the basement are killed instantly. The exit is blocked by debris by fallen millstones. Just 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 Polderhuis, “Om het vliegveld Vlissingen te herstellen, wordt overal op Walcheren zand 
gewonnen…Het dorp Nieuwe-Abeele wordt per ongeluk door geallieerden bombardement, het had het 
vliegveld Vlissingen moeten zijn.” 
483 All quotations from the Polderhuis taken from photographs taken at the museum by the author. 
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after one hour the flood water, coming through the dyke opening, flows through the 
village, drowning almost all the people in the mill. Only three of forty-seven people (2 
adults and a baby) are barely rescued from the rubble. On the same day, 113 other people 
die in Westkapelle. The remaining inhabitants abandon the village and go to surrounding 
villages. Only a few remain behind.”484 The environment therefore plays a central role in 
the province’s memory of what the Allies call “liberation.” 
 The primary theme interwoven throughout this form of memorialization is human 
tragedy and despair. Polderhuis visitors are steered through the course of events, but 
almost always within the framework of De Verwoesting. For example, after listing details 
about the Allied landing on Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland, placards list the degree of 
destruction inflicted upon their village. “Before the three bombardments there stood 650 
houses, afterwards only about 50 were inhabitable. The seawater, that the bombardment 
let free, brings new misery” and concludes that “the fighting and the shelling of 1 
November ensures that afterwards no building can be found unscathed.”485 When it 
comes to providing a timeline of Allied advances through Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland, 
one placard laconically reads: “1 November 1944, liberation.” Directly beside the title is 
“Feest?” (party?), questioning the local reaction to what the Allies typically refer to as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 Polderhuis dijk- en oorlogsmuseum “Westkappelaars zijn heel sterk aan hun grond en dorp 
gebonden...Het bombardement duurt meer dan twee uur; elk kwartier komen er nieuwe aanvalsgolven. De 
eerste bommen treffen niet alleen de dijk, maar ook een groot gedeelte van het dorp. De molen De Roos 
van de familie Theune wordt zwaar getroffen en stort in. Sommige mensen in de kelder zijn op slag dood. 
De uitgang is versperd door puin en de omlaag gevallen molenstenen. Als na een uur het vloedwater door 
het ontstane dijkgat het dorp instroomt, verdrinken vrijwel all mensen in de molen. Slechts drie van de 
zevenenveertig mensen (2 volwassenen en een baby) worden ternauwernood uit de puinhopen gered. Op 
dezelfde dag komen ook 113 andere mensen om in Westkapelle. De overgebleven inwoners verlaten het 
dorp en gaan naar de omliggende dorpen. Slechts enkelen blijven achter.” 
485 Polderhuis dijk- en oorlogsmuseum “Voor de drie bombardementen staan er in Westkapelle 650 
woningen, daarna zijn er circa 50 nog enigzins bewoonbaar. Het zeewater, dat na de bombardementen vrij 
spel heeft zorgt voor nieuwe ellende. Niet verwoeste huizen worden door het langdurige die het zeewater 
weten te doorstaan, bieden een treurige aanblik. De gevechten en de beschietingen van 1 November zorgen 
er vervolgens voor dat in Westkapelle geen onbeschadigd pand meer gevonden kan worden.” 
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liberation. To conclude the liberation section of the Polderhuis, one placard provides a 
list of every citizen from Westkapelle who died because of the Allied bombing and 
flooding, along with their age and photograph.  
The majority of the exhibit, however, devotes space to the reconstruction phase of 
the province’s history, which is perhaps the most important part of the town and 
province’s history. The sections that deal with the Allied assault on Walcheren and 
Zeeland occupy a small part of the museum’s exhibit. Here, the most apparent, and 
perhaps most important theme of the museum, is the ability of the people to rebuild 
following such a destructive process of liberation. Visitors then move on to a section 
entitled “Life Goes On” in which recovery and reconstruction forms the most important 
part of the narrative. The most striking aspect of this exhibit is the almost complete 
absence of any discussion of Allied assistance and the CA officers who worked alongside 
Dutch authorities from October 1944 onward. Instead, the exhibit tells the story of 
recovery in Westkapelle and Walcheren as one initiated, supported, and completed by the 
Zeeuwen and Dutch people. A placard reads “Walcheren is reclaimed. The land and its 
people, however, have suffered under the sea. Every farmer has damage done to 
buildings, business inventories, crops and his livestock. Walcheren becomes a desolate 
barren plain, with remains of trees and shrubs, which have almost without exception not 
survived the salt water.”486 In this section, too, visitors are guided through a life-sized 
“Bruynzeel” emergency home, in which many villagers were housed after the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Polderhuis dijk- en oorlogsmuseum “Walcheren is drooggevallen. Het land is en de bevolking echter 
hebben onder de zee geleden. Elke boer heeft schade aan gebouwen, aan de bedrijfsinventaris, aan 
gewassen en aan zijn veestapel. Walcheren is een troosteloze kale vlakte geworden, met resten van bomen 
en struiken, die vrijwel zonder uitzondering het zoute water niet hebben overleefd. Om Walcheren weer 
'aan te kleden' wordt er een Boomplantdag georganiseerd. Overal op Walcheren worden bomen geplant, 
vanuit de rest van het land gefinancierd. Prinses Juliana plant de eerste boom in Westkapelle op 4 
November 1947. Een jaar later plant haar moeder, koningin Wilhelmina, de eerste boom van het 
Wilhelminabos, ten zuiden van Westkapelle.” 
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bombardment. In 1945, the commune requested the Dutch government provide 200 
emergency homes placed throughout the town. The last home of this type was removed in 
1963. When it comes to closing and repairing the dykes, a small book containing English-
language information is located near the end of the exhibit. Even here the Allied 
contribution to reconstruction efforts, so exigently requested by Anthony Eden and 
others, remains absent. The page devoted to “Closing the Dykes” notes that “in the period 
between 18 May 1945 to 2 February 1946 (almost 9 months) around 4 million m3 of sand, 
1 40,000,000 kg of rocks, 3,600,000 bundles of wicker were used. In addition to the 
many hands, huge machinery was involved in carrying out the repairs. This included 12 
suction dredgers and 20 tugs. For the first time ever caissons (huge submersible concrete 
structures) were used to close off flow channels.”487 
 The materiel and the CA units sent to the region from the Allies have little place 
in the narrative of reconstruction. The type of memory and the story of the Polderhuis 
offer a stark contrast to how liberation is remembered in the Anglo-Canadian tradition in 
which liberation is almost exclusively associated with euphoria among local population. 
But the version told in Westkapelle underscores the human and environmental toll, and 
suggests implicitly that the processes of liberation, which also required substantial 
reconstruction, were more costly for the region than four years under Nazi occupation. In 
a publication commissioned by the Polderhuis, Thijs Weststrate writes “Although the 
invasion succeeded and Walcheren was liberated, the situation after the liberation was 
simply disastrous. In a couple weeks 184 inhabitants perished in Westkapelle, almost 8% 
of the entire population, and more than 80% of the village was destroyed. There was no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Polderhuis dijk- en oorlogsmuseum, Photo of placard taken by author in May 2012. 
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family in the village that was not in any way a victim of the war.”488 The history of 
liberation as constructed in this town in Zeeland emphasizes the damage and enormous 
scale of reconstruction and recovery, with particular attention given to the environmental 
consequences. It says little of any euphoria of a local population after Nazi Germany’s 
capitulation in 1944. The narrative described here affords important insight into an 
alternative form of remembrance than other forms of commemoration in the Netherlands 
or Canada. It also shows how human actors, regardless of nationality, appear less 
important than the environment. 
 Adding to the complexity of memory in this particular part of Walcheren is the 
recent announcement to internationalize the existing narrative at the Polderhuis. In a joint 
effort between the German Bundesarchiv and the Imperial War Museum in London, the 
Polderhuis museum hopes to gather stories from both Allied and German perspectives on 
the bombing and fighting on Walcheren. The changing nature of memory in this location 
is compounded by the memorial to the British 4 Commando Brigade who stormed 
Westkapelle’s beaches on 1 November 1944. Unveiled in 1961, it features a Sherman 
tank, which sits atop the dyke that Bomber Command breached in October 1944, only 
meters away from the Polderhuis museum. Interestingly, the final line on the epitaph 
reads “Walcheren can resurrect,” once again commemorating Walcheren’s commitment 
to regeneration.489 In the museum’s dominant narrative, however, the British have largely 
been written out. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 Thijs Weststrate, Slechts enkelen wenschen een zolderkamertje: Westkapelle en de wederopbouw 1945-
1963 (Vlissingen: ADZ, 2007), 6. “Hoewel die invasie slaagde en Walcheren bevrijd werd, was de toestand 
na de bevrijding kortweg rampzalig. Er waren in die paar weken 184 inwoners van Westkapelle 
omgekomen, bijna 8% van de hele bevolking, en meer dan 80% van het dorp was verwoest. Er was geen 
familie in het dorp die niet op een of andere manier slachtoffer was geworden van het oorlogsgeweld.” 
489 Polderhuis Westkapelle, Dijk- en Oorlogsmuseum, Memoria Walcheren 40-45: Een Overzicht van 
Oorlogsmonumenten en Restanten van de Atlantikwall (Westkapelle, EFRO: 2007), 16. 
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Bevrijdingsmuseum Zeeland 
 Compared to the wartime experience of Westkapelle and Walcheren, the town of 
Nieuwdorp just 25 kilometers away on Zuid-Beveland emerged from liberation with 
minimal damage (See Appendix IV). For that reason, the message presented to visitors in 
the Bevrijdingsmuseum greatly differs from that at Westkapelle. Unlike the Polderhuis, 
which explores the periods before and after the Second World War, the Liberation 
Museum specifically focuses on the period from 1940 to 1948, offering very little context 
to the Nazi Invasion in May 1940 and almost no information about the reconstruction 
process. In 2010, the Liberation Museum received the status of a “registered museum” 
and was listed on the register of Dutch museums.490 Before this time, however, it was 
considered a local and regional museum relatively unknown outside of the Commune of 
Borsele, in which the town of Nieuwdorp is located, and the province. Although the 
museum lacks an explicit mandate, the information provided on its website suggests that 
the museum purports to be provincial in scope and not necessarily communal.491 The 
museum claims “The Liberation Museum Zeeland takes us back to an extraordinary piece 
of Zeeland’s history. During the Second World War Allied Soldiers, sailors and airmen 
of various different nationalities united in the fight against the German occupation forces. 
This resulted in large numbers of dead and wounded on both sides. The local population 
in Zeeland also suffered heavy casualties.”492 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, “Bevrijdingsmuseum,” 21 October 2010, 1. 
491 The name of the museum, Liberation Museum Zeeland, and the slogan “Hét oorlogsmuseum in de 
Provincie Zeeland” suggests that it is provincial in scope and mandate. 
492 See homepage of the Bevrijdingsmuseum, http://bmzeeland.nl/index.php/en, accessed 21 June 2013. 
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 Visitors begin in the basement (kelder) of the museum. Images and video offer 
footage of the Battle for the Schelde, as well as aerial bombardment of the province, 
while interviews are overlaid to provide commentary about individual experiences. The 
civilians, presumably either witnesses or veterans of some kind during occupation, 
discuss their memories of the war in October-November 1944. Because of the 
multinational nature of the interviews, since the interviews are given in French, German, 
and Dutch, the message of the video once again emphasizes the human and physical 
tragedy of the war. Curiously, it does not explicitly condemn Germany’s occupation 
forces. In this way, the lack of context provided at the museum presents a confusing 
narrative for visitors unfamiliar with the development of the war in the Low Countries. 
 Visitors leave the basement to explore two additional floors, each floor “leading 
the visitor step-by-step to the liberation of Zeeland.”493 The main floor briefly outlines 
the German occupation forces, but presents the period through the materiel left behind. In 
this sense, the experience of occupation is told through a variety of artifacts found and 
donated by residents from nearby villages and communes. In addition to items such as a 
Hitler Youth dagger, various helmets, and other Nazi miscellanea, the exhibit presents 
information about resistance to the Nazi regime and briefly discusses the Jewish 
experience in the Netherlands during occupation. Later, on the opposite side of the 
exhibit, the narrative focuses on the Atlantikwall and the German attempts to defend 
Zeeland’s air space against Allied heavy bombers. The main floor, therefore, provides 
some sort of context for the final stages of Zeeland’s experience during the Second World 
War—the Allied assault and the Battle for the Schelde. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 Visitor information, Bevrijdingsmuseum, http://bmzeeland.nl/index.php/en, accessed 21 June 2013.	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 The final stage in the museum’s narrative almost exclusively deals with the 
Anglo-Canadian forces of First Canadian Army, as well as the Polish units under the 
command of the Canadians. This section invests a sizable portion into the Canadian 
attempts to gain the Zuid-Beveland Canal, but especially the Sloedam, which was 
extremely costly for Canadian troops. Here the exhibit also devotes space to the 52nd 
Lowland Division. This part of the exhibit includes an interactive, touchscreen map that 
explains the operational details of the Battle and pinpoints where both belligerents 
engaged one another in fighting. Following this section, visitors briefly encounter 
placards about liberation in Zeeland. Unlike the Polderhuis, however, very little space is 
dedicated to inundation and damages. One placard reads “Inundation—living and 
fighting on flooded land.” The placard continues,  
“Inundation is an important characteristic of the battles fought in the western part 
of the Netherlands. Long before World War II it was a well-known defence tactic 
in the Netherlands…In 1944, the Germans order large-scale inundations of 
Schouwen-Duiveland and in West Zeeland Flanders, as part of their Atlantikwall. 
A brand new form of inundation, which was certainly not unquestioned, is the 
inundation by the Allies of Walcheren Island, which took place in October 1944. 
This inundation causes a host of problems for the Germans at Walcheren Island. 
Many of their inland bunkers are flooded and the communication lines go down. 
Yet the Allies themselves are also hindered by the inundations. Important German 
coastal batteries that control the West Scheldt are now difficult to reach, so that 
risky landing operations are called for. It takes until 1946 for the holes in the 
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dykes to be repaired and for Walcheren Island to become fit for habitation 
again.”494 
This effectively marks the end of the narrative involving the Allied assault and the Battle 
for the Schelde. Reconstruction and recovery do not occupy an important position in the 
story the Liberation Museum tells. While this narrative considers the operational efficacy 
of inundation, it does not give any indication of the lengthy recovery process and the 
civilian experience in the post-war world. 
 The final section of the Liberation Museum focuses on Zeeland’s contribution to 
the reclaim the Dutch East-Indies. As we have already seen, Zeeuwen had played a 
considerable role as part of the Dutch attempt to bring law and order to the Dutch East-
Indies from 1946 to 1948. That the last exhibit in a museum dedicated to the liberation of 
Zeeland explores Zeeland’s contribution in the process of reestablishing colonial power is 
most perplexing, but it does indicate the place of the Dutch East-Indies in the collective 
memory of some Zeeuwen. Roughly 20,000 men from the province volunteered to serve 
in the east and it represents one way that this rural Dutch province contributed to the 
international events of the post-war era. In a period during which Zeeland was 
economically destitute, flooded and destroyed, highlighting something less dismal in the 
history of the province is important. By placing emphasis on something believed to be 
positive, Zeeland’s experiences in the Dutch East-Indies are explored against the 
backdrop of liberation by displacing and even juxtaposing the conditions facing civilians 
in the province. 
 The two museums demonstrate not only the complexity of history and memory, 
but also that two different narratives in extremis exist concomitantly. The ways in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 Photograph of placard taken by author on 12 June 2012. 
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these two museums choose to tell their history are so vastly different from one part of the 
same province to another, let alone from province to province. At the crux of the 
communalization of memory is a choice to emphasize parts of history at the expense of 
others. It highlights that the process of war, destruction, and recovery was never a unified 
process and developed unevenly from one region of the province to the next. It also 
illustrates how individual choice in narrative selection shapes the construction of 
memory. More importantly, the liberator as an actor is presented differently at the 
Polderhuis and Liberation Museum. While in Nieuwdorp the Allies appear as heroes 
fighting valiantly to open the port of Antwerp, the Polderhuis gives less attention to the 
liberator. When the museum at Westkapelle presents the Allies, it is not necessarily in a 
favorable light.   
 The museums explored above are constructions of memory as envisaged long 
after hostilities came to an end. They must be understood as histories as conceived by 
subsequent generations. It is important to note, however, that almost immediately 
following the Battle for the Schelde, the British Allies hoped to construct a number of 
monuments to honor the sacrifices of their soldiers, only a handful of which materialized. 
In August 1945, for example, one officer from the 52nd Lowland Division submitted a 
request to the Dutch authorities, asking PMC Slot to “examine the local supplies of stone 
and select that most suitable for construction of a memorial in the form of a SCOTTISH 
cairn, not more than 3’6” in height and 6’ diam at base.”495 In addition to Allied demands 
to create a series of monuments in the region, the Dutch also requested assistance to 
preserve some of their own landmarks and historic sites. In at least one case, civilians 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland 4300 IX H, “Advice on construction of Memorial Cairn,” 7 
August 1945, 1. 
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tried to take debris from fallen buildings to repair homes and other property. As a result, 
CA officers posted notices that warned civilians “This Building is an HISTORIC 
MONUMENT: All military personnel will co-operate in protecting it against defacement. 
No material or article of any sort will be removed from the premises except by a 
responsible Allied or Dutch Authority for safekeeping.”496 The protection of historical 
sites, such as churches and cathedrals, was a chief concern for many authorities in the 
province. In another instance, civilians in Middelburg became aware of a stockpile of 
ammunition and explosives in an old home called the Gouden Poorte, at which point they 
informed the authorities. MG and CA officials recognized the danger and had the 
materials removed before they were accidentally detonated.497 
 
Conclusion 
The two, and often diverging, narratives presented at Westkapelle and Nieuwdorp 
are apt to begin a study of the construction of memory and the narration of history. 
Neither wholly satisfies the complexity and enormity of the recovery process in the 
province. Both, however, underscore the uneven ways reconstruction affected the way 
people remember the events from 1944 to the 1960s. The two museums also show how 
towns and villages in the province have tried to tell a simple and straightforward story at 
the expense of the multifaceted and difficult nature of reconstruction. In some ways, both 
museums explore a part of their past to comfort the villages or communes of which they 
are a part. At Westkapelle, the onus of reconstruction is placed on the civilians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland 4300 IX H, “Notice. This Building is an HISTORIC 
MONUMENT,” n.d. 
497 ZA, 280 Militair Gezag voor Zeeland 4300 IX H, “Letter from PMC Zeeland to F. Fr. Wuthrich,” 25 
January 1945, 1.  
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themselves, demonstrating among the Zeeuwen a degree of stoicism and perseverance in 
light of incalculable resource, materiel, and manpower challenges. The narrative at the 
Polderhuis is therefore one of pride, self-reliance, and a commitment to local recovery, 
which might account for the general absence of CA assistance. At Nieuwdorp, on the 
other hand, a narrative of recovery occupies very little space. Instead, the museum 
focuses the Battle for the Schelde and largely exists to showcase the material culture left 
after the war. The marked shift in emphasis can be explained by the lack of damage 
inflicted upon the village during fighting in 1944. As a result, reconstruction is of minor 
concern, and the museum employs the word “liberation” in a way typically associated 
with the euphoria of civilians upon the capitulation of the Germans and not unlike the 
way readers in the English-language conceptualize the term. The English rendering of the 
word “liberation” comes closer to “emancipation,” denoting a relinquishment of legal, 
social, and political restraints. On the other hand, the Polderhuis uses the word sparingly 
and does not correlate liberation with a euphoric period or great relations between the 
Allies and the Dutch, but rather a period of intense chaos, environmental damage, and 
civilian casualties.  
An additional issue surrounding museums is the commercialization of memory. 
Some museums exist not only to tell one part of a region or town’s history, but also to 
attract visitors and increase profits. At Westkapelle, the museum might be less attentive 
to German occupation since the town brings in a great number of German tourists, many 
of whom vacation on Walcheren. On the other hand, most of the artifacts donated to the 
Liberation Museum in Nieuwdorp have dictated what message the museum offers. The 
museum in that town, therefore, might be designed to tell a particular story because the 
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creators had precious few options in its exhibitition development. Either way, a museum 
that stresses the great sacrifices made by Canadian, British, and Polish troops, as well as 
Dutch civilians, appeals to a much different demographic. 
The “wartime love affair” or “Sweetest Spring” narratives, described by Moogk 
and celebrated between governments, are not necessarily wrong since they do apply to 
other parts of the Netherlands. They are not, however, representative of Zeeland’s 
experiences in the autumn of 1944. That war continued unabated for over half a year after 
Walcheren and many other parts of the province were badly damaged ensured that 
recovery would be extremely slow. In many places, a “wartime love affair” could not 
exist because of the circumstances of destruction and reconstruction—evacuation 
procedures, for example—did not foment love. In other parts of the Netherlands, 
liberated in spring 1945, the end of hostilities ushered in a wave of optimism and 
enthusiasm, typically in places that the Allied did not completely raze. In towns like 
Breskens, Schoondijk, Westkapelle, or Vlissingen, enthusiasm for the Allies at the time is 
questionable. Whether or not subsequent generations of politicians, museums, and 
civilians have chosen to reconstruct a history in which all Zeeuwen enjoyed the presence 
of Allied troops is an issue related to generational shifts. This is part of the historical 
rehabilitation process and an essential part of cultural recovery. 
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CONCLUSION 
The twentieth century brought fundamental changes to the people of Zeeland. 
From the Napoleonic era onward, the Kingdom of the Netherlands clung to its neutrality 
as a way to ensure its survival in an era of nationalism and continental expansion. The 
country came close to war in 1914, when the vital waterways around the province 
attracted the attention of both Imperial Germany and the United Kingdom. The civilians 
around the Schelde heard the sounds of the Great War, experienced some of its resource 
constraints, and the people coped with the influx of Belgian refugees. All of this had a 
profound impact on how the people of Zeeland understood their position in a rapidly 
changing world. Above all, the First World War reinforced the importance the Dutch 
government placed on neutrality. While the conflict had been the most destructive and 
costly for Zeeland’s neighbours, the Dutch emerged relatively unscathed. That they did 
so convinced some politicians that the Netherlands could navigate even the worst of 
conflicts by reaffirming their neutral status. However, despite the country’s neutrality, the 
central and provincial governments controlled the economy from the Great War to the 
interwar period. During the 1940s, civilians once again came under the control and 
influence of a strong bureaucratic administration, albeit an external one.  
The first signs of industrialization in the interwar years also changed the province. 
The islands of Zeeland remained isolated, but transport by rail began to transform the 
economy in the 1920s. During this era, the people of Zeeland began to negotiate with the 
outside world. Newspapers carried stories about the economy outside of Europe and, as 
industrialization continued in the province, their position in Europe became less isolated. 
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With the industrialization of the province came increasing connections with a broader 
economy. This meant that they were not exempt from the boom and bust of the 1930s. 
The economic challenges of the 1930s made farmers and businessmen question 
the abilities of the provincial and national governments to improve their conditions. In 
this way, the people of the Netherlands began negotiating with new ideologies. In the 
search for better socio-economic conditions in the dominantly agrarian economies of 
Europe, some turned to burgeoning political ideologies like communism and National 
Socialism, whose promise of change and prosperity attracted some Zeeuwen. By the mid 
1930s, newspapers in the province highlighted political developments in Germany and 
the expansionist rhetoric of Hitler’s Nazi regime. The politicians and military 
commanders in Den Haag, however, believed that in the event of another war Hitler 
would respect Dutch neutrality as the Kaiser did in 1914.  
Dutch historian Hermann von der Dunk reminds us that all of these changes 
wrought by the Great War, industrialization, and negotiating with the outside world are 
necessary to understand the shock of May 1940, occupation, and war.498 When Nazi 
Germany invaded the Netherlands in May 1940, politicians and the military were 
flatfooted, for they lacked the imagination to entertain the possibility of a war on Dutch 
soil. They lacked the imagination necessary to understand that Nazi Germany would not 
respect Dutch neutrality. Perhaps more importantly, though, the Great War and 
government measures imposed to assuage the financial crises of the 1930s offered the 
only points of reference to frame the experiences of the 1940s. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 Hermann von der Dunk, “The Netherlands and the Memory of the Second World War,” European 
Review 4, 3 (1996), 222. 
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 Zeeland’s geographic position and topography shaped the course of war in 1940. 
Fighting continued on Zeeland’s soil two days after General Winkelman’s formal 
capitulation, while the various islands hindered the German advance. These same islands 
offered auspicious positions for the German occupiers. The land dictated the ways in 
which the Germans occupied Zeeland and where they would build defensive positions. It 
also influenced how civilians would endure, negotiate, and participate in the war. While 
in other parts of the country, the Nazi regime conscripted Dutch civilians for work far 
removed from their provinces, the people of Zeeland often worked where they lived, 
exemplified by the construction of the Atlantikwall in the Schelde. For these reasons, the 
initial occupation was benign. The benign occupation gradually became more restrictive 
according to the broader contours of the war, which reached an apogee in autumn 1944. 
In addition to topography and geographic position, Zeeland’s demographic 
features influenced occupation experiences. The predominantly Reformed communities 
of the province understood occupation and war in covenantal terms; negotiating with the 
outside world, industrialization, and modern amenities helped lead to a divine 
punishment. Resistance in the province also hinged on the environment. On the sparsely 
populated islands, resistance to the regime was extremely challenging. Small pockets of 
resistance formed throughout occupation, but their abilities were limited and began as the 
Allies pushed out of Normandy in the summer of 1944. In a dominantly agrarian 
economy, few individuals possessed the skills to build and operate clandestine radios to 
contact Allied armies and intelligence networks in the United Kingdom. For this reason, 
the actions of the OD and of people like Piet de Kam were extraordinary. However, the 
lack of resistance must be understood in context. German sanctioned work projects 
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provided many civilians in the province with wages to support families and, by 1941, it 
appeared as though Germany had won the war. In this way, the pragmatic approach to 
occupation the Zeeuwen adopted is not surprising and represents another way the people 
negotiated occupation. 
As the occupation progressed so too did the demands of the Nazi regime in the 
Netherlands. Many families on Walcheren were uprooted because of coastal defense 
construction and other factors. Nonetheless, the people of this province endured 
occupation with a great deal of stoicism. This period of occupation can best be described 
as an accommodation based, in part, on the region’s experience of neutrality during the 
Great War and the economic crises of the 1930s. 
The province of Zeeland once again became a focal point among Allied 
commanders, following the rapid Allied advance through France in the summer of 1944. 
By September 1944, Allied armies had successfully captured the port of Antwerp. While 
some of the French ports on which the Allies had previously relied were damaged 
because of either fighting or weather, the port of Antwerp was in prime condition. 
Convinced that a narrow-front strategy and the penetration of the Reich near Arnhem 
could end the war quickly, Montgomery launched Operation “Market Garden” on 17 
September 1944. At the same time, the Allies assigned an increasingly long list of tasks 
to First Canadian Army, while resources and personnel were diverted from the 
Canadians. The exigency of resupplying First Canadian Army and other elements of 21 
Army Group fomented a debate between Eisenhower and Montgomery at the strategic 
level. Eventually, Eisenhower convinced Montgomery that clearing the approaches to 
Antwerp was absolutely integral to the future of European operations. SHAEF declared 
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in early October 1944 that operations to clear the Schelde and open Antwerp would 
receive full attention. After witnessing the German army hastily crossing the Schelde 
over the course of two weeks in September, the people of Zeeland believed the war was 
coming to an end, and perhaps it would come just as easily as it did elsewhere in 
Belgium. 
The strategic necessity of Antwerp is necessary to understand the extent to which 
the Allies went to clear the approaches. The exigencies of resupply in northwest Europe 
trumped the consideration of civilian casualties and damages. Here we need to suspend 
our knowledge of what transpired following November 1944. To Eisenhower and other 
leaders, there was a very real possibility of operations coming to a complete halt if they 
could not open Antwerp’s port. The push into the Netherlands would not have been 
possible after November 1944 had it not been for the operations in Zeeland. 
As this study has highlighted, the military exigencies in October and November 
1944 had immense and unprecedented consequences for civilians in Zeeland—even once 
hostilities in the province had ended. Aside from comparatively small battles between 
Dutch and German forces in May 1940, this region had not witnessed war since the early 
1800s. Invasion and occupation had sent the Zeeuwen into considerable shock. Whether 
people accepted occupation as a divine punishment or accepted it for more pragmatic 
reasons, this period had a considerable effect on Zeeland’s people. Even more long-
lasting, however, was the Allied bombardment and flooding.  
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To be sure, flooding was not a new phenomenon for people living in the region, 
as many Dutch historians have pointed out.499 But the Allied attempts to sink the island of 
Walcheren, and to a lesser extent the German use of flooding, embodied something new. 
It represented the first time modern warfare and air power coopted to mobilize water as a 
weapon. It also marked the first time when modern technology brought war to the region. 
Flooding had been used in the Low Countries as a form of defense as early as the 
sixteenth century, but no one had ever used aerial bombardment to destroy and flood 
swathes of Dutch territory. During the Great War, some newspapers displayed a great 
deal of consternation about the use of aircraft over their territory. From a civilian 
perspective, some might have never seen aircraft before the 1940s. Still others barely left 
their communes in the 1920s and 1930s. This was yet another instance in which Zeeland 
negotiated with the outside world. In this way, the flooding of Walcheren and the 
damages as a result of war represented something entirely new, something that had an 
indelible physical and psychological impact upon this region. 
The environmental impact of occupation, war, and reconstruction is a recurring 
theme in this study. Topography governed the development of occupation and the way in 
which the Allies attacked German armed forces. In 1947, one Canadian official explained 
how the environment had shaped Zeeland’s culture:  
“In the struggle against the sea and the great rivers, the Netherlands have waged 
an offensive as well as a defensive war, for a large part of the country has been 
reclaimed from the sea and any relaxation of effort means flooding and disaster. 
This dual struggle has left its mark on the character of the people who possess a 	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historisch onderzoek naar de receptie van Keert u tot Hem die slat (1825),” Tijdschrift voor 
Waterstaatsgeschiedenis (1992), 58-68. 
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love of freedom and a strong aversion to any form of regimentation or direction. 
Stolidness, determination, stubbornness, serenity, and a certain stiffness are 
characteristic qualities. To Netherlanders, life is a serious and earnest affair; 
humour is not lacking but there is considerably less frivolity than in the average 
English-speaking character. The average Netherlander is neither rash nor 
impetuous; he is provident-quite often to the point of parsimony, and has a high 
regard for cleanliness, neatness and orderliness-without unreasoning submission 
to authority.”500 
While no doubt patronizing the general population, this statement highlights how the 
rhythm of coastal life and the province’s topography have made an impact upon the 
culture of the Zeeuwen. 
This study has also highlighted the chaotic nature of reconstruction and recovery 
efforts. In the immediate aftermath of battle, and as Hitler’s forces readjusted their lines 
along the Maas, the Allies were unable to dispose many resources. Nonetheless, without 
Allied Civil Affairs and the large machinery supplied by the Allies the most pressing 
problem—closing the dykes on Walcheren—would not have been accomplished as 
easily. CA and MG officials worked in concert to assess damages as best as possible in 
late 1944 and early 1945. Canadian reports on CA involvement highlight how different 
the situation in the Netherlands was compared to that in either France or Belgium. In the 
1960s, Donnison, perhaps the only historian to compare CA missions in Western Europe, 
argued that the Dutch government required what was ultimately a Dutch CA organization 
because of the degree to which Nazi sympathizers remained in politics. Additionally, the 	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Dutch government established the MGs because they had no historical reference point 
and no experience in how best to recover almost every sector of the country. With two 
mirroring institutions, CA and MG officials often possessed the same portfolios. While 
resources were still difficult to obtain from SHAEF, the Allies were fundamental to initial 
reconstruction projects, including evacuating much of Walcheren and Tholen, and 
transporting civilians to Zuid-Beveland. While the Allies were responsible for extensive 
damages to the region, they also provided fundamental manpower and materiel after the 
campaign to open up Antwerp had ended. 
Like any occupation, civilians resisted some of the measures CA and MG 
authorities implemented. Villagers evacuated from Walcheren often refused to leave their 
homes and many complained about lost baggage and other administrative problems. 
When Allied troops shot sixteen year-old Cornelis van der Hoeven or stole a boat from a 
man in Vlissingen, civilians voiced their discontent to burgemeesters and other 
authorities. These types of complaints highlight the growing discontent civilians 
experienced as a result of the Allied presence in the province. These illustrate the 
propensity for tension inherent in civil-military relations. 
For the duration of the war and throughout 1946-1947, recovery projects 
continued. As Chapter VI demonstrates, the most vital sectors of Zeeland’s rural 
economy—agriculture and fisheries— began to receive attention. In order to accomplish 
this, however, infrastructure like railways and bridges needed to be restored. During this 
period, civilians also became increasingly irritated by the lack of assistance from the 
Dutch central government, despite promises to compensate civilians for the loss of 
property and income. Instead, the government sought to reclaim its colonies, but invested 
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most heavily in the Dutch East-Indies. This was central to the rehabilitation of Dutch 
political culture. 
Recovery typically implies physical and tangible reconstruction, but it can also 
include the writing of one’s history or the construction of memory. This is a form of 
reconstruction that takes place long after the cessation of hostilities, but one that is an 
inherent part of Henry Rousso’s concept “exiting war.” Although amorphous, memories 
serve to simplify and to communicate difficult experiences of the past. Because of how 
disparate each part of the province was, and how civilians experienced occupation and 
war in dramatically different ways, memory of this period remains communalized. The 
way in which different villages and towns narrate this period differs as one moves from 
one part of the province to the next. Chapter VII demonstrates this communalization of 
memory by focusing on two museums, but the idea might also apply elsewhere. The 
Bevrijdingsmuseum in Nieuwdorp, a village that emerged from the war with little 
damage, depicts the Allies in a celebratory way. In Westkapelle, however, the overriding 
message is one of human tragedy, despair, and the stoicism of the villagers to persevere. 
Neither the Allies nor the German occupiers figure prominently in the narrative. 
The communalization thesis offers stark contrast to the way the majority of 
Canadians remember the liberation of the Netherlands. The Canadian narrative begins in 
April-May 1945, long after operations in Zeeland, and emphasizes the euphoria of a 
destitute, starving, and largely urban population. That the Canadian government granted 
the Ottawa hospital in which Princess Margriet was born as extraterritorial to retain 
Dutch citizenship is well known to Canadians. While this is not necessary wrong, it is by 
no means representative of the Netherlands as a whole. But, how many Canadians are 
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aware of the level of destruction inflicted upon this region in autumn 1944? The former 
narrative serves to gloss over the painful and destructive process of “liberation” in 
Zeeland. An analysis of the communalization of memory in Zeeland demonstrates that 
the word “liberation” requires deconstruction. It highlights the profound effects the 
Second World War has had on this part of the country. In this way, rather than speaking 
about liberation, historians need to consider liberations—as a way to appreciate the 
complexity and variegated experience inherent in the process. 
By examining this region’s history from the early to mid-twentieth century, this 
study has shown how the people of Zeeland have navigated a period of enormous 
political, economic, and cultural transition. It has also identified considerable continuity 
in economic and political experiences between the First and Second World Wars. The 
Zeeuwen began negotiating with the outside world through the Great War and increased 
industrialization in the 1920s and 1930s. By the 1940s, the people of this region were 
presented with an unprecedented set of choices. Yet, it was liberation, not occupation, 
that proved most destructive and which proved the greatest departure from any other part 
of the early twentieth century. The destruction of Allied liberation in 1944 represented 
the breaking point in Zeeland’s history. From Nazi occupation to war, destruction, and 
reconstruction, the people of Zeeland accommodated each phase of their wartime 
experience by remaining steadfast in their stoic commitment to recovery and 
regeneration. In each of these phases, the people had embodied Zeeland’s provincial 
motto: Luctor et Emergo, I struggle and I emerge.  
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APPENDIX I 
 Populations of Selected Towns, 1899-1930 
	  
 
 
  
	  
  
Population of Towns 
(1899) 
Breskens 1957 
Goes 6923 
Middelburg 18,837 
Terneuzen 8174 
Vlissingen 18,893 
Population of Towns 
(1909) 
Breskens 2198 
Goes 7620 
Middelburg 19,564 
Terneuzen 9329 
Vlissingen 21,363 
Population of Towns 
(1920) 
Breskens 2451 
Goes 7848 
Middelburg 18,605 
Terneuzen 9770 
Vlissingen 23,025 
Population of Towns 
(1930) 
Breskens 3003 
Goes 9124 
Middelburg 18,395 
Terneuzen 10,458 
Vlissingen 21,716 
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APPENDIX II 
Net Profit or Loss of Agricultural Firms in Zeeland According to Hectarage, 1928-
1934502 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 Adapted from de Bree, Zeeland, 1940-1945, 17. He employed statistics produced by the accounting 
office of the Zeeuwsche Landbouwmaatschappij (ZLM, Zeeland Agricultural Society). 
10-20 Hectares (HA) 21-50 HA. 51-100 HA. 
1928 + 71 florins per HA + 81 florins per HA + 84 florins per HA 
1929 + 56 fl. + 12 fl. +27 fl. 
1930 + 41 fl. - 28 fl. - 3 fl. 
1931 - 43 fl. - 51 fl. - 30 fl. 
1932 - 34 fl. - 22 fl. - 20 fl. 
1933 + 34 fl. + 40 fl. + 44 fl. 
1934 + 40 fl. + 49 fl. + 81 fl. 
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APPENDIX III 
Defense Sectors (Verdedigingssectoren)503 
 
*Küstenverteidigungsabschnitt (K.V.A) 
 
K.V.A. A1—Walcheren and both Bevelands, as well as the area around Hujbergen 
(Noord-Brabant) 
 
August 1942-October 1942 39. Infanterie-Division 
October 1942-June 1943 65. Infanterie-Divison 
June 1943-January 1944 19. Luftwaffen-Feld-Division 
January 1944-July 1944 165. Reserve-Division 
July 1944-November 1944 70. Infanterie-Division (bo) 
 
K.V.A. A2—from Terneuzen to the south of Blankenberge 
 
June 1942-September 1944 712. Infanterie-Division 
September 1944-November 1944 64. Infanterie-Division 
 
K.V.A. A3—south of Blankenberge to the French-Belgian border 
 
August 1941-November 1942 306. Infanterie-Division 
November 1942-February 1943 39. Infanterie-Division 
February 1943-January 1944  171. Reserve-Division 
January 1944-August 1944  48. Infanterie-Division 
 
N.B. the line from K.V.A. A2 to A3 pushes inland 20 kilometer. 
 
 
Along the Hauptlinie (H.K.L.), by September 1943 was as follows: 
 
Manpower 
 
KVA A1 16,917 (total) 57(distance/coast)  7,950 (total) 139(per km) 
KVA A2 11,902 (total) 45(km)   6,695 (total) 149(per km) 
KVA A3 26,171 (total) 47(km)   14,800 (total) 315(per km) 
 
Total: 54,990   149(km)   29,445(total) 198(per km) 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 Hans Sakkers and Hans Houterman, Atlantikwall in Zeeland en Vlaanderen, 8-9. 
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APPENDIX IV 
List of Civilian Casualties in Selected Towns of Zuid-Beveland504 
 
Town Dead Severely 
Wounded 
Lightly 
Wounded 
Total 
Rilland 15 4 20 39 
Waarde 6 2 2 10 
Krabbendijke 10 7 12 29 
Kruiningen 2 - - 2 
Yerseke 4 1 2 7 
Hansweert ?    
Wemeldinge 7 5 70 82 
Kapelle-
Biezelinge 
16 - - 16 
Schere 1 - - 1 
Kloetinge 3   3 
Kattendijke ?    
Wilhelminadorp 1 - 1 2 
Goes 11 6 8 25 
‘s Heer-
Hendrikskinderen 
1 2 - 3 
‘s Heer-
Arendskerke 
3 - - 3 
Lewedorp 3 1 3 7 
Nieuwdorp 2 3 2 7 
Wolphaartsdijk ?    
‘s Heerenhoek ?    
Borselle 10 3 2 15 
Heinkenszand 8 7 4 19 
Driewegen 11 3 3 17 
Ellewoutsdijk 2 2 1 5 
Ovezande 2 1 5 8 
Oudelande 11 2 2 15 
Hoedekenskerke 26 2 - 28 
‘s Gravenpolder ?    
Kwadendamme ?    
Nisse 3 3 3 9 
‘s Heer-
Abtskerke 
?    
Baarland 3 2 2 7 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 NIMH, De Kam, 510, inv. 13. “Rapport betreffende de werkzaamheden der O.D. in het District Zuid-
Beveland gedurende het tijdvak 29 October t/m 11 November 1944,” Bijlage D—Slachtoffers. 
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APPENDIX V 
Aerial Photographs, October-November 1944 
 
  Figure 1.1 Westkapelle (Walcheren), 28 October 1944 
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 Figure 1.2 Breskens (Zeeuws-Vlaanderen), 12 October 1944 
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1.3 An inundated village likely near Veere (Walcheren), 3 November 1944 
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1.4 German “Controlled” flooding outside Oostburg (Zeeuws-Vlaanderen), 
12 October 1944. 
 234 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 “Controlled” Flooding in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, 11 September 1944 
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APPENDIX VI 
Map of Zeeland Indicating Some Flooding 
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APPENDIX VII 
Map of Walcheren, October 1944 
 	  
 
